Bank lending behaviour a comparative study of British and German banks by Anthony R. Stevenson (7196666)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough University as a PhD thesis by the 
author and is made available in the Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) under the following Creative Commons Licence 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
 2 
 
 
  
 
BANK LENDING BEHAVIOUR 
 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
 
OF BRITISH AND GERMAN BANKS 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
 
SUBMITTED BY 
 
 
ANTHONY ROBERT STEVENSON 
 
 
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE 
 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
FOR THE AWARD OF 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
OF LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
© Anthony Robert Stevenson  
 3 
 
Contents: 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS: ................................................................................................ 10 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 13 
Section 1- Motivation for the research ................................................................................... 13 
Section 2 - Research aims and objectives: ............................................................................. 14 
Section 3 - Structure of the thesis: .......................................................................................... 16 
CHAPTER 2 – BANK LENDING: A REVIEW OF BANKING LITERATURE ................. 17 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 17 
Main differences between market-based and banks based systems ................................... 20 
A comparison of industrial growth under the two financial structures .............................. 25 
Section – 2 A review of literature bank lending and SMEs ................................................... 27 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 27 
Why banks are said to have a comparative advantage ....................................................... 27 
Do banks have comparative advantage? ............................................................................. 30 
Differences in UK and German Banks and their approach to lending ................................... 39 
Differences in approaches between UK and German banks in the handling of Information 
Asymmetry in relation to SMEs ............................................................................................... 43 
Differences in the Management of risk between German and UK banks .............................. 44 
The banking environment in the UK and Germany ............................................................... 44 
Section 3 - The regulatory environment in Germany and the UK ......................................... 49 
The principle Agent problem .............................................................................................. 51 
 4 
 
A short history of bank regulations in Germany and the UK ................................................. 53 
The development of the Financial Services Authority ....................................................... 56 
Section 4 - Bank culture – Hierarchy, and Market-led ........................................................... 57 
Section - 5 How Banks influence loan officers to effect changes .......................................... 59 
Funding gaps for young SMEs in the UK and Germany .................................................... 65 
Section Six - Types of Approaches used for lending to SMEs & Attitudinal Differences 
between German and UK banks ............................................................................................... 71 
Transactional Approaches to Lending .................................................................................... 72 
Relationship Approaches to Lending ................................................................................. 76 
Section Seven Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 79 
CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH MODEL .......................... 85 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 85 
Section 1 What are the research objectives and is there a need for another study of retail 
banks? ....................................................................................................................................... 85 
Justification for the research study ......................................................................................... 86 
Section 2 – What are the research questions? ........................................................................ 88 
Research question one: Does the environment change institutional behaviour of banks? ..... 88 
Research question two: Do banks in the UK and Germany manage SMEs risk differently? 89 
Research question three: Does the institutional type or cultures of banks affect lending? .... 89 
Delimitations of the study ...................................................................................................... 89 
Section 3 – Research approach and methodology .................................................................. 91 
 
 5 
 
CHAPTER 4 – THE RESEARCH DESIGN .......................................................................... 93 
Section 1 – The research design ............................................................................................. 94 
Section 2- Methodological approach ...................................................................................... 99 
Section 3 – Data collection ................................................................................................... 101 
Participants ........................................................................................................................... 104 
Institution Position ................................................................................................................ 104 
Case Study ............................................................................................................................ 104 
Data analysis techniques ....................................................................................................... 111 
SECTION - 4 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................ 118 
CHAPTER 5 – ANALYSIS .................................................................................................. 121 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 121 
Section One – Part (a) An analysis of the initial lending process. ....................................... 122 
Table 5.4 Response from D4 German bank (Initial requirements for credit) ...................... 125 
Section two – Part (b) an analysis the internal environment ................................................ 129 
Section three – Part (c) an analysis of the external environment ......................................... 135 
The External Environment ................................................................................................... 148 
CHAPTER 6 – FINDINGS ................................................................................................... 150 
Section one – lending approaches ........................................................................................ 150 
Section two – the culture of banks ....................................................................................... 153 
Section three – The external environment ............................................................................ 158 
CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................... 160 
 6 
 
Section 1 – Key findings and implications ........................................................................... 160 
Limitations to the research findings ..................................................................................... 164 
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................... 167 
APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE ...................................................................................... 179 
Participant Information Sheet ............................................................................................... 185 
APPENDIX 2 QUESTIONNAIRE ENGLISH VERSION .................................................. 187 
Section A Categorisation issues ................................................................................... 187 
Section B Informational issues .................................................................................... 188 
Section C Institutional / Policy issues ......................................................................... 190 
Section D Personal issues ............................................................................................ 191 
APPENDIX 3 GERMAN INFORMATION SHEET ........................................................... 192 
APPENDIX 4 GERMAN QUESTIONNAIRE .................................................................... 194 
APPENDIX 4 QUESTIONNAIRE   GERMAN BANKS .................................................... 203 
Section B Informational issues .................................................................................... 213 
Section C Institutional / Policy issues ......................................................................... 216 
Section D Personal issues ............................................................................................ 217 
Section B Informational issues .................................................................................... 218 
Section C Institutional / Policy issues ......................................................................... 221 
Section D Personal issues ............................................................................................ 222 
Section B Informational issues .................................................................................... 223 
Section C Institutional / Policy issues ......................................................................... 226 
 7 
 
Section D Personal issues ............................................................................................ 227 
Section B Informational issues .................................................................................... 229 
Section C Institutional / Policy issues ......................................................................... 231 
Section D Personal issues ............................................................................................ 232 
Appendix 3: Transcript Data Using N-Vivo ........................................................................ 233 
APPENDIX : BACKGROUND RESEARCH ON BANK STRATEGIES .......................... 244 
 
 
  
 8 
 
List of Tables:   
Table 2 2 Bank returns on Equity ............................................................................................... 47 
Table 2 3 Basle II ....................................................................................................................... 49 
Table 2 4 A history of German Banking Regulations ................................................................ 55 
Table 2 5 Cambridge Survey ...................................................................................................... 69 
Table 2 6 Approaches to Bank Lending ..................................................................................... 75 
 
Table 4 1 Profile of Participants ............................................................................................... 102 
Table 4 2 Participants of Banks ................................................................................................ 104 
Table 4 3 Banks and Locations ................................................................................................ 105 
Table 4 4 Interview dates and locations ................................................................................... 108 
Table 4 5 - response matrix to categories. ................................................................................ 114 
Table 4 6 coding data into categories ....................................................................................... 115 
 
Table 5.1 1 Key responses to initial requirements ................................................................... 122 
Table 5.1 2 Response from H1 bank (Initial requirements for credit) ..................................... 123 
Table 5.1 3 Response from D2 bank (Initial requirements for credit) ..................................... 124 
Table 5.1 4 Response from C3 German bank (Initial requirements for credit) ........................ 125 
Table 5.1 5 Response from D4 German bank (Initial requirements for credit) ....................... 125 
Table 5.1 6 Response from N5 UK bank (Initial requirements for credit) ............................... 126 
Table 5.1 7 Response from V6 German bank (Initial requirements for credit) ....................... 127 
Table 5.1 8 L7 UK bank (Initial requirements for credit) ........................................................ 127 
Table 5.1 9  B8 UK (Initial requirements for credit) ................................................................ 128 
 9 
 
Table 5.1 10 R9 German Bank (Initial requirements for credit) .............................................. 128 
Table 5.1 11 repeated words from transcripts .......................................................................... 129 
Table 5.1 12 cluster formation leading to categories ............................................................... 130 
Table 5.1 13 H1 Internal environment ..................................................................................... 130 
Table 5.1 14 D2 Internal environments .................................................................................... 131 
Table 5.1 15 C3 Internal environment ...................................................................................... 132 
Table 5.1 16 D4 Internal environment ..................................................................................... 132 
Table 5.1 17 N5 Internal environment ..................................................................................... 133 
Table 5.1 18 V6 German Bank Internal environment .............................................................. 133 
Table 5.1 19 B8 Internal environments .................................................................................... 133 
Table 5.1 20 R9 Internal environment ...................................................................................... 134 
Table 5.1 21 Key responses to external environment ............................................................... 135 
Table 5.1 22 illustration of coded words taken from transcript ............................................... 135 
Table 5.1 23 H1 External environment .................................................................................... 136 
Table 5.1 24 D2 external environment ..................................................................................... 137 
Table 5.1 25 C3 external environment ..................................................................................... 137 
Table 5.1 26 D4 external environment ..................................................................................... 138 
Table 5.1 27 N5 External environment .................................................................................... 138 
Table 5.1 27 V6 external environment . ................................................................................... 138 
Table 5.1 28 L7 external environment cont. ............................................................................. 139 
 
  
 10 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS: 
BOE Bank of England 
CD Certificates of Deposit 
BB Barclay's Bank 
LB Lloyds Bank 
DR Dresdner Bank 
RWA Risk Weighted Assets 
IR Interest Rates 
  
 11 
 
Abstract 
Even though it is generally recognised that new firms encounter difficulty in obtaining loans 
from banks, little research is devoted to the factors which influence bank lending between 2004 
and 2007. More precisely, this study attempts to fill a gap in the research of bank lending 
practices and behaviour of bank loan officers. 
This research study contributes to the body of literature in the field of lending between banks 
and SMEs. More specifically, the study compares the lending practices between British and 
German retail banks.  
A qualitative approach was employed as a research design because the study related to lending 
practice and risk within the context of a social setting. 
It is worth mentioning that whilst the empirical findings in this study predated the credit 
crunch, the areas discussed was about how banks managed risk and the ambiguous nature of 
external pressures affecting their lending practices both in the UK and Germany.   
There is no doubt that after the biggest banking crisis in history, academic researchers and 
regulatory institutions will inevitably ask questions about how banks behaved during this period.  
The upshot of recent academic research is compelling and suggests that the regulatory 
institutions and politicians knew little about the activities of banks – particularly in the UK. 
The findings in this research also reveal that whilst German banks steer towards the Anglo Saxon 
banking model (shareholder approach); they struggle to shake off their embedded culture and 
values, oriented towards the goodness of communities (stakeholder approach).  
The findings also show that UK retail banks continue to lend by distance and SMEs continue to 
believe that banks in Britain orientate their strategies towards large multinational firms. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter explains the motivation for the research and highlights the issues 
that bring together the thesis. Section one introduces the motivation for the research and explains 
how the research objective and questions contribute to the area of banking research. Section two 
discusses the main aim of the study and research objectives along with the design methodology. 
Section two also discusses how the research questions will be answered. Section three outlines 
the structure of the research. 
Section 1- Motivation for the research 
This research was motivated by an interest in the way that banks lend to SMEs following 
banking deregulation and change in the competitive landscape of the UK and Germany.  
SMEs face many challenges during their business cycle; notwithstanding the huge barriers they 
face in seeking external credit to enable the financing of future investment opportunities and 
capitalise on their operations.  
There is a continuing academic and political debate about UK banks and their lending practices 
involving domestic SMEs. The “Cruickshank report” published in 2000 commissioned by the 
UK government to investigate if services provided by banks for SMEs were falling short of 
expectation. In addition, the Secretary of Trade and Industry and the Chancellor, Gordon Brown 
(in office at that time) exercised his power of office by referring the clearing banks to the 
Competition Commission to investigate if cartel practices existed amongst the UK retail banks 
regarding the supply and services to small businesses.  
Much of the recent academic debate and literature suggests that UK banks focus their efforts on 
the banks equity holders - rather than acting as a payment mechanism through which transactions 
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are consummated. Banks are instead turning their efforts to profitable global markets and vying 
to keep pace with the rapid technological changes managing their International customer base.  
Section 2 - Research aims and objectives: 
In recent years UK banks have come under intense scrutiny and had to strenuously defend their 
practices of high street commercial banking. Academics researching in this controversial area 
suggest that in general, UK retail banks have changed their value orientation away from serving 
the needs of SMEs in the local community, but are instead, shifting their efforts towards global 
banking, and the securitization of products in the International capital markets.   
There is no doubt that retail banking in the UK has changed significantly following the 
deregulation of financial institutions during the 1980’s. During this period, building societies 
demutualised and became direct competitors to retail banks (Cruickshank 2000). In the main, 
deregulation in the UK has intensified competition in the financial sectors.  
The German banking sector has also undergone similar experiences following their own 
banking reforms in the 1990’s and faced challenges to increases in competition, productivity, and 
efficiency. The Initial literature suggests that the whole of the banking sector in the UK and 
Germany had undergone considerable changes in the last couple of decades. It is therefore useful 
to examine the literature further to see if these changes had implications for SMEs Cross-
Nationally. 
Therefore, the aim of this research attempts to take a look at the banking sector as a whole, 
including the lending process and interplay between the bank and the SME. The research also 
takes a look at the attitudinal differences of loan officers in the UK and Germany and their 
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lending practices towards SMEs. The study examines banks in two countries namely: Germany 
and the UK.  
 There is an abundance of literature, which discusses the contract, structure of loans, and the 
associated problems of information asymmetry, but little research is devoted to the employees of 
banks regarding their perception and attitudes towards SMEs during the lending process. The 
academic literature suggests that some attitudinal differences to risk between UK and German 
banks manifest through different lending practices when dealing with SMEs.  
 The German financial environment strongly features the “Hausbanks” commonly known for 
extending relationships and supporting SMEs whereas, the opposite is argued about UK banks 
said to operate an arm’s length approach to SME customers.   
Some academics for example, argue that German banks manage uncertainty by absorbing a 
greater proportion of risk mainly because they are in possession of proprietary information for 
example; German banks are more likely to negotiate loan credit terms by fixing interest rates 
during the life of the loan absorbing market risk fluctuation. However, the opposite is argued for 
UK banks which are said to externalise their risk through increased security requirements and by 
passing on market-variance risk. In addition, UK banks shift monitoring costs onto SMEs. 
Therefore, the first question is, ‘do banks in Germany have different lending practices compared 
to their UK counterparts’?  
Other academic literature proposes that the institutional environment takes into account the 
effective State Policy and Regulations and in turn, affects the way institutions operate (Lane and 
Quack 2001, Douglas and Wildavsky; 1982). The second theme in this study looks at the effects 
of change to the institutional environmental and how these factors affect the way institutions and 
employees behave. This section of the review looks at banking institutions across Germany and 
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the UK. It was also relevant to examine the literature that discusses how institutions motivate and 
control employees following environmental changes. This aspect in the literature gives an insight 
into the values, culture and perceptions of bank loan officers in the UK and Germany, said, to 
have face-to-face contact with SMEs.  
The academic literature raises a second question - ‘Is the regulatory and institutional 
environment a factor in influencing lending behaviour’? 
Section 3 - Structure of the thesis: 
The structure of this thesis comprises seven chapters. Chapter one presents a basic outline of 
the study and explains the motivation for the research along with the focus, rationale, 
methodologies adopted, and the approach taken. Chapter two reviews the academic literature 
relevant to bank intermediation and bank lending theory. Chapter three discusses the research 
methods, collection of data, and the analysis of data. 
Chapter four explains the rationale and justification for the approaches adopted. Also explained 
in detail, are the various models that were employed in the study, including the rationale for the 
design methodology. Chapter five presents the analysis from the data collected. Each question is 
examined and analysed in detail and presented in the summarised form.  
Chapter six discusses the findings and conclusions from the academic literature and the results 
of the analysis. Chapter seven concludes. Additionally, conclusions in the chapter give an outline 
to future research and the implications of the study for banks and SMEs.  
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Chapter 2 – Bank lending: A review of banking literature  
Introduction 
Most economists generally accept that banks play an essential role in growing an economy by 
financing strong business investment opportunities by identifying and managing the associated 
risks of business. However, in the last couple of decades, the role of commercial banks in the UK  
raised a number of questions amongst academics about their lending policies and practices to 
SMEs. Some academics argue (Lane and Quack 2001, Binks, Enew & Reed 1988, 1990, 1992, 
Binks and Enew 1996) that UK banks turned away from the notion of traditional lending but 
have instead sought to serve the needs of private equity holders by focusing their efforts towards 
Multi-National Corporations and by diversifying in the global financial markets.   
UK banks during the period of this research were highly profitable and operated effectively in 
the capital markets through global diversification and a tightly controlled domestic market. UK 
retail banks are adding to their asset portfolios by actively engaging in the International markets - 
seeking out high returns on large capital projects, mergers and acquisitions, and other high risk 
ventures. These strategic measures are said to be driven by increases in global competition and 
by changes in regulatory laws and the technological environment (Llewellyn 1999).  
UK banks are characterised as being market-based banks, which, according to some academics, 
explains to some extent the differences in banking approaches to lending compared to their 
European counterparts. The German banking sector is said to be bank-based. Proponents of the 
market-based view argue that market-based structures have a greater tendency to engender 
economic growth more effectively than bank-based systems. Some academics also argue that 
 18 
 
economic growth does not depend on either view. These opposite views are examined in detail 
and compared to gain an insight into the two financial systems.  
Henceforth, the structure of this chapter is as follows:  Section one reviews, the literature 
relevant to the evolution of the industrial market and bank based financial structures in the UK 
and Germany. In theory, (Vitols 2001; Gershcenkron; 1962, Lazonic; and O’Sullivan 1997) as 
countries develop economically and grow during the course of time, industry is said to become 
less reliant on banks for investment capital, but is instead, drawn to the capital markets - gaining 
access to a wider choice of investment funding. In addition, many economists also argue that as 
countries’ industrial sectors develop, firms look towards other avenues of external funding and 
the balance of financial power and profits enjoyed by banks, shifts across to the capital markets. 
The theoretical notion proposed is juxtaposed by as many who argue that banks play a positive 
role in the development of countries than capital markets.  
Section two reviews the literature relevant to the theory of bank intermediation. The review is 
enhanced by adopting economic theory and a number of concepts such as information 
asymmetry, moral hazard and credit rationing. 
Section three reviews the academic literature relevant to the financial regulations in both 
Germany and the UK. The whole section is drawn together to form a coherent framework which 
looks at how banking regulation affects lending practice in both countries’.   
Section four and five reviews the material relevant to the organisations institutional type - the 
organisational culture, said by academics, (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) to change and 
influence normative patterns of behaviour particularly in relation to banking practice. 
Section six looks at the attitudinal differences between German and UK banks in respect to 
their approaches to lending. The review of the relevant literature led to the formation of a 
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conceptual model which acts as a tool to compare and understand the strategy that banks use 
when assessing SME loan credit within their own financial systems. Finally, section seven 
summarises. 
Section 1 - Market-based and Bank-based financial systems.  
In the early part of the century, economists argued that bank-based systems are more effective 
in the management of savings, highlighting good investment opportunities, at the same time 
exercising corporate control and governance during the initial stages of economic development.  
On the other hand, other economists argue that market-based systems are more effective in the 
allocation of capital, providing risk, and management expertise. Proponents of the bank-based 
view point out the inefficiencies of market-based financial structures (Allen and Gale 2001); in 
relation to the speed of information offered in the public domain. Whereas, bank-based financial 
structures monitor the potential opportunity and may not readily reveal information (Boot, 
Greenbaum, and Thakor 1993).   
This section reviews the relevant academic literature to gain an insight into market, and bank-
based financial structures. A look into the early beginnings of banking prove useful by gaining 
an understanding of why UK and German banks exhibit institutional differences of policy and 
lending practice despite sharing common EU regulation and laws. The development of a 
country’s institutional financial system can, in part, explain these differences. 
A useful starting point in this review is to take a look at the historical evidence, which widely 
accepts that the roots of a financial structure stem from the start each country’s industrialisation 
phase. (Gerschenkron; 1962, Lazonic and O’Sullivan 1997) referred to this theory as “Timing of 
Industrialisation” TOI. In the UK the industrialisation phase started early and firms were able to 
finance investments from internal sources or from the issuance of shares in relatively developed 
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markets (Vitols 2001). Vitols also argued that the bank-based structure in Germany was 
significantly overstated in respect to the differences in financial structures. Vitols (2001) also 
argued that the TOI did not take into account the regulatory aspects of each country; and these 
differences in regulatory practices meant that individual country’s financial goals were different. 
In addition, TOI did not consider the laissez-faire approach to a country’s financial structure 
Germany’s TOI on the other hand, started later than the UK Vitols (2001) argued that those 
countries which developed later, were unable to raise internally generated funds, in addition, 
firms were unable to issue securities because of the relatively underdeveloped capital markets. 
This suggested that Germanys’ under-developed capital market left the way for banks to fill the 
gap by providing funds, at the same time managing risk. Vitols (2001) argued that the growth 
spurt in the UK economy was mainly because of the financial markets. (Allen and Gale 2001) 
suggest that since both Germany and the UK have similar long run growth rates, little conclusion 
can be drawn from the merits of both systems, however, the structure and regulation of each 
country’s legal system is considered to be an essential component in the effectiveness of 
economic development.  
Main differences between market-based and banks based systems 
Traditional bank-based lending can be explained by discussing the interaction between the 
bank and the borrower. For example, in traditional banking, the bank’s decision to lend is based 
on a number of factors, such as relationship standing, history of the borrower, management 
experience, and also including that of the borrower’s ability to pay. In the bank-based setting, 
banks must have sufficient funds on their asset register to cover the loan and meet all regulatory, 
and liquidity requirements. The gain/loss that the bank makes on the contract is deducted/ added 
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to the bank’s asset sheet. The interest rate and terms of the contract are set down by the bank and 
in principle, the loan terms are set. In the event that the borrower is unable to service the debt 
and meet the obligation to the bank (Rajan and Zingales 1997) point out; that powerful banks are 
able to impose punitive measures to ensure debts are paid without being hampered by regulatory 
red tape restrictions normally found in the capital markets.      
The bank-based system, once established, has the capacity to survive and develop a country’s 
economic growth (Aoki and Patrick 1994). The relaxed approach led to increased instability and 
uncertainty. For example, the German banking was never regulated until the 1930s and any effort 
to effectively regulate the capital markets failed.   
In the market-based system, banks are governed by the market and the decision to lend is based 
on the terms the bank can achieve if sold into the market directly, or by securitisation – the 
market in effect, determines the rate of interest and the loan terms. One essential difference is 
that the loan does not come directly from the bank’s asset sheet, but instead from market 
investors.      
(Levine’s 1997) typology of market-based and bank-based financial structures serve as a useful 
method to broadly classify the financial structure in both Germany and the UK by examining the 
ratio of banks (size activity, and efficiency), relative to stock market development, (also 
measured by size, activity, and efficiency).  
Countries that have larger ratios of bank to stock market are categorised as bank-based and 
those countries respectively are categorised as being market-based financial structures. However, 
Levine (1997) noted that some countries are categorised as being bank based, this is primarily 
because their markets are not well developed. It can be seen from table 2.1 that Germany is at the 
extreme end compared to the US where banks were considered less important; (Allen and Gale 
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2001) show a similar pattern in the US with the ratio of assets to GDP substantially lower at 53 
per cent than Germany about 152 per cent. Interestingly, the UK and France continue to place 
importance on both the capital markets and banks, although the UK is generally referred to as a 
market-based financial structure.   
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Table 2 1 Financial Intermediary and equity market development across countries   
Financially underdeveloped  Financially developed  
economies  economies  
Country Structure Country Structure  
name index name  Index 
Bank-based economies  Bank-based economies  
Bangladesh -0.90 Panama - 0.92 
Nepal -0.87 Tunisia -0.88 
Egypt -0.82 Cyprus -0.77 
Costa Rica -0.79 Portugal  -0.75 
Barbados -0.78 Austria  -0.73 
Honduras -0.75 Belgium  -0.66 
Trinidad and Tobago -0.74 Italy  -0.57 
Mauritius -0.70 Finland  -0.53 
Kenya -0.69 Norway  -0.33 
Ecuador -0.56 New Zealand  -0.29 
Sri Lanka -0.54 Japan  -0.19 
Indonesia -0.50 France  -0.17 
Colombia -0.47 Jordan  -0.14 
Pakistan -0.38 Germany  -0.10 
Zimbabwe -0.34 Israel  -0.06 
Greece -0.34 Spain   0.02 
Argentina -0.25   
Venezuela -0.15   
India -0.14   
Ireland -0.06   
group-mean -0.54 group-mean -0.44 
    
Market-based economies  Market-based economies  
Denmark  0.15 Netherlands 0.11 
Peru  0.16 Thailand  0.39 
Chile  0.25 Canada  0.41 
Jamaica  0.28 Australia  0.50 
Brazil  0.65 South Africa  0.83 
Mexico  0.68 Korea  0.89 
Philippines  0.71 Sweden  0.91 
Turkey  1.23 Great Britain  0.92 
  Singapore  1.18 
  United States  1.96 
  Switzerland  2.03 
  Hong Kong  2.10 
  Malaysia  2.93 
group-mean  0.52  1.17 
Financially underdeveloped countries  -0.24  0.28 
Sourced Levine 1997 
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There is a vast amount of theoretical literature which argues the advantages and disadvantages 
between the two financial systems. Academic theory suggests that under a bank-based financial 
structure, relationship building between banks and SMEs is not uncommon, (Peterson and Rajan 
1994). Boot and Thackor (1994), Lane, and Quack; (2001), argue that bank-based institutions are 
generally able gain access to proprietary information about SMEs through the relationship 
building during the course of time – the forged relationship between the bank and SME gains a 
distinct comparative advantage for the bank over other lending institutions who are not in 
possession of such information.  
In bank-based financial structures, information collected from SME’s is utilised to refine the rate 
of interest and thus, potentially reduce the need for the SME to offer collateral against the credit. 
Allen and Carletti (2008) point out those banks are best placed to find out what the borrower is 
doing with the credit – they are in possession of the SMEs history and are able to monitor SMEs 
effectively. (Boot and Thackor 1994) gives an account in which the bank-based view emphasises 
the positive role of banks by developing long-run relationships with SMEs and their respective 
managers promoting the effective allocation of funds. Elas and Krahnen (2003) also argue that 
the bank-based view, (relationship lending) increases the levels of success following hard times 
experienced by SMEs.   
According to Elas (2003), a bank-based financial system is determined by three distinct 
variables: borrower characteristics, informational opaqueness, and access to public debt. The 
final aspect is somewhat detailed and refers to the banks characteristics i.e. whether the bank is a 
cooperative, savings bank, or Hausbanks. In addition, Elas (2003) also suggests that other 
characteristics can determine the identity of a bank for example, the markets in which it operates, 
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its competition, for example, whether public banks verses private banks, structure of market and 
so on. The concept of the relationship bank is discussed more fully later in the review.   
The contrasting views of both systems continue to be a source of debate regarding the merits of 
each system; with much of the debate between the arms’ length approach to finance in market-
based financial systems, compared to relationship finance in bank based systems. On the other 
hand, this assumes that a clear and detailed distinction can be drawn to assess whether a bank can 
be identified as a relationship, or arm’s length bank. In the main however, commercial banks are 
involved in both activities – that is to say, retail banks have increased their activities from normal 
intermediation and transaction to investment banking. Llewellyn (2006) argues that the bank-
based view in Germany is moving towards an Anglo Saxon market-based system for example, 
Germany’s Deutsche bank had 55 per cent of its liabilities which were customer deposits.        
A comparison of industrial growth under the two financial structures  
(Rajan and Zingales 1998) research paper looked at the financial structure in the US and selected 
a specific industry to find if a correlation existed between faster growth and industry in well-
developed financial structures. They reported a positive correlation indicating that higher growth 
in certain industries was evident when industry engaged in the capital markets. On the other 
hand, Meyer (1997) argues that Germany had experienced strong economic growth compared to 
those countries with market-based financial structures further; the strength of relations between 
the bank and the industrial sector, increased loan availability and at the same time reducing the 
overall cost of loans to industry.  
(King and Levine’s 1993) survey compared the growth rates of several countries during the 
period 1960-1989. The survey results showed no strong correlation between the growth of a 
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country and its financial structure, however, their findings did show a relationship between the 
rigidity of a countries legal system and growth.   
As Levine (1997) points out, the UK, and Germany had similar long-run growth rates suggesting 
that the financial structure of each particular country did not matter. In sum, either the market or 
bank-based views were effective in promoting growth. However, as previously suggested by 
Levine, the legal system of each country played a leading role on the development of economic 
growth.  
(Levine’s 1997) research looked at four separate countries with similar growth runs, the evidence 
shows that well developed market-based financial structures have well developed bank-based 
systems with the reverse being true for the weakest market-based systems. Levine (1997) argued 
that the regulatory system within the country is a crucial component of growth and this links into 
the following section of regulations, which is discussed in more detail in section three Vitols 
(2001) argued that market-based systems are able to quickly channel funds in fast growing 
industries mainly because of risk sharing investors. (Levine 1997) argued that growth of industry 
did not matter whether the economy was market-based, or bank-based.  
Also discussed in section three, is the role of Basel II, the literature relevant to Basel, serves as a 
tool to illustrate how the banks under examination used certain components of the Basel 
framework in order to manage risk. It should also be mentioned that recent academic literature 
and the various reports in circulation highlight the shortcomings of the Basel Accord. These 
facets will be mentioned briefly later in the section.  
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Section – 2 A review of literature bank lending and SMEs   
Introduction 
Financial theory suggests that if firms have equal access to capital markets, the financial 
structure of a firm would not have any effect on investment decisions. The notion here would 
imply an assumption of perfect capital markets - where firms can substitute external funds for 
internal capital.  Some academics argue (Fazzari et al 1988); the assumption of perfect capital 
markets is not relevant for SMEs due to the existence of information asymmetry. In addition, 
when external financing resources are needed for future investment in a growth phase, SMEs 
have to at least partly rely on bank loans since collecting money on the public capital market is 
often a difficult and costly task (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Berger and Udell, 1998; Berger 
and Udell, 2002). Financing and access to funds plays a major part in a firm’s ability to enter a 
market and to continue operations (Storey 1994, Binks and Enew 1996). The relationship 
between the firm and the bank is a particularly important aspect in the context of accessing 
finance. The identification, measurement, and where possible, reduction of risk is central to the 
decision-making process and eventual allocation of funding. However, banks and investors alike 
are also profit takers recognising that profits are not without some element of risk. In perfectly 
competitive markets, commercial banks are profit takers; moreover, banking in perfect markets 
usually results in banks supplying funds at the lowest price.    
Why banks are said to have a comparative advantage 
Banks are in a unique position because they intermediate between the depositor and the 
borrower. Banks have access to a wide range of borrowers seeking investment money to expand 
their businesses, however, banks do require information from borrowers before the decision to 
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lend is finalised. The information in most cases is proprietary and the firm is usually willing to 
exchange the information in return for funds. This special information exchange places the bank 
in a position of comparative advantage over their competitors.    
The notion that banks are special and offer a set of unique services is based on (Fama’s 1985) 
 “Why are banks different” and (James’s 1987) suggesting the CD rates of banks are competitive 
to that of other securities. Diamond (1984) also argued that banks have a unique advantage over 
their competitors. (Fama’s 1985) work suggested that banks have a unique position of inside 
lending – since other financial institutions do not have access to proprietary information and 
investors view the banks in a different light compared to the capital markets.   
 However, the downside of this conjecture is that the reserve requirement on the cash ratio 
generally held by the bank is generally absorbed by the borrower. Bearing the downside in mind, 
Fama (1985) argues that borrowers bear the brunt of this implicit tax because banks offer special 
monitoring services. James (1987) also argued that banks are special because any announcement 
by banks relating to loan contracts creates a strong signal and link to positive abnormal returns. 
Banks (Fama, 1985, Diamond, and Rajan; 1990) actively monitor borrowers through the 
acquisition of proprietary information from SMEs, which gains a superior advantage over other 
lenders. Banks are also well equipped to deal with uncertainty by applying, both monitoring and 
use of collateral. These arguments suggest that banks have a comparative advantage over other 
types of financial institutions largely because they have access to proprietary information about 
the firm. However, Llewellyn (1999) argued that banks are losing their comparative advantage 
because of new technology and consumer awareness.  Deregulation and lower barrier entry has 
allowed an increased wave in competition. Llewellyn (1999) also argued that information 
disclosure law had led to banks losing their informational advantage – banks were able to hold 
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transactional information about their customers, which reduced ex ante (adverse selection) and 
ex post (moral hazard). Use of credit scoring systems has negated the need for acquisition of 
information from firms, in addition as mentioned previously, the new disclosure laws has meant 
that information is in the public domain.  
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Do banks have comparative advantage? 
Much of the literature suggests that banks have a considerable comparative advantage given they 
are privy to information about the SME which is not generally available to the public. Boot 
(1999) refers to a banks comparative advantage as having the ability to obtain information, 
which is often not obtainable in the public domain, and to evaluate a project’s profit through 
interaction with the borrower during the course of time. The comparative advantage held by 
banks is the culmination of relationship formation, which also includes offering other services 
such as letters of credit, business advice and other financial services. However, from an 
investment perspective, this comparative advantage held by banks is significant to an investor 
which seeks to minimize, or reduce the risk of his investment. 
The down side to borrowers not least the SMEs reliance on bank debt may lead to financing 
problems when banks become more reluctant to lend to small firms. This reluctance might be 
stimulated by some recent tendencies (e.g. the bank’s desire to make SME lending profitable, the 
consolidation of banks as well as (Basel II Capital Accord) reducing the credit supply for small 
firms (Berger et al., 1998; Saurina and Trucharte, 2004; Altman and Sabato, 2005; Berger, 
2006); resulting in credit rationing.  
Credit rationing serves as a practical solution when reduced supply of bank debt for certain firms 
would reduce their financial resources and prevent the execution of profitable investment 
projects. Moreover, the impact of financing constraints on investment behaviour tends to 
increase systematically as firm size decreases (Audretsch and Elston, 2002). 
The implicit assumption is often made that firms act in a neo-classical manner, with a desire to 
invest in all available projects with a positive discounted net cash flow. Consequently, 
imperfections in the supply of finance by financial institutions or credit rationing, tend to be 
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highlighted as a contributory cause of any small firm sector tendency to invest sub-optimally, 
exhibit slower than average growth or experience higher than average bankruptcy rates.  
Most models conclude that information asymmetry leads to credit rationing when the 
information problem remains unresolved.  Information asymmetry is the foundation for credit 
rationing: the expected return increases non-monotonously when the interest rate increases. 
According to Becker (1971, credit rationing may occur in two ways: through discrimination or a 
lack of information. Rationing theory draws attention to loan officers and their varying 
perception to risk, what is suggested from the studies is that a general failing exists in assessment 
techniques. Loan officers see large firm as proportionately less risky and therefore more likely to 
obtain funding.  Credit rationing alludes to a notion that firms seeking credit outweighs the 
banks’ ability to supply. Credit rationing might also be mitigated through the provision of 
security i.e. the assets held by the firm, or personal assets held by the borrower (Bester 1985). 
Bester also alludes to the idea that credit rationing is not necessary - if banks were able to make 
judgements about the background and capabilities of borrowers i.e. a type of matching the 
interest collateral and risk, this might suggest that a mechanism can exist, which ultimately 
reduces the rates of interest imposed. The arguments asserted by (Bester 1985), assumes that 
large firms therefore might have lower rates of interest because there is a presence of collateral 
similarly, the banks perception of risk is lessened, however, other factors, which may dispel the 
notion that credit rationing is negated through collateralisation is the notion that assets are 
measurable, not all cases, but some cases are instances where measurability is difficult (Berry 
Grant Jarvis 2004).  
A high degree of importance is attached to the notion of collateralisation. It is said generally that 
the taking of security is designed to lessen the risk if the loss of default can be reduced. Security 
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can take the form of collateral provided by the borrowing firm, or it may be in the form of a 
guarantee by a third party. An examination of theory within this context provided by (Nerin, 
Cossin Gonzalez, and Huang 2002) throws more light regarding the economic form and structure 
as suggested, the work is extended utilising the framework of (Merton 1974) the form here is the 
structural approach. The research paper starts with the simple form, which considers 
transactional interactions between the borrower and the lender. Similar research (Burke Hanley 
2006) also reinforces the process of securing against risk though instrumentation such as the 
taking of collateral.  
Other research extends into this area is the work of (Cressy 1996), but interestingly, the fresh 
work of (Burke, Hanley, 2006) shows in the discussion paper the instrumentation and dynamic at 
work with the trade-off between collateral and interest margins of UK banks in an attempt to be 
cognizant for measuring the trade-off. Importantly, cited here, is the assumption that data is 
limited to only those small firms selected for lending, but no data is reflected against the rejected 
applicants, and consequently may slightly distort the data presented, but (Burke and Hanley 
2006) document these facts. Additionally, the research does bear out subsequent research, which 
reflects that interest differences lay between those firm that post collateral and those not posting 
collateral, but perhaps most significant in the findings are the notable changes in the interest that 
is levied against those with no collateral and small firms that have collateral presence. (Bank of 
England 2002) 
As suggested previously, the notion of risk is aligned to asymmetric information, but as we know 
from the literature drawn, banks in general, overcome this problem through the adjustment of 
interest. The evidence (Deakins and Hussain 1994) suggests that a relationship does exist 
between the interest margin and the loan collateral ratio clearly small firm borrowing with no 
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collateral face higher interest. Nevertheless, the literature only assumes the correlation exist 
through stochastic methodology. Although it is mentioned that the approach is cognizant, it may 
be that the approach is based on some form of information data, but not expressed. A view that 
there is no significant difference between German and UK banks in taking personal collateral 
(Midland Bank 1994) contrasts with the perception of a lesser concern with taking that form of 
security.    
Credit rationing is also dependent on the bank’s ability to supply, and on those firms seeking 
credit outweighing the bank’s ability to supply funds.  Becker, (1971), (Quack) (Quack) also 
argues that credit rationing eases through the provision of security, i.e. the assets held by the 
firm, or personal assets held by the borrower (Bester 1985).  Bester (1985) further suggests that 
credit rationing is not necessary if banks are able to make judgements about the background and 
capabilities of borrowers, i.e. a type of matching of the interest collateral and risk. Deakins and 
Hussain (1994) suggest that a relationship exists between the interest margin and the loan 
collateral ratio, this argument would suggest that a mechanism can exist, which ultimately 
reduces the rates of interest imposed. The upside to the argument is (Bester 1985) is that large 
firms therefore might have lower rates of interest because there is a presence of collateral; 
similarly, the bank’s perception of risk reduces. But the downside is that SMEs borrowing with 
no collateral face higher interest. Another downside to the proposition of collateral and 
monitoring is the accuracy of information. (Binks and Enew 1996, Bester 1987, Bester and 
Hellwig 1989) argue that banks are unable to effectively monitor all information about the firm 
and consequently credit rationing occurs. On the other hand, other factors may dispel the notion 
that credit rationing through collateralisation, is reduced - assuming that assets are measurable. 
However, according to (Berry, Grant; and Jarvis 2004), in some cases, the measurability of assets 
 34 
 
is difficult. Information asymmetry results in finance gaps (Binks et al 1992). Secondly, as their 
rate of default is high, SME firms are risky customers.  
The amount of credit given by banks to new SME firms is not very high, but the frequency of 
loss is important. The costs of screening and monitoring are high and expected profits are too 
low to trade off these costs.      
Berger and Udell (2003) suggest that bank officers experience institutional memory problems 
and procyclicality, which manifest in the deterioration of quality through the cyclic phase and 
consequently, during recessionary cycles, loan officers ration credit based on previous bad 
experiences.  Loan officers change behaviour following the recessionary periods in the cycle and 
consequently adjust levels of terms, or deny credit to the small firm. In contrast, when conditions 
in the economic environment are buoyant and within the context of bank policy, loan officers 
ease monitoring and the use of collateralisation.  According to Van Hoose (DTI)2006), and 
Jackson (1999), Basel II requires banks to adopt sophisticated techniques for internal rating 
systems. VanHoose (DTI)2006) and Jackson (1999) further argued that capital tightening 
through regulation induced decreases in lending. However, maximisation of profit though risk 
aversion is strategically driven and it is implicit that banks are selectively credit rationing. Burke 
and Hanley suggest that banks differentiate and adjust their margins according to each risk class, 
but in some cases, a degree of exclusion is exercised through credit restriction to the SME. 
However, when banks replace staff, new incoming staff will not have acquired the experience to 
determine either the allocation of credit or the rationing of credit to firms in higher risk 
categories. Banks may offer particular policy guidance to loan officers and guiding strategies, 
but these based on an individual perception of risk. The literature is implicit: smaller 
organisations (in this case banks), exposed to the theory of memory hypothesis fare less well 
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than large organisations (Berger and Udell 2003).  Banks may offer particular policy guidance to 
loan officers and guiding strategies, but these based on an individual perception of risk. (Lane 
and Quack 2001) sheds light on the phenomenon of institutionalised decision-making in the 
allocation of loans to firms.  
One reason suggested for these differences is that perception and attitudes towards risk handling 
stem from the banking crisis in the UK in the early 1990s. UK banks took heavy losses and 
specifically linked this to the small firm, whereas this was not the case in Germany, with losses 
being absorbed by the banks.   
    Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) suggest that risk transference has become part of the 
institutional setting in banks.  Specific operating procedures guide the loan officer prior to the 
actual decision to make funding available. The externalisation of risk manifests in a number 
forms.  Transferring risk onto the firm is a common feature at banks and loan officers adopt a 
variety of methods; one is in the form of taking higher collateral than necessary, another is 
increasing the premium rate of interest with little effort made to appraise the potential firm. 
Asymmetry and SMEs 
Information asymmetry is complex and seen as one of the main barriers for SME borrowing and 
for bank lending. A good explanation of information asymmetry is the interaction between the 
lender and the firm.  On the one hand, the firm may be risky and invest in risky projects with a 
firm belief that the rewards are high and revenue streams are sufficient to pay off loans with an 
amount of profits left.  In a perfect world, the beneficiaries are the shareholders of the firm.   
On the other hand, if the lender has no information and takes no action to lower the risk, the 
lender would bear most of the risk with little compensation.  Berger and Udell (1995) suggest 
that small firms have information opaqueness due to a lack of record of accomplishment 
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information. Parker (2002) argues that the issue of opaqueness causes two specific risk types: 1. 
adverse selection, i.e. the firm that fails due to a number of reasons not foreseen; and 2. moral 
hazard, i.e. the firm that switches to riskier projects.   
At the start-up phase, the bank and the small firms have little or no common information about 
the opportunity - the owners of the firm present their business plan, which initially forecasts, and 
measures normal (risk free rate) risk, and provides the bank with information about the business 
project the investment costs, and cash flow estimates, and other relevant factors affecting the 
project. Firms usually identify a niche or an opportunity in the market and collect initial 
information, which is not always tested. Information about competition, marketability, and sales 
potential are based purely upon the firm’s vision and goal objectives, Banks can either accept 
that projects would yield revenues or attempt to mitigate the uncertainty and reduce the risk by 
acquiring more knowledge about the firm’s ability to perform effectively. The small firms have 
limited, or a complete absence of data, which reflects their performance (Cruickshank 2000). In 
most cases with newly started companies, the business plans provide information on future 
events, however these business plans are presented without verifiable accounting records, and it 
is this absence of verifiable data that constrains the growth small firms particularly, when high-
risk projects are involved. In these cases, the lending institutions are unable to monitor 
effectively all conditions and consequently credit rationing occurs (Binks and Enew, 1996; 
Bester, 1987; Bester and Hellwig, 1989).The ability of the firm to deliver future revenue may be 
in doubt. Mentioned earlier in this review, (Wickham 2001), describes the link to performance 
and success as being components of trait, and leadership characteristics, which are attributes, and 
contribute to the efficiency and produce the future revenues of the firm, what is known is future 
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revenues are held only by the firm based on business plans and future projections. Conversely, 
the verification and information of forecast data, and detail are not known to the bank.   
There are two approaches, which banks adopt to overcome the problems of asymmetry, these are 
well documented (Binks 1992). The first approach is the notion of information gathering about 
the future prospects of the firm. This is achieved through the collection of management accounts, 
business data, and proficiency of the management team; however, the approach fails to take into 
account those firms with no data, and is a complete unknown i.e. a new firm.  
Banks also adopt the gone concern approach, which looks specifically at the firm’s ability to 
generate future income; the gone concern approach takes into account the initial assets of the 
business and acts as a measure of loan repayments (Wilson 1979). Banks take the gone concern 
as a type of framework in which they can create a worst case scenario, where liquidation occurs 
at that point there is a trade of against assets, this may be achieved through a willingness of the 
firms shareholders for the banks to document a charge on assets against borrowing and in the 
event of a worst case scenario banks can salvage part, if not all of their investments (Berry Grant 
and Jarvis 2004).  
The going concern approach requires considerable skills on the part of the banks officers and is 
much more complex than that of the gone concern approach and is considered significantly more 
costly to enforce, the evidence alludes to the trade-off i.e. high profitability through the lowering 
of high default probability on loan repayment. Importantly, banks continued to suggest that the 
two approaches are embraced and combined, but other evidence from literature suggest that 
banks did in fact adopt an assessment policy of firm size (Berry, Grant and Jarvis 2004). 
Deakins, Hussain (1994) also revealed similar findings and suggested that banks continue to 
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adopt the gone approach in relations to the magnitude of each firms assets. Banks have denied 
these findings and asserted that there has been a greater use of credit scoring in assessment. 
Lending intermediaries attempt to overcome asymmetric information problems by producing and 
analysing information albeit limited, and setting loan contract terms, such as the interest rate 
charged or the collateral required, improving small firm incentives. The degree of information 
asymmetry depends on borrower characteristics such as firm size, firm age and governance, or 
legal form. Typically, small firms provide less information to outside financiers than large firms. 
This reflects fixed costs of information disclosure, or the absence of disclosure rules. 
Additionally, the lack of reputation constrains their borrowing (Martinelli 1997). Small firms are 
faced with difficulties when presenting a set of data to the banks.  
The data is typically forecast information and small firms attempt to demonstrate that sufficient 
future revenues can be generated, where cost expenses are controlled up to a point, and residual 
amounts are available to cover the cost of borrowing. 
Cressy and Olofsson (1997) suggest that in a perfect market any project, which brings positive 
streams of income where net present values exceed the zero are worth investment, on the other 
hand, banks argue that future revenues are difficult to assess (Cressy and Olofsson 2006). 
One of the most significant contributions regarding information asymmetry is (Akerlof’s 1970) 
paper in which he suggested that the market resembles that of the typical used car owner who 
possesses more information than the buyer does. The “Lemons” theory involves a form of 
asymmetric information. Ackerlof (1970) suggested that used cars “Lemons” are more likely to 
have a high probability that each car would be of a low quality and therefore any potential buyer 
of a lemon would bid down the price with the knowledge that the product would be low in 
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quality. Because of inefficiency, all high quality owners of used cars would bear the brunt 
because individuals view all used cars as low quality lemons.  
Banks attempt to overcome asymmetric information problems by producing and analysing 
information albeit limited, and by setting loan contract terms, which include interest rate 
charged, monitoring, the collateral required, or improving small firm incentives.  The degree of 
information asymmetry depends on borrower characteristics such as firm size, firm age and 
governance, or legal form. Typically, small firms provide less information to outside financiers 
than large firms. This reflects fixed costs of information disclosure, or the absence of disclosure 
rules. Additionally, the lack of reputation constrains their borrowing (Martinelli 1997).  
Differences in UK and German Banks and their approach to lending 
In general there are two distinct approaches that banks have developed in dealing with borrowers: 
The arm’s length and relationship approach. Many banks would argue that they embrace the two 
types during the lending process, but as pointed out by Elas (2003) a set of distinct variables 
separate the two types. In order to explain these distinctions, it serves to broadly define the two 
types as relationship and transaction, or arm’s-length. The relationship approach to lending is 
broadly defined as a long-term contract between the borrower and lender during the course of 
time. Rajan (1992), Peterson and Rajan (1994) also describe the relationship approach as one 
where intertemporal smoothing occurs along with increased credit and borrower enhancement of 
project pay-offs. However, the concept of the relationship banking is not without cost. For 
example, monitoring and verification costs are usually borne by the lender – in addition, 
verification can lead to hold up problems in the bank’s decision to lend. 
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(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982), further suggest that UK banks can be characterised as 
institutional market-based banks seeking to maximise profitability. UK banks increase 
profitability through risk transference as previously mentioned earlier in the review, however, 
importantly, bank loan officer’s cognizant attitude towards risk is largely seen as risk 
transference and not risk sharing. loan officer behaviour in UK banks has deteriorated 
significantly and that banks have distanced themselves (Chaston 1993), revealed in a survey of 
some 93 bankers and 179 small firms a general response was that loan officers had a higher 
tendency to make more use of collateral rather than any other characteristics of the firm. In 
contrast, German bank loan officers had a higher tendency to make use of information through 
the lending relationship process (Peterson, Rajan’ 1993). Research examining the cognizant 
behaviour of loan officers largely examines the Gestalt view suggests that environmental factors 
affect the cognizant perception towards risk – factors such as structure modernity  Waring (2010), 
suggests that the cognitive process accepts the external stimuli such as knowledge, attitudes and 
role, these variables facilitate a response towards risk estimation (Weber 1997) conceptualised 
this view in the heuristic dimension and applied the notion of perception towards credit risk. This 
view is implicit that the interpretation of risk is based on knowledge and experiences. A good 
example is that banks scan the environment and loan officers’ self-perception towards a 
particular market may be viewed as risky, but only based on previous experiences.  
In their paper, Saunders and Allen (2002) suggest that in almost every case, the bank’s risk 
assessment of the SME is subjective and the loan allocation is left to the discretion of the 
granting officer.   
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German banks see collateralisation as counterproductive, whereas, in contrast, UK banks readily 
take collateral as security. What is also evident from the reviewed literature is that fundamental 
differences exist in the taking of collateral.         
  Independent risk judgement is arbitrary following the presence of collateral. Therefore, SMEs 
offering no collateral bear most, if not all, of the risk apportioned to the loan through increases in 
much higher premiums over interest. A clear distinction can be drawn between those SMEs who 
can offer collateral and those who cannot. Lane and Quack (2001) suggested that UK banks 
adopted a hit and miss strategy between the level of premia and the collateral offered. On the 
other hand Cowling (1997) argued that no relationship existed between the size of collateral 
present, and argued further that the factors affecting risk premia were loan size, duration and the 
strength of relations held.  Research, which examines a number of banks that select safer 
propositions, illustrates that the trade-off between collateral and interest margin adjustments are 
therefore indicative that collateral mitigates risk and maximises profits, i.e. the market premium 
is reduced, but in addition mitigates the need for costly monitoring. 
    Banks’ interest margins are not in the public domain, but are largely tailored post-cognisant, 
i.e. decisions are made following factors in the economic condition in the loosening and 
tightening of credit subject to riskiness over set periods.  
    The evidence arising from the Competition Commission report (2006) revealed that banks 
operate a type of monopoly and restrict movement of small firms to other banks, which enables 
part or full collusion in interest rate determination (Cruickshank 2000).      
   Black, de Mezza and Jeffries (1996), argue that banks are charging excessive amounts of 
interest and that they adjust the market premium beyond any logic or probability default rationale: 
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“The role of banks in the provision of finance seems to be closer to that of pawnbrokers rather 
than venture capitalists”.  
    Previous research provides evidence that banks face liquidity constraints and the selection of 
less risky borrowers would indeed maximise profitability margins. Those borrowers have little 
choice largely because of collusion and because switching costs are cost prohibitive, which 
enables the bank to adjust the marginal rate of interest, which in turn satisfies the returns to the 
bank. UK banks have faced much criticism over the handling and understanding of small firms in 
relation to their financing needs and reliance on short-term financing in the form of overdrafts 
(Binks and Enew 1996).  
    In contrast to this type of bank lending behaviour, German banks smooth interest margins and 
set margins at lower rates in the beginning of the relationship (Rajan and Peterson 1994, Lane 
and Quack 2001). Lane and Quack (2001) suggest that German banks are readily prepared to 
adjust the margins, which are inclusive of market rate fluctuations, and share the risk with the 
borrower. UK banks on the other hand are less prepared to accept market fluctuations and pass 
on this risk to the small firm though the instrument of variable terms of interest. 
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Differences in approaches between UK and German banks in the handling of Information 
Asymmetry in relation to SMEs 
The construction of a conceptual model acts as a framework to discuss how the lending process 
is shaped by a number of influences both externally and internally.  The model illustrates a three 
stage lending process firstly, starting with the environment and how environmental pressure 
elicits changes to the intuition. Secondly, how the institution shapes and influences its loan 
officers, and thirdly, how loan officers translate, training, adherence to rules, in interpreting risk 
during the process of lending. The academic literature at each stage of the conceptual model is 
discussed. The conceptual model looks at the three factors differentiating UK and German banks, 
more specifically the variations of behaviour during the lending procedure between the lenders 
and SMEs. 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual model: influences affecting the way banks lend 
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legitimisation of the organisation emerges through the process of dominant practices, which in 
turn facilitates strategic choice. 
Differences in the Management of risk between German and UK banks  
The banking environment in the UK and Germany 
German banking has similarly to the UK undergone a series of changes with deregulation and 
European law on banking changes.  The German banking system is often described as a three-
pillar system, “Drei-Sälen Modell” and divides into three distinct categories: Public sector banks; 
these comprise of savings banks “(Sparkassen)” usually operating at regional level, but with head 
offices operating at provincial level, “Landesbanken”. The public sector banks account for half 
of the German banking sector with Sparkassen and Landesbanken controlling almost two thirds 
of the share. In the main public banks agendas are expected to stimulate local business and 
finance viable propositions for the public good. Generally, these regional banks are not in pursuit 
of profit maximisation and have a tendency to operate specifically at regional levels. 
Cooperative and Sparkassen banks operate at regional level, competing mainly with the public 
sector banks. Cooperative banks tend to leave non-lucrative regional markets to Sparkassen 
banks mainly because of size.  Even though they adhere to regional principles, they are not 
required to do so in a regulatory sense.      
The cooperative in Germany banks play an important role by lending to SMEs which account for 
almost half of overall lending in the SME sector.  Commercial banks, “Großbanken” comprise of 
about 350 private sector banks, which include five large banks: Deutsche Bank, AG Dresdner 
Bank AG, Hypo-und Verinsbank AG, Commerzbank AG, and Deutsche Post Bank AG.  
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German banks operate a higher degree of heterogeneity and are less centralised. One reason for 
this, is that banks in the German financial system are less centralised is because of the strong 
position held by the commercial and savings banks (Elas and Kranham 2004). According to 
Llewellyn (2002), and Lane and Quack (2001), German banks have an orientation towards the 
common good for their locality and welfare of their members. Saving banks in Germany serve 
the mainstream SME population and they are entrenched deeply within the community. Saving 
banks have played a central role in the financing of SMEs. These banks in general dominate and 
control a high proportion of the market. The European Commission raised a report in 2007 
highlighting concerns regarding the lack of competition and notably the regional cooperative 
banks in Germany who are said to play an important role in the development of SMEs through 
close relationships mainly achieved because of the close proximity of its customers regionally.  
In their defence, saving banks argue that they refrain from competing with each other, but focus 
on competition with banks from the other two pillars of the German banking structure (Rabb and 
Welzell 2010).    
Traditionally banks in the UK had been heterogeneous; but during the last two decades, the 
banking sector in Britain has undergone a number of changes following privatisation and 
deregulation. Four main commercial banks dominate the retail and corporate sectors of banking 
within the United Kingdom.  
UK banks are homogeneous and centralised with locations in London. Banking in Britain is 
highly competitive with recent mergers and acquisitions suggesting that banks seek to gain 
competitive advantage through economies of scale; for example, the takeover of NatWest in 
2000 by RBS (Royal Bank of Scotland) and Lloyds Bank merging with TSB in 1995.  Similarly, 
in 1992, HSBC acquired the Midland Bank, which was valued at the time at £3.9bn illustrates 
 46 
 
the extremely high concentration levels of banks in the UK, suggesting that three of the largest 
banking groups held 50 per cent of market share. Cruickshank (2000) suggests that there are 
unusually high concentration levels in the banking sector, when compared to other businesses.  
The difference between the two systems suggests a greater diversity, reflecting that German 
banks pursuit of high profits is not highly ranked according to their long-term strategic goals. 
This is in contrast to banks in the United Kingdom, which continually report unprecedented 
profits each year. According to Llewellyn (2006), UK banks steer toward a shareholder 
orientation, whereas German banks are orientated towards a stakeholder approach.  
These opposite approaches stem from the competitive environment. Banks in Britain argue that 
they face extreme competition following changes in the banking laws and deregulation. In 
addition, European and other international banks and building societies are entering the market 
sector. These changes have pushed banks to compete for market share. Llewellyn (2006) 
suggests that major differences in lending practices and attitudes towards risk in German banks 
lie in their values, profitability, goals and overall strategic aims. (Llewellyn 2006) found two 
distinct differences between German and UK banks:  
 
STV (stakeholder value)  
 
SHV (shareholder value)  
 
Llewellyn (2006) suggested that orientations towards value goals manifest in major differences 
between European and UK banks. UK banks have higher returns on capital employed (see Table 
2.2) because of their value orientation towards shareholder wealth focussing on wealth 
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maximisation. Llewellyn (2006) also argued that banks in the UK are more aggressive than their 
European counterparts attributing this to the changes in financial reforms during the 1980s. 
The saving and co-operative banks in Germany are oriented towards stakeholders and the 
goodness of the community and as such profit maximisation is ranked as not being important. 
(Lane and Quack 2001), also found lending differences between the two banking sectors, and 
that value orientations in different environments lead towards differences in lending practices 
and attitudes towards risk. Llewellyn (DTI)1999) also suggests that deregulation and 
competition, to some extent, generates a degree of short-termism within the UK banking sector. 
The research of Lane and Quack, (2001), and Binks, and Enew (1996); suggests that relationship 
lending previously embedded into the UK banking sector has deteriorated significantly in Britain 
following deregulation and a change of value orientation.    
 
Table 2 2 Bank returns on Equity 
 Average 1992–
1995 
Average          
1996–2000 
2001 2002 2003 
Germany   8.1   9.7   2.0 -1.4 -6.0 
Spain 12.0 11.8 13.6 11.9 14.0 
France   3.1   3.9 13.8 10.1 11.8 
Italy   3.2  3.1 11.7   5.3   8.3 
UK 15.8 18.6 13.4 14.4 17.0 
Switzerland   8.6   6.0   8.8   1.8   9.8 
US 16.4 15.4 12.9 14.5 17.8 
Source: Llewellyn 2002 
There are major differences between German and UK banks, these differences bear out the 
hypothesis of German banks, and the stronger relations held by small business firms. The 
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regulatory practices and government legislation is such that German banks aim for the good of 
the community, which in turn stimulates local business and the economy as a whole. In contrast, 
the notion that UK banks serve the community is unfounded we often see marketing and 
advertisements which draws business and shows a relationship context, which is contrary to the 
evidence drawn from the literature. From the evidence drawn, there are elements, which may 
suggest that banking in the UK is dominated by a few players and this may impact on the 
credibility of effective competition. Also identified is that German banking is guided, not only by 
their disposition towards profitability, but guided by regulatory and institutional frameworks. 
Profitability however is at the forefront of the main private banks in Germany, but continuing to 
model towards the UK model. From the German banking perspective, the supply of funds to 
small businesses is predominantly achieved at local level. The major commercial banks normally 
would not compete at this level; the main four banks operate within the corporate sector. Co-
operative banks also receive referral from the main commercial banks for small firm funding. It 
is worth pointing out that co-operative banks do not pay dividends on accumulated reserves and 
as such, if member were to resign, shareholding is not transferable. One major difference 
identified in the differences are the goals of Co-operative banks, they are in their design and 
makeup, non-profit seeking institutions, which serve the local community. In contrast, that that 
of German banks, UK banks are profit takers and as such are strategically designed to be 
effective and do not have specific goals of serving the local communities, but instead achieve 
their visionary goals of serving the shareholder Hellwig (1999). UK banks easily outperform 
German banks in returns banks in excess of 12 per cent on equity and have achieved higher than 
most German banks.  
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Section 3 - The regulatory environment in Germany and the UK  
There was clear evidence that bank professionals lacked skills in the modelling and management 
of risk. Previously, much emphasis was placed on the borrower’s creditworthiness, but in recent 
time’s further emphasis is placed with the modelling of an entire banks portfolio, which was 
largely the result of regulatory shifts in the banking industry as a whole. All banks are required to 
retain capital following any losses they may incur and as such, the level of retention is 
determined by the bank. Basle I was succeeded by Basle II largely because the original accord 
created in 1974 had shortcomings. The original critics suggest that Basle II in significantly 
improved when compared to the original release. Its main purpose was to drive changes, both in 
a regulatory way and align banks to address credit risk. The Basle II accord gives greater 
flexibility which enables the banks to determine their own level of capital retention; this was 
considered one of the main sweeping improvements. That meant that banks could in fact 
determine their capital retention according to a specific level of risk exposure. The regulatory 
framework is based on three pillars 
Table 2 3 Basle II  
Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3 
Minimum Capital 
Requirement 
Supervisory review Market Discipline 
Measurement of 
Risk – assets ratio 
To include 
 
Credit risk 
Market risk 
Operational risk 
Supervisors responsible 
For evaluating how well banks 
are assessing their 
Capital adequacy needs 
Relative to their risk. 
 
Encourage banks to develop 
internal assessments methods 
 
Encourage effective 
Disclosure about: 
 
Risk exposure 
Capital adequacy 
Risk management 
             techniques 
 
Starting with the first pillar, Basle identified three clear areas of risk, market risk, operational 
risk, and credit risk. The market risk broadly, is that risk where the value of an investment falls. 
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The two main indicators of measurement proposed are the standardised approach and the internal 
model approach. The second aspect in pillar I, suggests that banks retain capital following any 
losses from internal operations; these may include poor employment of fixed cost or other types 
of internalised operations; here proposed are three indicators for measurement suggested and 
proposed was the standardised approach, the basic indicator approach and the advanced 
measurement approach. Basle defines credit risk as being that risk where losses are incurred 
because of payment default. Basle identifies two clear areas for measurement – the standardised 
approach and foundation internal rating approach. 
The supervisory review process is designed to allow judgements about its risk profile as a whole 
therefore a series of measures should be imposed, which can allow individual banks to assess 
their own risk. Also included within this framework type is the banks’ ability to adapt techniques 
in the assessment of risk.  
Finally, in the third pillar framework Basle aims to improve an overall market discipline through 
the introduction of transparency and disclosure procedures, which in turn is suggested to lead to 
an overall better decision framework in assessment 
The role of financial regulation is generally regarded as a mechanism to ensure safety and 
sufficiently robust in order to protect consumers and investors alike. The Corporate governance 
of banks is somewhat different to most other organisations because poorly managed banks can 
have a profound effect on a countries economy notwithstanding the bank’s collapse and other 
implications concerning liquidity. These potential threats cause regulators to place 
responsibilities on the directors controlling the bank.    
The discussion and review of academic literature in this section generally precedes the financial 
crises, however, the release of the Turner report in 2009 have implications to the banking sector 
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as a whole regarding the shortcomings of in-house and external regulatory practices. The review 
of academic literature in this section precedes the financial crises and looks at the regulatory 
environment in both the UK and Germany in order to gain insight about how banks behave under 
regulatory controlled conditions leading up to one of the biggest financial crises this century.  
One of the key questions asked by many academics is how do banks react to capital requirements 
once they reach the regulatory minimum. Another question raised is the implication of banks 
behaviour – do banks adjust their risk weighted assets, or capital buffer, or both? Most of the 
academic work tends to focus on the US (Shrives and Dahl 1992, Jacques and Nigro 1997; 
Aggarwal and Jacques 2001).  Discussions in this section also take in account, the implications 
of the Basle II Accord. Many academics have already released literature highlighting the 
weaknesses and the fragile nature of the current accord, no doubt, a number of debates will 
continue for some years to come.  
The principle Agent problem 
One of the main features with any governance issue is that opportunities will present themselves 
to managers that facilitate in engaging in risky activities in order to achieve big payoffs 
(Alexander 2004). After deregulation in the 1970s banks in both Germany and the UK became 
internationalised and turned to the global markets expanding their operations by moving into 
other financial products and market sectors in an effort to increase profitability. Banks also 
developed their own complex pricing and risk management strategies which meant that managers 
were generating more risk and potentially causing liquidity problems. The limited liability 
structure of banks and the combination of premiums for shareholders meant that banks were 
prepared to take more risk in pursuit of increased profits (Alexander 2004). Bearing this in mind, 
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and the complex nature of monitoring banks externally, an emphasis was placed on internal 
monitoring system and control, but still retaining the involvement of the regulator.    
Bank supervision following deregulation 1970s mainly focussed on minimum capital 
requirements. The importance attached to this area is highlighted in the Basel II Accord. EU 
directives state that banks must hold minimum capital requirements of 8% of capital to risk 
weighted assets. Academics will no doubt continue to argue the merits of external and internal 
regulatory systems, but even now, questions are raising concerns about the robustness of the 
Basle II Accord. Basle II was an initiative drawn up by G10 supervisor from the International 
banks, which acted as a safeguard for banks operating in the global markets. It is commonly 
argued that Basel II was never implemented, or that implementation had only begun, which may 
or may not have compounded the problems facing the economy at large today. However, the 
Basel regime was put in place to significantly change the behavior of banks. One objective for 
the regime was to encourage bankers to boost their capital positions (Jackson 1999). Another 
objective was to develop a set of international standards which reduced competitive inequalities 
amongst international banks. (Jackson’s 1999) work fruitfully sets the Basle II Accord in detail: 
the primary aim or strategy was to: 
make regulatory more sensitive capital sensitive to differences in risk profiles amongst banking 
organisations; 
   take of balance sheet exposures explicitly into account when assessing capital adequacy; and;  
   lower the disincentives to holding liquid low risk assets. 
One of the key questions being asked by both academics and governments is whether the Basle 
committee changed the behavior of banks by evidence of increases in capital buffers. Evidence 
from (Jackson’s 1999) paper suggests that capital to weight-risk assets rose from 9.3% in 1988 to 
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11.2% in 1996. On the other hand, as (Jackson 1999) suggested, these differences might be the 
upshot of external market discipline. The points raised by both (Jackson 1999) and (Alexander 
2004) serve to illustrate that banks were constraining capital, which effectively filtered into the 
SME market. As had been noted earlier in the review, during the 1990s SMEs were finding it 
increasingly more difficult to access banks’ capital funds.      
A short history of bank regulations in Germany and the UK 
Banking in Germany dates back to the early 1930’s during which time licensing requirements 
and bank supervision was introduced on a grand scale. Prior to this period only the public sector 
and mortgage banks were subjected to some form of supervision (Hermann, Fisher, and Pfeil 
2003). The introduction of bank regulation is the upshot of a series of banking crisis. The 
regulatory initiatives followed the problems arising from the Danatbank, which resulted in the 
first banking act in 1934. Despite a number of banking crises there were no successful attempts 
to impose comprehensive legislation onto German banks (Vitols 2001). The German banking act 
enacted in 1934 required banks to hold capital in relation to an overall measurement of risk. In 
addition, the banking act restricted amounts of lending to single borrowers. During the Nazi 
regime, banks formed cartels, which supported by the government agreed interest rates and fees. 
This led to the formation of the Central Credit Committee (Zentraler Kreditausschuss) and 
established as a vehicle coordinating the cooperative and public banks managing business 
decision and operating in an advisory capacity on debt ceilings. Post Second World War, the 
1934 banking act still formed the basis of bank regulation and indeed was utilised by the allies 
prior to the passing on to the state and respective authorities (Fisher, and Pfeil 2003). During the 
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late 1950s branching restrictions were lifted and banks were free to set up anywhere in the 
country.  
The 1961 act led to the passing of a new act (Kreditwesengesetz) the act meant that all 
supervisory activities became centralised and governed by the federal state forming the Federal 
Banking Supervisory Office, or FBSO. The law required the Bundesbank to be involved in the 
supervisory process; also, in addition, every state in Germany was required to have a supervisory 
authority for public sector banks. The banking act of 1961 meant that the FSBO could draw up 
requirements, which gained access to banks establishing whether the liquidity and capital of the 
banks is sufficient. The principle 1 followed and banks were required to hold buffer levels of 
capital relative to the risk weighted assets of the bank (Fisher, and Pfeil 2003).  
The principle 1 followed and banks were required to hold buffer levels of capital relative to the 
risk weighted assets of the bank. Amendments resulted in Principle II and Principle III but its 
main focus was to manage maturity mismatches and required assets of certain maturities to be 
related to liabilities.  In the main, the German banking act of 1969 remained relatively 
unchanged. Table 2.3 summarizes the banking acts and amendments during the period I931 and 
2002. It should also be pointed out that the next amendment to the 1969 act followed after the  
collapse of Bankhauss Herstatt as a consequence of over exposure to large speculative position in 
the FX market (Herring and Litan 1995). 
Banking regulation in the UK is similar to Germany in that the introduction of legislation and 
various acts was as a result of banking crises in the UK The banking acts of 1979 and 1987 was 
in direct response to a series of crises. The secondary banking crises in 1979 after a number of 
fringe banks collapsed during the 1960s due to poor management.  
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Table 2 4 A history of German Banking Regulations 
 
Source Hermann, Fisher, and Pfeil 2003 
Before the 1979 enactment there had been no supervision of banks in the UK and in general, 
banks merely took instructions from the Bank of England. The banking act 1987 gave the BOE 
more power to extract information from banks regarding the prudential returns as well as their 
internal systems. The act came into force mainly as a consequence of bad banking practices for 
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example, in the case of Johnson Matthey bankers (lending parameters exceeding that of BOE 
requirements). Relaxed banking supervision meant that no early warning signal or fail safe 
mechanism existed to alert the BOE.  
The development of the Financial Services Authority 
In 1997 the government (labour party at the time) announced that the power of the BOE would 
be passed over to a new authority - namely the Financial Services Authority, or FSA 
interestingly, also removed was the regulation in which treated the way banks dealt with its 
customers. In its place was the establishment of the Ombudsman, which in turn looked at 
specific cases where banks had dubious dealings. The Ombudsman in certain cases has sufficient 
powers to heavily fine banks with poor practices relating to customer issues.  The 1997 act was 
succeeded by the FSA act in 2000 the broad approach was generally one of a risk-based 
approach, which oversee the whole of the financial services. The Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) (1999/2000) effectively took on the role of super-regulator, replacing the (SIB), and 
became responsible for the regulation of banks and building societies. These regulatory standards 
ensure that senior management of financial institutes implement and maintain adequate control 
systems. The FSA have sufficient powers to discipline those managers that are not acting within 
the regulatory regime.  
To achieve this, FSA engage with senior management at banks in setting up systems and 
controls, and this aims to protect shareholders, creditors and customers. The tripartite system of 
regulations comprises of: 
The bank of England – responsible for overseeing the monetary policy and systematic stability 
within the UK. 
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The Financial Services Authority – legislated by the Financial Services Act 2000 (FSA) – 
responsible for supervising the financial intermediaries.  In addition, the FSA oversees and 
supervises securities, clearing settlements and the conduct of business supervision. 
The Treasury responsible overall for the structure and the governing legislation. The Treasury 
has no responsibilities regarding the FSA or the bank of England 
Section 4 - Bank culture – Hierarchy, and Market-led 
Organisational theory suggests that behaviour and behavioural adjustment centres on the values 
and beliefs held by the organisation. It also suggests that the institutional effect determined is by 
the macro-environment.  The institution is shaped through the prescription of norms, which give 
legitimisation. The academic literature suggests that the environment cause differences in risk 
behaviour (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982,). Starbuck (1973), and March, (1988); suggest that 
decision styles largely vary with differing societies. 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), argue that values and attitudes of individuals vary according to 
their institutional types and attitudes to risk vary accordingly. The institutional types: Hierarchy, 
(collectivist), and Market, (individualist), separate German and UK banks. At first glance, UK 
banks are individualist and have a propensity to externalise risk by transferring onto customers 
through the taking of security and interest rate adjustment. German banks however, collectively 
share risk through the relationship model (Lane and Quack 2001).  
The institutional types of organisations shape and determine normative patterns of behaviour 
through a number of influences exerted by the organisation, which in turn shape the behaviour of 
employees.  
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On one hand, German culture exhibits collectivist behaviour that is to say, individuals are 
strongly connected, but very different and the development of the institutional type takes the 
hierarchical form with laws that regulate individual action and provide for social weaker 
members for example, Lane and Quack, (2001), and Deeg; (1996), suggested that German banks 
have a strong orientation towards the common good, both in their locality, and the welfare of 
their members.  
According to German state law, both the savings and cooperative banks should interact with 
small firms within their community in an attempt to facilitate growth and stimulate the economy 
(Deeg 1992). In addition, the state guides German banks through regulation, various grants, and 
privileges to achieve their goals in their pursuit of the business opportunities within their 
communities. The collectivist view also held by German government’s intervention through state 
funding of SMEs.  
In both countries, the state supports loan development grants for smaller businesses, particularly 
those small firms that have long-term prospects but have difficulty in raising finance (Lane and 
Quack 2001). Such schemes have been in operation since the 1950s in Germany, and 
subsequently introduced in 1981 in the UK. However, fundamental problems are apparent for 
smaller start-ups, largely because of asymmetric information and therefore grants can be limiting 
the amount and the terms.  
Normally start-up companies supported loans are around 70 per cent of the total loan, but limited 
to loan amounts: between £5,000 and £100,000, whereas established small firms have a ceiling 
of £250,000.  (Lane and Quack 2001) found that during the period between 1990 and 1995 the 
volume of loan issued guarantees was three times higher in Germany than in the UK.           
 59 
 
The reason for such a disparity was the size of the firm by comparison to their German 
counterparts. Another factor was the low take-up by UK firms. German banks were more willing 
to assist firms in setting up loans compared to UK banks. The annual SFLG (2006/7) report 
suggested that UK retail banks saw a decline in the take-up of SFLG schemes. One reason cited 
was that small to medium firms having revenues less than £100,000. However, the government 
did go on to review the SFLG scheme, which led to changes in the structure and criteria of loans 
(Teresa Graham 2003). 
The individualist cultural aspects of the UK as argued by academics Douglas and Wildavsky 
(1982), Lane and Quack (2001) show individuals as being similar, but have little or no obligation 
to one another, individuals prefer and enjoy differences more than similarities and seek to avoid 
central authority.   
UK banks serve the shareholder value (SHV). Profitability and a shift towards an Anglo-Saxon 
banking model are at the forefront of the main private banks in Germany (Lane and Quack 
2001). The shift towards the Anglo Saxon model suggests that sub sections of society take on the 
individualist institution type. Hellwig suggests that organisations are profit takers and 
strategically designed to be effective, and do not have the specific goal of serving the local 
communities but instead achieve their visionary goals of serving the shareholder. The differences 
in the institutional types manifest in different behaviour types this part of the section reviews the 
academic literature, which examines the lending process between banks and SMEs. 
Section - 5 How Banks influence loan officers to effect changes   
The academic literature that examines the lending technologies adopted by banks tends to focus 
on the instruments employed during the initial stages of the lending process. Bank lending 
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models in their design tend to be a one fits all, but strong evidence from academics suggest that 
in some cases loan officers are discretionary during the lending process itself (Lane and Quack 
2001) which could have an impact on the outcome on the lending decision. Not much research is 
devoted to the dynamic of loan officers operating in their respective environments. Therefore this 
section looks at the attitudinal differences between lending officers at both German and UK 
banks.   
The financing of small firms and the risks involved in the lending decision generally involves 
bank managers to act as rational decision makers and adhere universally to valid assumptions 
about risk assessment (Lane and Quack 2001). However, cross-national studies of small firm 
financing in the UK and Germany have demonstrated that differing strategies of risk 
management have led to nationally distinctive bank-firm relations with diverse outcomes for 
small firm development (Storey 1994). The studies undertaken do not address issues relative to 
management perceptions and practices, and within this context, an understanding of risk is 
relatively unexplored. Clearly, to examine cross-national divergence in bank managerial practice, 
it is necessary to consider the institutional environment in which these relations are embedded. 
The approach, which examines the institutional effect, identifies not only the regulatory and state 
influences, but also the cultural influences, such as the different goals and assumptions of 
rationality.    
The two economic models are quite different, particularly in relation to the relevance of and 
relationship with risk and risk aversion. Luhmann, (1993); and Douglas, and Wildavsky (1982);  
contend that risk and the degree of risk aversion are often dependent on individual attitudes, 
which are socially constructed and supported by the statute books of economic need for the 
community.  
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UK firms perceive risk as a set of goals, profitability, and security. German firms are in pursuit 
of sustainability and security, including a low degree of risk acceptance. However, the small firm 
in the United Kingdom and its high-risk culture is widely proclaimed.  The idea of bankruptcy 
within a social context generates fear for the small German enterprise; conversely, SMEs 
operating in the United Kingdom do not attach as much importance to the stigma of being 
insolvent and descending into receivership (Baecker 1993). Douglas, and Wildavsky (1982) 
suggests that risk is socially constructed, and that banks and small firms are socially planned, and 
constructed by a group of actors Hall and Taylor (1996) point out that a bank’s intention to be 
objective through numerical scoring and other quantitative models is not always efficient in the 
allocation of credit. March (1998) reinforces the proposition and expresses the idea that 
individual behaviour is shaped to the values, meaning systems and assumptions of rationality, as 
embodied in institutions.  The contributions of (March 1998) in this area may give rise to the 
notion that at macro levels, normative, regulative effects should be factored into the discussion 
regarding risk.  Scott (1995) argues that these factors can contaminate perception towards risk 
and are often difficult to disentangle in any empirical analysis of managerial decision-making 
practices.  Lane and Quack (2001) also suggest that these factors have become the norm and 
eventual habitual trait characteristics of managers, which in turn embrace societal values. A 
clearer understanding emerges if the nature of institutionalisation and decisions combine to 
examine risk.  
The institutional type of an organisation influences the way people behave and ultimately 
determines their decision behaviour. Decision making generally falls into two discrete 
categories: Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) argue that risk is socially constructed, and that banks 
and small firms are socially planned, and constructed by a group of actors.  
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March (1998) proposed the idea that individual behaviour is shaped to the values, meaning 
systems and assumptions of rationality, as embodied in institutions. Scott (1995) argues that 
these factors can contaminate perception towards risk and are often difficult to disentangle in any 
empirical analysis of managerial decision-making practices. Lane and Quack (2001) also suggest 
that these factors have become the norm and eventual habitual trait characteristics of managers, 
which in turn embrace societal values. A clearer understanding emerges if the nature of 
institutionalisation and decisions are combine to examine risk. The structure of an organisation 
influences the way people behave and ultimately determines their decision behaviour 
According to (Bartol and Martin 2002), the rational model manifests in managers engaging in 
rational decision processes following possession of all relevant information. Managers ultimately 
make optimal decisions, which include all possible outcomes. Berry and Grant (2004) argue that 
significant variations exist between German and UK banks in the ways that they manage risk. 
German banks operate a structure of strict processes, with each procedure standardised for each 
class of borrower. Academic literature (Hoffman 2002, Dawson 1996) implies that institutional 
change is generally as a result of outside pressure being exerted onto the organisation. 
Institutional changes are subsequently communicated to employees usually by further training or 
with new employees by some form of induction following appointments of new staff. Studies by 
(Quack, O’Reilly and Hildebrandt 1995) suggest that there are major differences between UK 
and German banks in the recruitment, training and retention of bank employees, for example, 
German banks, employ different practices, which include the induction and institutional 
conditioning based on a hierarchy orientation, but in the case of UK banks orientation is towards 
the market led institution typically based on the shareholder approach shareholders. Training in 
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UK banks has been largely ‘on the job’ training and newcomers typically undergo training for a 
period of approximately three years.      
Nevertheless, the intensity of competition and pressure on profits has meant limitations on 
training budgets. Quack, O’Reilly and Hildebrandt (1995) argue that rapid changes in the 
environment and technology meant that banks were not making the necessary preparations for 
adjustment and adaptation. This may be indicative that lending behaviour and the various 
sophisticated instruments for evaluation of risk have lessened the need for highly skilled and 
highly trained loan officers; rather an officer’s ability to align to the banks’ products and specific 
services.     
In contrast, the German banking training system has one of the highest levels of internal training 
in Germany (Quack O’Reilly and Hildebrandt 1995).  In the main, German banks train 
employees over a period of three years and recruit from the graduate population. However, costs 
of training to banks in Germany are high. Quack, O’Reilly and Hildebrandt (1995) point to the 
fact that the turnover rate of staff is higher than that of UK banks. In UK banks, there is a 
predominance of school leavers with GCSE or ‘O’ level standard education. During the 1980s, 
the UK Association of Communicators in Business (CIB) qualification geared toward the 
development of managerial staff, providing them with qualifications to facilitate entrance to 
higher management roles (Quack, O’Reilly, and Hildebrandt 1995). 
There has been a decline in demand, and membership numbers have fallen following 
recessionary periods and the desire by UK banks to restructure and train in-house (Seal and Croft 
1997).    
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Quack, O’Reilly and Hildebrandt (1995) implied that banks are ill equipped to deal with the 
basic core tasks of objective risk handling. UK banks also make use of resources outside; 
resources such as marketing and computer technology are widely used.  
The introduction of the UK NVQ system in 1993 received with little or no interest by the banks. 
Banks in Britain are extremely competitive and consider the training of their own recruits as a 
means to preserve knowledge within a specific organisation; they largely see the employment of 
the NVQ as a universal mechanism, which can enable bank staff to hop from one bank to another 
(Quack, O’Reilly and Hildebrandt 1995). Quack, O’Reilly and Hildebrandt (1995) further argue 
that UK banks spend less on training than German banks, and therefore, UK bank employees 
may be more likely to become more reliant on a particular culture embedded into the institution 
of that particular bank.  This effectively demonstrates and shows that cultural differences exist 
between the four main banks in the UK and therefore it would be implicit that variations of 
lending behaviour also exist (Lane and Quack 2001).  
Banks maximise their efforts to achieve high returns to their shareholders and are under 
increasing pressure to sell more services and more products.  The intensity of competition breeds 
an aggressive selling culture. UK banks attempt to increase market share by convincing potential 
customers to switch to their services. The pressures on staff members are such that the friendly 
banking service has become more sales focused as opposed to offering specific financial 
intermediary services. The comparative studies France, Germany and the UK (Quack, O’Reilly 
and Hildebrandt 1995) show market pressures have led to a general decline in training bank 
employees. 
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Funding gaps for young SMEs in the UK and Germany 
In the past three decades funding gaps have been a common source of debate by a number of 
academics and report committees, the first identified by the MacMillan Report in the UK in 1931 
and has since been emphasized in many instances, for example (Bolton Committee Report, 
1971); (Stanworth and Gray, 1991).  The discussions and debate by academics will no doubt 
continue following the new regulatory approach that banks adopt after the Basle II Accord 
phases in. Access to finance (Freel 2000, Storey 1997; Binks, and Enew 1996,) is a major hurdle 
for the growth of SMEs. Deakins and Hussain (Quack)1994) further argued that a general 
funding gap exists for small firms. The survey conducted by the Bank of England (2002) 
highlighted that at least ten per cent of small firms were making use of credit cards as a means of 
funding operations and investments. A research debate continues over the relationships that exist 
between access to capital and the investment decisions of small firms Lean and Tucker 2001). 
However, given the right economic opportunities and cost condition, and timing of market entry, 
the sourcing of external funds provides a perfect substitute for internal capital (De Meza and 
Webb 2000). According to Binks and Enew (1996), Deakins and Hussain (1994), Storey (1997), 
and Cosh and Hughes (2003), funding gaps for small firms is a major barrier for growth. The 
survival and growth of small firms when compared to larger firms clearly highlights special 
financing problems. Smaller firms are limited in their ability to access funding via venture 
capital funding or business angels (individuals with private sources). Allen (White)2001) 
suggests that ‘bootstrapping’   is commonly adopted by start-up businesses, which essentially is a 
means to begin operations with little or no resources at the start-up phase. In theory, perfect 
markets would suggest that funding would be largely unlimited – and the assertion that funding 
is unlimited alludes to the notion that firms are not therefore necessarily constrained.    
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In practice, however, funding gaps exist because at the first stage in the lending process the 
lender has no information on the borrower, particularly for a new small firm. In addition, Binks 
and Enew (1996), Bester (1987) and Bester and Hellwig (1989) suggest that monitoring is costly 
and banks seek instead to ration credit. Banks have an advantage to accumulate information, but 
banks cannot necessarily gather all information and consequently a funding gap continues to 
exist and a constraint on credit is applied to firms likely to default on loans.  (Deakins and 
Hussain 1974) also found that banks face a two-fold dilemma in their decision to lend to firms – 
first the dilemma of adverse selection, giving rise to the second dilemma, moral hazard 
(discussed previously in the review).  
New firms have a tendency to initiate start-ups through self-finance or by other means such as 
friends or family. Cruickshank (2000) suggested that a high proportion of small firms have a 
tendency to self-finance following disparity after attempting to gain credit through the 
commercial banks (Cosh and Hughes 1994).  
New firms have no accurate evidence, or empirical data to reassure the bank that future revenue 
streams will be forthcoming. Banks therefore face difficulties in gathering information from new 
firms. This gives rise to an increase in the degree of risk, causing a rise in premiums to lower the 
bank’s exposure to risk.  Small firms are reluctant to pay significantly higher charges than those 
paid by larger businesses, and banks’ general reluctance to engage with SMEs can give rise to a 
general funding gap (Cruickshank 2000).  In most cases, SMEs experience a number of barriers 
when accessing credit from commercial banks and consequently continue to face difficulties 
(Binks and Enew 2002).  
These difficulties are a continuing source of debate amongst small businesses and banks; 
consequently, it is more likely that small firms will make use of retained profits. Many small 
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SMEs have no choice but to use other sources of financing for both business start-up and 
continuing operations. Other methods firms adopt include the formation of alliances or 
partnerships with firms already operating in the market. Cressy (1993) argues that approximately 
30 per cent of small start-up firms access funding through overdraft facilities, and that this is 
utilised in capital operations 
Awareness of these problems might prevent the start of ventures, and may prevent entrepreneurs 
from entering the market following buoyancy. The continuation of the debate in research, in the 
late 1980s, was largely empirical.  Work by (Cowling 1998), for example, argues that small 
firms are discouraged from entering markets because of refusal by UK banks to lend.  Hughes 
and Leube (1997) found that small firm loan applications had fallen from 98 per cent in the 
1990s to 17 per cent in 2002. However, further studies (Carter and Allen 1997) also found that 
14.3 per cent reflected the overall turn down rates for small firms. Hughes refers to this type of 
rejection as “hard credit rationing” and suggests that it largely surfaces as the result of the firm’s 
inability to produce security.  This view, further evidenced by Storey (1994), suggests that firms 
are discouraged largely because it is the entrepreneurs’ belief that loans are difficult to obtain 
and this thereby causes discouragement. In addition, entrepreneurs stated that the fact that banks 
take high collateral from firms as a decision-making factor is discouraging when contemplating 
loan applications.  
Keasey and Watson (1993), argue that base rates are determined through macroeconomic factors, 
but the marginal rate of interest is the basis of a number of elements. Cowling (1998) suggests 
that banks charge small firms margins which are significantly above rates charged to larger 
firms, from which it may be implicit that banks are in a stronger position throughout negotiation 
than the small firms.       
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On the other hand, Cruickshank (2000) argued that during the early start-up phase, small firms 
were not reliant on external funding, but instead found other sources to fund projects. He further 
argued that capital markets in the UK operate adequately; however, Hughes (1997), Storey 
(1994), and Cosh et al (2005) argue that firms perceive access to credit as a major barrier for 
growth and market entry (Freel 2000; Storey 1997; Binks and Enew 1996; Deakins and Hussain 
1991). Frazer (2004) argues that the take up rate for external funding by small firms in the UK 
was relatively low by comparison with other European countries. Frazer (2004) suggested that 
only 44% took external funding over the three preceding years.   
Evidence presented by a (Cambridge Survey 1996) showed that most entrepreneurs believed that 
a constraint on financing was a deciding factor for entrance to market. The other side of these 
arguments also bring into account the alternative methods that young SMEs resort to in financing 
their future investment opportunities, for example, mezzanine finance and leasing. In addition, 
the comments in the Cruikshank report 2000, SMEs make use of factoring debt. This is 
particularly relevant because German SMEs do seize the opportunity to arrange mezzanine 
capital as a substitute for bank gaps in funding.  The equity gap in SMEs in Germany is 
relatively small by comparison to the UK (Bannier and Grote 2008) and found that German 
SMEs tend to hold a greater proportion of equity than debt when compared to UK SMEs.  
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Table 2 5 Cambridge Survey 
Constraint (mean score) 
Type of firm Increasi
ng 
compet
ition 
Overall 
growth of 
market 
demand 
Marketing 
and sales 
skills 
Manage
-ment 
skills 
Availability 
and cost of 
finance for 
expansion 
Availability 
and cost of 
overdraft 
finance 
All 2.90 2.89 2.69 2.62 2.58 2.36 
Manufacturing 2.95 3.02 2.69 2.58 2.52 2.31 
Services 2.84 2.75 2.70 2.66 2.65 2.41 
Micro 2.52 2.54 2.56 2.54 2.78 2.52 
Small 2.97 2.98 2.71 2.58 2.56 2.36 
Medium 3.20 3.23 2.92 2.68 2.33 2.20 
Large 3.14 2.88 2.64 3.21 2.42 2.07 
Source Cambridge 1996 
State funding 
Government funding to help plug an equity gap in SME finance is commonly employed in 
conjunction with banks in Germany but little evidence has shown that this method is widely 
adopted by banks in the UK. In both countries, the state supports loan development grants for 
young SMEs, particularly those that have long-term prospects but difficulty in raising finance 
(Lane and Quack, 2001). Such schemes have been in operation since the 1950s in Germany and 
introduced into the UK in 1981. Fundamental problems however, are apparent for smaller start-
ups, largely because of asymmetric information problems and therefore grants can be limiting in 
the amount and the terms.  
Normally young start-up company support loans are around 70 per cent of the total funding 
needs, but limited to loan amounts at between £5,000 and £100,000, whereas established small 
firms have a ceiling of £250,000.  Lane and Quack (2001) found in field research that during the 
period between 1990 and 1995 the volume of loan issued guarantees was three times higher in 
 70 
 
Germany than in Britain. The reason for such disparity was the size of the firm by comparison to 
their German counterparts; another factor was the low take-up by UK firms. German banks were 
more willing to assist firms in setting up loans compared to UK banks. The annual SFLGS 
(2006/7) report suggested that UK retail banks saw a decline in the take-up of SFLGS 
guarantees. One reason cited was that small to medium firms had revenues of less than £100,000 
(I.e.: they were too small. The government did however, go on to review the SFLGS, which led 
to changes in the structure and criteria of loans (Graham, 2003).  
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Section Six - Types of Approaches used for lending to SMEs & Attitudinal 
Differences between German and UK banks 
The literature discusses two approaches to lending, adopted by banks in order to overcome the 
problems of information asymmetry, these are well documented. Berry, Grant and Jarvis (2004), 
characterise the ‘going concern’ approach as future oriented, focusing on the generation of future 
revenues. The ‘going concern’ approach requires considerable skills on the part of bank officers 
and is considered more complex than that of the ‘gone concern’ approach and significantly more 
costly. 
Banks also adopt the ‘gone concern’ approach; taking into account the initial assets of the 
business and acting as a measure of loan repayments (Wilson, 1979). Berry, Grant and Jarvis 
(2004) describe the ‘gone concern’ approach as primarily, a method in which banks secure any 
borrowings by trading off any security or assets taken by way of fixed and floating charges. 
Banks adopt the ‘gone concern’ approach where liquidation occurs, a trade-off against assets is 
achieved through the willingness of shareholders and directors for the banks to take a charge on 
assets to secure borrowing and in the event of a worst case scenario, banks can salvage part, if 
not all, of their investment. 
Several researchers have looked at this area but probably the most telling survey was that 
undertaken by Berry, Grant and Jarvis (2004), which revealed that UK clearing banks never 
actively engaged in the ‘going concern’ approach when lending to SMEs. The results also 
revealed that European banks nearly always adopted the ‘going concern’ approach, this in turn 
tended to foster closer relations with the SME. This was contrary to UK banks adopting the 
‘gone concern’ approach which relies on secured lending. Although evidence does suggest 
(Berger and Udell, 2004) financial statement lending is commonly practised, in general, the 
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financial statements should be audited by certified accountants over a period of not less than 2 
years. Banks tend to look at the credibility of auditors and in addition, the accounting standards 
and practice within the organisation. 
Transactional Approaches to Lending 
In the past, small business loan lending, generally involved close contact with the borrower, a 
strong knowledge of local activities, and markets (Peterson and Rajan, 2002). With the rapid 
change in the competitive nature of banks plus the advent of new technology (particularly credit 
scoring)  it has become possible to underwrite transaction loans based on hard information. 
Allen, DeLong and Saunders (1999), characterise transaction lending as being portfolio based, 
adopting a number of credit scoring measurement tools to determine the creditworthiness of a 
borrower. There appears to be strong evidence which points towards transaction lending having 
some distinct advantages particularly in lowering costs and at the same time increasing the 
output of loans being granted (Hannan, 2003; Frame, 2004; Berger, Frame and Miller, 2005). 
Another distinct advantage is that no face-to-face contact is required thus enabling banks to 
conduct business anywhere in the country. Documentation is minimal, mainly because only the 
credit history is under review. Feldman (1997) observes a reduction in loan losses owing to the 
bank’s portfolio diversification. De Young, Nigro and Glenon (2008) argue that the problems 
associated with transaction lending, damage relationships, due to factors such as the heavy use of 
central call centres, leading in turn to failures in the communication between the bank and the 
SMEs. SMEs attempting to access funds face difficulty and have become disenchanted by the 
actions of banks to adopt the use of credit scoring to measure a firm’s creditworthiness. Other 
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forms of lending adopted by banks are the financial statement and loans are granted or denied 
based on the strength of the statement. 
Other disadvantages with credit scoring models is that the information is primarily based on the 
personal details of the owner rather than the small business these sources of information typically 
include income debt and home ownership publicly available details which are generally collected 
by credit scoring agencies (Feldman 1997 and Mester 1997). Data is entered into a loan 
prediction model which yields a score a summary statistic for the loan. (Berger and Udell 2004) 
also point out that in some case the decision is solely based on the rule set down by computerised 
parameters with some overrides. 
Small firms attempting to access funds face difficulty and have become disenchanted by the 
actions of UK banks following their strategies to adopt the use of credit scoring to measure a 
firm’s credibility. UK banks adopt these tactics and processes in order to cut down operating 
costs and increase profitability (Mester 1997, Rossi 1998, Berger and Scott 2005). 
The centralisation of banks and the adoption of communications and high technology have 
reduced the need for banks to have face-to face contact with SMEs, which have compounded and 
accentuated distant relationship or “arm’s length” lending. Only a limited amount of research 
exists in the area, which examines the effects of distant loans to small firms. 
Research undertaken by Lane and Quack (2001) suggests that bank culture, the 
institutionalisation of its lending officers and the interaction between firms and banks is 
discriminative towards particular markets and small firms.   
Bank pursuance and goal realisation vary significantly between UK and German bank cultures 
(Llewellyn, 2006). UK banks are in pursuit of higher returns with fewer costs, realised through 
taking collateral to offset uncertainty and minimise exposure in the event of default probability. 
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As Lane and Quack (2001) suggest, this is a form of externalisation through risk transference 
onto the small firm’s borrowings. On the other hand, institutional differences in German banks, 
namely their hierarchical structure, mean that they focus more on the future flow of funding by 
monitoring those from the present.      
Lane and Quack (2001) also suggest that any evidence of the externalisation of risk is largely 
through risk sharing schemes such as government supported guarantee schemes previously 
mentioned. These have been used in the UK, since 1981. UK loan officers have made heavy use 
of variable interest rates under the terms of the contract, offering a degree of protection to the 
bank against fluctuations in the general economy and the money markets. 
In contrast, German banks use loan agreements with fixed terms and conditions, implying that 
goal pursuance is a longer-term strategy. Recent evidence from the Bank of England (2002) 
suggests slight movements towards fixed-term lending by UK banks.  Loan officers attempt to 
mitigate risk by dealing with those firms in higher risk categories. 
Banks achieved their objectives through increases of interest premia, increases in monitoring and 
making use of collateral. Banks did not accept the cost of bearing that risk, but would make use 
of the risk instruments if the small firm absorbed the cost. 
German banks were less likely to adopt this type of strategy to minimise risk but would instead 
identify groups that reflect a lower risk. Additionally, German banks believed that the use of 
higher interest rates to mitigate risk would be counterproductive because the cost, competition 
and the reluctance of small firms could influence interest rates set in the contract.  
Differences in the lending process are brought about not only by risk, and the perception of risk 
within the institutional context, but also by differences in the individual perception of risk 
between the lending officer and the firm applying for credit. 
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Problems that UK banks experienced following the economic slump in the early 1990s may have 
triggered the idea of institutional memory and procyclicality in the lending behaviour of banks 
(Berger and Udell, 2003).  The survey data collected by Berger and Udell (2003) in the United 
States between 1980 and 2000, on commercial growth loans however, did not reflect these 
phenomena. The research examined and compared differences with regard to banks’ 
management of internalised risk, conceptualised as the processes of managing applications 
through to contractual terms of debt offered to businesses.  Lane and Quack (2001) and Berry 
and Grant (2004) reveal significant variations in banks’ management of internalised risk; 
research reveals that German banks operate a structure of stringent processes and each procedure 
is standardised, which is likened to the bureaucratic structure driven through the single action of 
subordinated behaviour.   
Table 2.6 illustrates the approaches to lending, with banks adopting a number of techniques to 
assess risk. 
Table 2 6 Approaches to Bank Lending 
 
Source Grant and Berry2004  
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   These standardised approaches to risk partially devolve the risk assessment onto individual 
staff members. Recently, German banks, however, have adopted a team focus approach 
following fierce competition, with a view to increasing efficiencies in the clearing of 
applications.  
Responsibility and ceiling levels of loan applications were in the order of approximately 
€200,000 – €500,000, contrasting with the levels of responsibility of their UK banking 
counterparts.  Lending officers in UK banks were limited to ceiling levels of £40,000; above this 
threshold, staff had to refer to senior levels of management (Lane and Quack, 2001, Deakins and 
Husain, 1994, Hutchinson and Killop, 1992). Similarities were apparent, however, in the systems 
controlling and managing internalised risk.  Thus far, the literature speaks of evidence of 
variations in the method of operating and managing risk between both countries. There are 
variations in the terms of contracts and the various instruments adopted to mitigate risk.   
Relationship Approaches to Lending 
Previous literature has argued that relationship lending offers distinct advantages to one or both 
parties because the intermediary has access to proprietary information (Rajan, 1992 and Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994). The relationship approach allows banks to strategically acquire proprietary 
information and to create a threat of adverse selection for their rivals, thereby softening price 
competition.  Another contrasting difference in the relationship verses the transaction approach is 
the information advantage; for example, Petersen and Rajan (2002) argue that local banks 
collecting “soft” proprietary information on small firms, consequently have an informational 
advantage over more remote competitors who might not enjoy the same degree of access to local 
information. Further, the better qualitative information a bank has, the more willing it should be 
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to approve loan applications.  But also the higher the interest rate conditional on the applicant’s 
credit quality (von Thadden, 2004 and Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). By contrast, remote and 
less well informed transactional lenders should charge lower rates and be more reluctant to grant 
credit to applicants of comparable credit quality (Broecker, 1990 and Hauswald and Marquez, 
2003).  
Peterson and Rajan (1994); Boot and Thackor (1994) and Lane and Quack (2001), suggest that 
German banks mitigate some uncertainty through the relationship lending approach and this 
approach to lending leads to a reduction in the rate of interest. 
During the period of the loan, information is collected and used to refine the rate of interest, 
reducing the need for collateralisation (Diamond, 1991; Thackor, 1984; Prescott and Boyd, 
1986). 
Lane and Quack (2001); Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990), assert that the relationship between the 
firm and the bank, gain benefits through transparency of information which would otherwise be 
hidden. Berger and Udell (2003) argue that relationship lending is an effective tool to acquire 
soft information. Udell and Yamori (2008) found that the dissemination of soft information 
throughout an organisation was an important factor; they suggest that the cumulative effect of 
data gathering, over the course of time generates a lowering of interest. Studies have shown  that 
relationship banking amongst the Hausbanks servicing the SME market is very much alive, 
(Elsas and Krahnen, 2003). 
Relationship banking can best be characterised as bankers with the ability to obtain more than 
average information about their customers (Allen and Gale, 2001) and in this process, the 
lending relationship is distinguishable from transaction lending since the latter relies purely on 
hard quantitative information (Berger and Udell, 2002).  Schwarze (2006) found that out of 549 
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German banks, qualitative information extracted via the relationship process, showed remarkable 
results predicting failure. These results are counter-argued by Grunert et al. (2005) suggesting 
that both qualitative and quantitative information when combined, improved failure prediction 
more effectively. Interestingly, the survey also revealed that about 85% of German banks took a 
view that they valued their relationship with customers as one of their most valuable assets. 
The merits of both transaction and relationship lending will no doubt continue to be argued by 
academics during the course of time, particularly in light of the recent financial crisis. 
Researchers are already pointing the finger towards the lack of control by bankers mainly 
because they didn’t know their customers. 
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Section Seven Conclusions 
Section one in Chapter Two initially examined whether market-based banking and bank based 
views would show differences in banks’ approach to lending. The typology used from Kunt and 
Levine (1999) showed that bank-based views were predominantly based on the relationship 
proposition; market-based banking strongly featured distant relationships. Nevertheless, Levine 
also indicated that no one type offered any particular advantage in terms of efficiency or the 
acceleration of credit decisions but in fact, the regulatory and legal structure accounted for the 
effectiveness of a country’s economic growth.   
Section two reviews the literature relevant to bank intermediation and the problems of 
asymmetry between banks and SMEs, this is relevant, and links to the notion that banks are 
generally reluctant to engage with SMEs because the cost of dealing with asymmetric problems 
and monitoring cost far outweigh the benefits to the bank. 
This dilemma can also lead to problems of credit rationing, Besanko and Thakor (1988); 
Williamson (1987); Milde and Riley (1988). have suggested that the problems of SMEs and their 
opacity leads to credit rationing, however, the propositions are based on a number of theoretical 
models and still no clear evidence that the relationship between asymmetry and credit rationing 
actually link. 
Section three of this chapter looked at the academic literature associated with the regulatory 
environment in both Germany and the UK. Whilst some academics have argued that regulatory 
conditions change the behaviour of banks, some argued that banks are not constrained by 
regulations, but have an ability to interpret in their favour and that capital adequacy, and 
constraints were, or are, managed effectively(Jackson 1999). These aspects also touched on the 
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agency issues inherent in the loan officers’ position. The literature showed  that given the 
intention to increase profits to shareholders by most banks, there was therefore a high tendency 
to take risk (Alexandra, 2004). The regulatory framework which monitors the banks’ activities 
were in fact being influenced by the monitoring of those very banks. 
Sections Four and Five covered the research relevant to the structure of banks, this was an 
important component and relevant to the way banks organise themselves both in response to the 
external and regulatory environment. As we have already seen from Jackson (1999), banks were 
adjusting capital buffers to a point where capital constraint was needed. Evidenced from the 
work of Deeg (1996) showed that German banks are operating a collectivist institutional type, on 
the UK side, (Lane and Quack, 2001) in their work identified UK banks as being market-led and 
more individualistic, this fits neatly into the work of (Llewellyn 2006), which separates the two 
(e.g. shareholder and stakeholder approach)  
Section Six also reviewed the academic literature relevant to attitudinal differences between 
German and UK banks in their lending approaches. Llewellyn (2006) and Lane and Quack 
(2001) show that attitudinal differences arise from the differing bank cultures. Llewellyn (2002) 
argues that UK retail banks have a shareholder approach, whereas, German bankers adopt a 
stakeholders approach; however, it remains to be seen if the two approaches are widely different 
from the lending side. This was evident from the lending approaches because both countries 
made use of technology and scoring techniques.  
The commercial banks in Britain adopt a portfolio-type strategy favouring class-based individual 
assessment, using a quantitative approach. There is also evidence that UK banks have a tendency 
to disregard the qualitative data; in contrast, German banks follow a more case-based approach, 
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using information accumulated over a period of time. UK banks are unwilling to standardise 
their procedures, they are geared instead toward the driving strategy of leaner organisations. 
Evidence would suggest (Cruickshank 2000) that UK banks’ returns on pre-taxation profits were 
in excess of £5 billion. Although this may not necessarily reflect differences of margins that 
relate directly to credit advances, Cruickshank (Governers,  et al.)2000) argues that standard 
rates of returns would ordinarily not reflect a return higher than that of the standard cost of 
capital.  The proposition here may suggest that higher than normal profits are obtained through 
the determination of market premium, which, as evidenced, is abnormal compared to model 
banking sectors. Cruickshank (2000) (Governers,  et al.)argues that UK banks are highly 
concentrated and homogeneous and that their prevailing market power is operated through a kind 
of oligopoly.  A strand of research argues that banks are proactive in their strategy to entice less 
risky borrowers through the instrument of adjustment and lowering the levels of interest.  
This strategy attracts borrowers with high collateral, which implies that payment default is 
unlikely. The banks also externalise the cost of loan terms, administration, and monitoring 
charges. It is argued however that arbitrary pricing presents agency problems between the loan 
officer and the small firm bank loan officers, these may be driven by factors other than the 
regulatory accord recommended by the Basel report. Officers of the bank may be steered by the 
provision of performance-related bonuses to restrict loans covertly to risky borrowers or heighten 
the variable interest rate in order to ensure that their bank’s profit objectives are maximised.  
The Principal / Agency problem may lead to alignment of loan granting predominantly to 
collateralised borrowers, this assures repayment and consequently, the actions of the loan officer 
are acceptable to the institutional bank strategy.  The foregoing may be implicit in the sense that 
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a reverberating effect manifests itself through unstable markets. In contrast, German banks have 
stricter regulatory controls to mitigate the Principal / Agent problem.  
Evidence supports the hypothesis that banks, through loan officers, arbitrarily adjust the terms of 
payments and the small firm continues to take the risk, thus increasing the probability of risk 
default to the point of insolvency (Besanko and Kanatas, 1993). 
Banks ration credit, particularly to young small start-up firms (Bolton, 1971 and Wilson, 1979).  
Banks believe that these firm types are considered too risky and deny access to funding.  In some 
instances however, banks offset regulatory accords by increasing interest on the loan referred to 
as ‘Type ll’ (De Mezza and Webb, 2000). Loan officers expect to align themselves to bank 
strategy and have a duty to the shareholders of the bank but previous experiences may lead to 
perception towards risk becoming distorted (Lane and Quack, 2001). Douglas and Wildavsky 
(1982) elaborate on this view and contend that risk perception and its consequent distortion 
manifest as previous institutional exposure. It may therefore be implicit that short-termism and 
high profits are factors in the arbitrary adjustment of interest rates. There is no clear evidence to 
suggest that a correlation exists between the margin set by the bank and the failure of the firm. 
Banks in Germany do set lower margin rates than UK banks, which may have an influencing 
effect on a firm’s ability to succeed during the growth stages.   Peel, Wilson and Howarth (2003) 
suggest that a great number of failures occur through a general lack of expertise.  New firms 
entering markets face difficulty during the growth stages and a lack of strategic direction and 
vision of the actors can influence failure. In addition, there is a general reluctance on the part of 
banks to extend funding if profitability is not evident in the developing stages.  
 83 
 
The facts, arguably, suggest that amongst the variables attributed to small firm failure is an 
inability to manage finance. Small firms need cash to fund rapid growth and face difficulties 
during the growth process.  
Another component identified as a probable cause of hindrance is the problem that firms face 
when encountering government regulation. In recent times, particularly with the introduction of 
new EU regulations, firms face increasing regulatory restrictions during their operations.  
Other studies support the proposition that government regulation leads not only to the loss of 
visionary goals, but also impacts upon the future revenues of the firm due to higher compliance 
costs (Chittenden et al., 1996). Most of the evidence suggests that UK firms are constrained and 
growth is stifled.  In contrast, small firms in Germany tend to make greater use of external 
resources to offset distraction, similar strategies are evident in other parts of Europe (ENSR 
1995).  
There are major differences between the German and UK banking sector, these are borne out in 
the research. For example, Llewellyn (DTI)2002) argues that German banks orientate towards 
STV and that small business firms and German banks maintain stronger relations. In addition, 
regulatory practice and government legislation is such that German banks strive for the good of 
the community, which in turn stimulates local business and the economy as a whole.   
The literature is apparent from two clear perspectives: firstly, financial theory assumes that risk 
is measurable and adjustments of interest rates lower the risk to the bank following default on the 
loan; secondly, UK banks place a heavy reliance on measuring risk and apportioning a premium 
to enable transference of risk. Douglas and Wildasky (1982) and Lane and Quack (2001) suggest 
that risk is socially constructed and that qualitative factors influence the decision.  
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 he assumption is that banks are subjective in their lending assessments and accordingly impose 
higher premium rates on small firms in order to reduce risk. 
Earlier in the literature, clear implications that loan officers were lacking skill in the general 
assessment of risk were suggested.  This places a greater reliance on the banks’ centralised 
policies.  The notion that a banking culture existed and acted as the guiding framework in which 
officers graded risk categories was also apparent. 
The conceptual model of lending behaviour suggests that environmental pressures drive the 
institutional effect. The model illustrates the behavioural effects on loan officers after long-term 
exposure to intuitions.   
We also learn from the conceptual model the idea that societies are different and provide 
different sets of mimetic pressures, in turn altering the institutional effect and behaviour. These 
differing patterns of behaviour reflected are the differences in lending behaviour towards small 
business enterprises.  
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Chapter 3 – Research Hypothesis and Research Model  
Introduction 
This section collates the academic literature discussed in the preceding chapter to clarify the 
research objectives of this thesis. The chapter is divided into four sections and are as follows: 
section one introduces the objective of the research and its importance. Section two utilizes the 
model proposed in chapter two, and introduces the research questions at the same time 
highlighting the relevance of a conceptual model within a context of qualitative research study. 
Section two also highlights the delimitations of the study. Section three describes and details the 
hypothesis relating to the research questions that the study attempts to address. The final section 
concludes. 
Section 1 What are the research objectives and is there a need for another 
study of retail banks? 
This section outlines and justifies the need for a further study of commercial banks in both 
Germany and the UK. Earlier contributions in this study area give mixed messages about the 
merits of lending approaches that being a relationship lending approach or transaction type styles 
of business loans. Previous studies have shown that banks attitudes to SMEs do change 
according to their organisational setting, or type.   This study presents a number of arguments 
and submits that most bank lending models are too simplistic and do not take into account other 
factors such as qualitative information (Lane and Quack 2001). Additionally, this research looks 
at risk within a social context and the attitudinal differences of bank loan officers within their 
respective environments. The study aims to gain insight into the values and goal orientations of 
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UK and German banks in an attempt to discover whether different values within the context of 
institutions influence lending decisions.  
Justification for the research study 
As previously pointed out in chapter two, the research debate continues regarding capital 
constraining where banks adjust their capital buffer to adhere to regulatory practices, or do they 
interpret regulation’s as they see fit (Jackson 1999). Accordingly, key features that arise from the 
debate focus on bank behaviour and whether indeed behaviour changes according to their 
interpretation, or their respective environments or both. Therefore, a cross-national and societal 
examination of two separate banking cultures provides evidence that one set of lending practices 
can either advantage an SME or not. As several studies have shown (Lane and Quack, 2001; 
Pond, 2004) differences in lending practices and various technologies adopted tend to stem from 
the environment, regulatory pressure and the motives of the bank. In addition, other studies have 
shown that market-led and hierarchy institutions operate differently particularly when assessing 
risk.  The final issue, which justifies the study, is the relevance of loan officer’s attitudes. Only a 
small amount of work has been undertaken in this area. Some previous studies have shown that 
managers in organisations are influenced by a number of methods usually resulting in 
conformance and exhibiting normative patterns of behaviour, however, relatively unanswered 
questions were the changes of bank employees behaviour following incentive and motivation, 
and of course the personal values of loan officers. (Lane and Quack 2001) touch some the areas 
in a small survey, but a fuller study can bring richness to these grey and somewhat ambiguous 
areas. 
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The study also contributes in part to the work of other researchers who may wish to repeat a 
similar study and expand on the issues of risk through an interpretive approach. In addition, 
future researchers adopting a positivistic approach in the study of risk may gain an insight from 
an interpretive study combined with the quantitative approach. The research conducted in this 
study highlights the complex issues and barriers encountered when investigating the lending 
relationship between banks and small firms, not only from the perspective of the difficulties and 
challenges faced when studying social phenomena, but also the challenges and difficulties in 
reaching an interpretation and understanding of the issues. Moreover, in accessing and collecting 
data the researcher encountered a great many challenges. However, whilst the researcher did not 
foresee these challenges, the material led to insights from the emergent information, which led to 
a greater understanding of the phenomena.  
During the study, the researcher explored the social phenomena of risk, but also gained insights 
into bank strategies, which provides a useful platform for further research. The literature review 
led to insights into the phenomenon of risk within the context of a social setting. The combined 
approach toward an analysis of risk through the lenses of both the quantitative and qualitative 
studies helped shed some light on the rationale underpinning attitudes towards risk of loan 
officers and banks.  
The academic literature in chapter two showed some similarities between UK and German 
banking systems. For example, UK banks took more security than German banks and externalise 
the costs of monitoring and market risk onto the small firm. These attitudes towards SMEs 
suggest that UK banks would sooner leave the funding of SMEs to other intuitions, for example 
factoring, and leasing. The section concludes by arguing that research in the area of bank lending 
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behaviour can contribute to academic research interest in an area where a considerable amount of 
interest and attention is being paid.   
 
The research objectives are summarised as follows: 
Address the gap and lack of qualitative research in lending behaviour of banks;    
Review research relating to small business failure and the role of institutional lending in the 
United Kingdom; 
Examine the theoretical approaches and differences between UK and German banks;  
Build a workable and testable model linking influences of loan allocation activity and test the 
model using an interpretive approach; and present the data and draw conclusions about its 
reliability and significance, from both the theoretical and practical applications.      
Section 2 – What are the research questions? 
The literature in chapter two indicates that the environment takes into account the effective state 
policy and regulations which can cause institutions to adjust their behaviour. The combination of 
these factors is useful to identify the changes in the prevalent modes of risk behaviour the 
literature also shows that an individual’s perception of risk is socially constructed. 
Research question one: Does the environment change institutional behaviour of banks? 
The literature shows that banks adjust their capital following market disciplinary pressure and 
the power of the regulators also influence the behaviour of banks when handling risk. The 
literature review also highlight that changes to institutional behaviour can impact the SME 
market through capital constraints. It is important to investigate this area to identify exactly what 
the effects are.  
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Research question two: Do banks in the UK and Germany manage SMEs risk differently?  
Chapter 2 illustrates that difference in managing SME risk exists between the two banking 
sectors in Germany and the UK. The question raised needs an investigation to understand if 
certain differences do exist, then what the implications are, whether these differences actually 
affect SMEs trying to access funding. The two questions outlined are linked together and form 
the basis of an investigation to show that differences between the two banking models and 
approaches to lending. 
Research question three: Does the institutional type or cultures of banks affect lending?  
Delimitations of the study 
This research focused on issues such as perception towards risk and its social construction. In 
addition, the differing perspectives of the main retail banks The study aim was to find answers to 
the initial research questions, i.e. how do bank’s perceive risk and did any conflict arise during 
the process of loan allocation between the banking institutions and the SMEs.  
The approach taken by this study took the form of a qualitative analysis and interpretive enquiry: 
to identify, collect, and interpret. The original thinking was to identify any statistical inferences 
linking SMEs failure as the result of high loan rates.    
The research was abandoned for a number of reasons. The researcher was unable to access 
appropriate data, but even where this data was available, the evidence drawn would not 
necessarily be conclusive, and aspects of the approach would have issues of validity and 
trustworthiness. The researcher believes that research studies are always more convincing if a 
positivistic approach is used. The study, however, did indicate that an interpretive enquiry would 
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yield information that is more meaningful and evidence gaining an insight into the phenomena of 
lending behaviour by banks.   
Another obstacle encountered in the research was the time taken to gain access to the banking 
community in the United Kingdom. The reluctance of banks in the United Kingdom to 
participate in interviews became evident following several attempts to gain access. In addition to 
access difficulty, the researcher assumed that information would be free flowing; yet this was 
never the case, with the exception of all the banks in Leverkusen, Germany. As a result, the 
study required additional analysis and coding. A series of the assumptions made from the 
thematic analysis may have, with hindsight, led to disproportionate findings, and biased towards 
the weighting between German and UK banks. However, the steps taken at every stage in the 
study minimised the researcher’s bias.  
Another limitation in the study was the omission of the government’s role, initially considered 
because the researcher believed that the actions of the government attributed to the deterioration 
of relations between the two actors – the UK lending institution and the small SME. The 
researcher considered that major difficulties would ensue if government issues became part of 
the research.  The researcher took supervision advice and omitted certain aspects of the broader 
literature and materials from the research. With hindsight, omitting these proved to be the correct 
decision.     
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Section 3 – Research approach and methodology  
This investigation was primarily concerned generally to see how banks dealt with SMEs and how 
lending practices of loan officers could have an effect in the SME market. From a research 
perspective, the study of organisations within the context of an interpretive inquiry sees 
behavioural and cultural issues in the organisational setting as a source of rich data; and its 
methodological approaches for the collection of data for research have continued to gain worth 
and credibility in the field. The interpretive methodology fits from the perspective of processing 
behaviour of groups or teams. This notion lends appropriately to the teams and their activities in 
the processing notions of loan allocation.  
It is worth pointing out that an abundance of research refers to the processing case study in the 
literature, which draws much of the data from inductive means and similarly, initial theory 
generated follows the process research (Strauss and Corbin 1990). This research adopts, in part, a 
process-type structure because the nature of collection was a partial observational study and took 
into account a framework which alludes to the idea of understanding behaviour in organisations. 
The key was to identify particular thematic issues, differences about perceptions and 
constructions of risk prevalent across the banks, both in Britain and Germany.  The naturalistic 
enquiry approach to the study meant that data collection achieved was through the design of a 
questionnaire and the use of semi-structured interviews. The questionnaire merely acted as a 
guiding framework during the course of the semi-structured interview; the questionnaire design 
evoked open responses from the participants. In addition, the conceptual model in chapter two, 
derived from the initial interviews, and literature, acted as a supplementary guide in the semi-
structured interviews.    
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Section 4 – Conclusions  
The chapter explained and highlights the complex issues and barriers encountered when 
investigating the lending relationship between banks and small firms, not only from the 
perspective of the difficulties and challenges faced when studying social phenomena, but also the 
challenges and difficulties in reaching an interpretation and understanding of the issues. The 
research study, explores how bank lending practices and strategies impact the SME lending 
market. The literature review led to insights into the phenomenon of risk within the context of a 
social setting and institutional culture.  
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Chapter 4 – The research design  
Introduction 
A review of the literature (Chapter 2) covered various strands of research across the span of 
journals and articles examine the characteristics of banks in the UK and Germany.  Academic 
literature also focused on the lending behaviour and culture of banks in Germany and the UK.  
The review led to insights, which revealed differences in cultural beliefs, attitudes, and 
perceptions towards risk between lending banks in Britain and Germany.  
The underlying aim of the literature review was to identify if attitudinal and environmental 
differences existed between banks in Britain and Germany and influenced lending towards 
SMEs. For the study to yield meaningful information into these phenomena, a clear and effective 
research method design was critical.  The method design would be critical to the success in the 
measurement of qualitative variables. This chapter discusses the researcher’s methods and the 
research strategy design. Included are the methods of sampling and data collection. In order to 
ensure that the methods complied within the context of verifiability, honesty, and transferability, 
each description is discussed at length and, where appropriate, tabulated and detailed.  This 
chapter also sets out the methods used and discusses the underpinning rationale behind the 
researcher’s choice and selection of the research strategy and design.  Also discussed at length 
are verifiability of information, ethical considerations and the limitations of the study. The 
chapter is broken into four main sections and are as follows: Section one introduces the design 
concept, the rationale and underpinning theory for the chosen approach. Section two highlights 
how qualitative data can be interpreted such to present evidence in a meaningful way. Section 
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three discusses the data collection process and the methods used to collect and collate data, 
which can be presented in a robust format. Section four concludes the chapter. 
Section 1 – The research design  
This section explains the design concept and the theory underpinning research investigations. 
The section also explains the design approach and methodologies adopted which steer towards a 
final decision. Additionally, the section finally explains why in this research a qualitative 
interpretive approach was chosen. 
What is research design? 
Heppner et al (1992) describe a research design as a plan or structure for an investigation or a list 
of specifications and procedure for conducting and controlling a research project. In research 
designs and strategies, there are a number of academics who broadly define and describe the 
research design itself as being staged. (Johnson 1994) pointed out that the design of any research 
design would include a series of activities, in this case eight, each activity or stage in the research 
is guided.  
Epistemology and research approach 
According to Bryman (2001), the following three philosophical pillars are the central tenets that 
underpin an epistemological construction. 
Positivistic 
The positivistic theme suggests that the effective and objective study of reality is through the 
adoption of analytical instruments.  A good example of this might be statistical inference, cross-
comparative data of variables, facts and any other forms of quantitative data. All of these themes 
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designed are to measure and describe the phenomenon independently of the researcher 
(Orlickowski and Baroudi 1991, Yin 2002).  
Interpretive 
In contrast to the positivist approach, an interpretive study views reality within the context of 
social construction and consequently gains access to knowledge, which manifests through 
language – a social construct, which captures the consciousness with definitive meaning. 
Research within the context of management and organisational systems has gained considerable 
ground from an interpretive perspective, providing insight and understanding of human thinking, 
particularly within the organisational setting (Klein and Myers 1999).  Interpretivism and its 
idealistic goals lie with our knowledge, perception and the construct of realism between the 
actors and their environment. Spitler (2002) suggests that the interpretivistic approach filters out 
any potential distortions of the known reality through the construction of knowledge from 
humans. 
Critical 
According to the research philosopher Karl Popper, the critical approach is a science orientation 
with negative and fault finding connotations, which form the basis of the scientific methodology. 
The philosophical root of interpretive research stems from the naturalistic enquiry approach to 
the phenomenon (Boland 1985).  
The ontological and epistemological considerations led the researcher to design this study within 
the contextual framework of an interpretive paradigm, which acted as a conduit to gain access to 
the perceptions of the participants in their natural setting. The approach principally guided was 
by a premise of understanding the phenomena of meanings relevant to the construction of risk 
assigned by loan officers.  
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The interpretive paradigm views realism, constructed by humans, and reality, which exists 
beyond the consciousness, as a way to share values that weave into a fabric of assumptions and 
beliefs, which is sustained and changeable.  
The research objective aims to seek out the systems and appropriately interpret the phenomena. 
From the perspective of the research, the interpretive paradigm adopts the view that scientific 
knowledge is a social construct and similarly contained, its meaning underpinned with an 
assumption that interpretation is achievable and within its immediate social context In this study, 
the researcher’s decision was to steer away from a positivistic paradigm toward an interpretive 
approach, with an aim of collecting and examining the phenomena within the intuitional and 
social context of the banks.  Furthermore, the interpretive paradigm suggests that the information 
uncovered might also lead to social, cultural and political constructions, not ordinarily obtained 
and in this case, the assumption is that no universal hard and fast rules apply in the world of 
finance.  
In contrast, the positivist’s paradigm views the reality somewhat differently – it assumes a 
definite order of things – which leads the researcher to a precise non-subjective approach, free 
from social distortion, and based on the idea that finance is tangible, concrete and non-abstract.  
Most research involving finance tends to be based on the positivistic paradigm; a general tenet of 
the positivist paradigm is such that the human element is considered a hindrance, which 
interferes with the job of objectivity. However, the search for meaning and underpinning values 
suggested that the research approach should steer away from the positivistic paradigm and 
instead toward an interpretive enquiry. The interpretive enquiry and analysis makes use of 
observational and interview techniques. The researcher argues that an empirical methodology of 
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data interpretation would not readily lend itself to the positivist paradigm – one reason for this 
assertion is the number of institutions under examination.  
The comparative numbers under the positivist’s paradigm would be negligible for an objective 
study seeking statistical inference. However, in order to gain an insight into cross-national bank 
divergences in perceptions towards risk and the evaluation of such risk, it was necessary to study 
the environment in which relations are embedded.  
The strategic choice of research methods also follows from underlying assumptions of ontology 
and epistemology. In this study, the researcher’s decision was to steer away from a positivistic 
paradigm toward an interpretive approach, with the aim of collecting and examining the 
phenomena within the intuitional and social context of the banks.  Furthermore, the qualitative 
paradigm suggests that the information uncovered might also lead to social, cultural and political 
constructions, not ordinarily obtained.  In contrast, the positivist’s paradigm views the reality 
somewhat differently – it assumes a definite order of things – which leads the researcher to a 
precise non-subjective approach, free from social distortion, and based on the idea that finance is 
tangible, concrete and non-abstract.  
Most research involving finance tends to be based on the positivistic paradigm; a general tenet of 
the positivist paradigm is such that the human element is considered a hindrance, which 
interferes with the job of objectivity. However, the search for meaning and underpinning values 
suggested that the research approach should steer away from the positivistic paradigm and 
instead toward an interpretive enquiry. The interpretive enquiry and analysis makes use of 
observational and interview techniques. The researcher argues that an empirical methodology of 
data interpretation would not readily lend itself to the positivist paradigm – one reason for this 
assertion is the number of institutions under examination.  The enquiry and selection of the 
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researcher’s design will inevitably influence methods of data collection and analysis of the data. 
Now that the research approach is established, the type of method adopted should connect with 
the theoretical aspects that relate to the research discipline. A factor in deciding the methodology 
is the appropriateness of the questions and objectives outlined in the study.   
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Section 2- Methodological approach   
Qualitative research 
This section outline the appropriateness for a qualitative approach adopted for this study. 
Qualitative research seeks to uncover the phenomena through a naturalistic enquiry, which is 
considered to contrast with the quantitative enquiry approach, which aims to make use of 
statistical inference. Strauss & Corbin (White)1994) suggest:  Reliability of qualitative 
approaches involves two aspects, first the researcher’s ability in the research design, second, the 
analysis of results and quality (Patton 2001).  The essence of reliability is its trustworthiness 
(Seale 1997).  Judgment and trustworthiness lies in the strength of the report itself. Credibility 
and validity are rooted in four main themes – credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
conformability (Guber and Lincoln 1982). The approach to these themes is indicative of a 
specific research strategy, which embrace aspects of audit trailing, sufficient coding and material 
referencing effectiveness.       
An interpretive study 
Interpretive methods are based on a series of assumptions of subjective human experiences as 
ontologically real and accessible through dialogue within a qualitative framework Terre-Blanche 
and Kelly, (1999). The qualitative interpretive approach is described as the participant telling 
their own version of events. The interpretive paradigm views realism, constructed by humans, 
and reality, which exists beyond the consciousness, as a way to share values that weave into a 
fabric of assumptions and beliefs, which is sustained and changeable. The research objective 
aims to seek out the systems and appropriately interpret the phenomena. From the perspective of 
the research, the interpretive paradigm adopts the view that scientific knowledge is a social 
construct and similarly contained, its meaning underpinned with an assumption that 
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interpretation is achievable and within its immediate social context Paudel 2005].  The 
interpretive approach makes use of observational and interview techniques.  
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Section 3 – Data collection 
According to Creswell (1998), there are four types of data collection: observational, interviews, 
documentation and audio. In this case, the researcher chose the model which adapted to fit the 
questionnaire in the context of the field interview process, and which would aid the process for 
interpretation testing and observations. 
Researchers who are actively involved in the study of organisations employ cognitive models in 
both qualitative and quantitative studies. Computer designed models have gained much ground 
and are used extensively in qualitative research (Steckler et al 1992). Approaches in a research 
investigation design are employed with a predictive type of enquiry or an interpretive enquiry 
(Blanco, Gillingham and Lewko 2002, Ben-Daya and Hariga 1998).  
The initial construction of a conceptual model in the context of this study was developed 
following an initial review of literature and discussions at Barclays Bank in 2003 and at Lloyds 
TSB in 2004; an aim was to develop an initial model that mapped out the ‘observed’ lending 
process. 
Sampling 
The sample size in this research was considered to be too small for a robust research study, and 
to overcome the weakness, a further questionnaire was distributed in an attempt to capture a 
wider audience with a particular focus on 
Loan officers employed at the same bank 
Representation of the mutual banks. 
The changes to the design methodology are discussed later in the conclusion section four. Since 
the phenomenon or unit of study is predominantly the process of lending and the attitudinal 
differences to SMEs by managers and loan officers, the procedural step was to interview about 
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ten officers, five of whom would be UK based and five of whom are in Germany. The profiles of 
participants are tabulated Table 4.1 
Table 4 1 Profile of Participants 
Age No  County  and  Location Position Held at bank 
+25 5 United Kingdom Team Leaders & Managers 
+30 1 Koln, Germany Senior Manager 
+40 4 Leverkusen, Germany Bank Managers 
 
The material used for data collection was, in part, based on the model developed during the 
initial theory building stages. The interview structure and technique designed was with the aim 
of following the process of the developed model, which acted as a two-fold guiding strategy 
framework for the study.  
The process of population selection used in the case study adopts the purposive approach (Patton 
2001), which is seen as particularly appropriate since the study identifies a group of individuals 
contained within their own institutions (the banks).  Purposive sampling leads to an 
understanding of perceptions and behaviours – and in the context of this research attempts to 
identify the perception of the ‘lenders’ towards risk. Dane (1990) supports the view of (Patton 
2001) and suggests that purposive sampling can be refined toward a small collection of 
individuals, rather than toward the typical cross-section and main data utilising probability 
techniques. This notion is central to the research construction of a theoretical framework.  
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Glasser and Strauss (1967) suggest that a number of techniques/approaches adopt purposive 
sampling. This research adopts a theoretical sampling approach. Although the purposive 
sampling approach is based on investigating the phenomena, in this case, a combination of both 
exploratory and descriptive techniques can fruitfully investigate the phenomena. The sampling 
criterion was predominately purposive by nature (Patton 2001); all interview criteria were 
predetermined and consequently each manager or loan officer selected had a minimum of five 
years’ experience in the allocation of loans to small firms. The notion here was to be specific in 
the sample selection. The rationale underpinning the choice for a purposive sampling was the 
inherent constraint on resources.  
The researcher’s aim was to balance the selection criteria from both German and UK banks – this 
was critical to the researcher’s objectives. Ten interviews were scheduled and arranged with loan 
teams from the four main commercial banks in the United Kingdom and five German banks four 
of which are based in in central Leverkusen and one based in Koln.  
The researcher was very aware that banks in general are secretive and guard employees against 
researchers soliciting information. The strategy to gain access consisted of contacting the 
research departments of UK banks. The researcher knew two of the banks’ contacts. Saunders et 
al (1996) suggest that first-time researchers may encounter difficulties when attempting to access 
information. Saunders, (1996), also suggests that the researcher’s status may also have a bearing 
on their ability to gain access to organisations. In this case, the researcher was known to the bank 
through previous experiences at director level, and thus status was never an issue. Access to the 
banks in Germany was achieved by direct contact in the first instance, and arranging for 
appointments to discuss the research. Access to banks in Germany was considerably easier than 
that of the UK; this took approximately six months. One of the biggest barriers was convincing 
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the initial contact (the gatekeeper) that the research was genuine and not media research.  The 
Table 4.2 shows the participant positions at their prospective bank. 
 
Table 4 2 Participants of Banks 
Participants   Institution Position  Case Study  
H1 Manager   Volksbank  
D2  Manager  Dresdner Bank 
C3  Direktor Commerzbank 
D4  Manager Deutsche Bank  
N5   Loan Officer National Westminster 
V6  Team Leader  Volksbank 
L7 Manager Lloyds TSB 
B8 Team leader  Barclay’s 
R9 Manager Raiffeisen 
The research sites selected in the UK were more through luck than judgement; however, the sites 
chosen in Germany were based on regional familiarity for the researcher.  The selection of sites, 
and more specifically, actual locations, facilitated a more natural approach, intended to evoke 
normal behaviour in the participants.  The sites identified are set out in Table 4.3 below. The 
researcher was familiar with the sites in Leverkusen, Germany, which is known to be a heavily 
industrialised area.  The researcher believed that a higher volume of loan applications from small 
firms would feed into the local retail banks in Leverkusen. On the other hand, the sites chosen in 
Britain did not resemble any particular pattern. Although a potential bias could exist largely 
because of the concentration on a specific region known to the researcher, minimisation of bias 
with regard to UK banks was attempted through random selection. The researcher was not aware 
of industrial concentrations, but an assumption made was that small firm concentrations were in 
regions not evident during the review of literature into small start-up firms.      
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Table 4 3 Banks and Locations 
UK Banks 
 
German Banks 
HSBC (Cappie and Affairs.) 
 
Raiffhaisen Bank (Leverkusen) 
 
Lloyds TSB (Peterborough) 
 
Dresdner Bank (Köln) 
 
Barclays Bank (Cappie and Affairs.) 
 
Deutsche Bank (Leverkusen) 
 
National Westminster (Cappie and Affairs.) Volksbank (Leverkusen) 
 
 Commerzbank (Leverkusen) 
 
Cross-comparisons undertaken were in Germany (Leverkusen and Köln) and Commerzbank. 
Also included within the context of the field research was a composition of cooperative banks, 
which in addition led to a comparative analysis through a “constant comparative” technique 
(Spitler 2002) and theoretical sampling. 
 
The questionnaire design and process 
Questionnaires in their design are methods for the gathering of data (usually in a structured 
format). The researcher was aware of the importance attached to tabled questions and recognised 
that the way in which the questions were worded could result in significant differences in the 
participant responses and influence the findings and the usefulness of the questionnaire in the 
study. As indicated earlier in the chapter, the reason a conceptual model was developed was to 
gain an understanding of the processing methodology. The net effect of this resulted with the 
interview questions designed around the activities of the lending process. The procedure was 
such that it included the incorporation of all aspects of lending procedure.  
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In essence, the model acted as the conceptual framework, which was the original intention of the 
researcher.  From this perspective, the researcher identified the model as having relevance and it 
acted as a guiding tool in the process of communication and interaction between the loan officer, 
the small firm and the researcher.  
The model aimed to determine if organisational conflict occurred and was present during the 
loan processing (Daft 2004). Secondary to that, the process model acts as a supplementary tool 
yielding additional information relative to the banks’ values and beliefs, underpinned by an 
embedded culture which impacts on loan decisions. 
The questionnaire adopted followed the interview approach, and its design was such that 
participants were asked a series of questions which link to the theoretical model. The aim was to 
look beneath the surface of normative behaviour during the loan process. For example, did the 
managers perceive risk within the context of their institution or, did their attitudes change?  The 
researcher’s aim was to use the second questionnaire to bolster and reinforce the research (Baker 
1999). 
Pilot study 
Pilot studies in questionnaire designs are useful for a number of reasons, and assist the researcher 
to gain understanding and clarification of response effectiveness relative to questions and 
consequently the validity of the responses. The overarching aim of the pilot study was to test the 
developed model in conjunction with the questionnaire to ensure that participants understood the 
nature of the questions. An interview was arranged at Lloyds TSB for this purpose, but there was 
insufficient time to arrange a similar testing interview for Germany. Some of the questions were 
amended following the pilot interview; for example, one question asked the participant’s view on 
money laundering and racism. The bank supervisor believed that no participant would give 
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answers to this type of question and thereafter, was removed from the questionnaire. The results 
of the pilot questionnaire were excluded from the study.  
According to Burgess (2001), the questionnaire designed should include issue-related questions, 
eliciting focused responses from the participants. In this case, the piloted questions designed 
were around the issues of the lending process. The aim and link with the research needed 
establishing with the questionnaire design. Here, the link between the research issues and 
responses designed are such that each question linked directly with the theoretical model, for 
example, in question 1: the researcher asks participants what the initial requirements are prior to 
loan application.  The question itself links directly to the observed normative behaviour in the 
conceptual model and the underlying cultural symbols (bank culture). Pilot studies are also 
useful in that the researcher has an opportunity to re-design questions that are ambiguous and as 
such may elicit vague responses (Robson 2002). The questionnaire submitted was to the 
researcher’s supervisor for guidance and re-design. The pilot questionnaire sent to a loan officer 
was at a UK bank, and minor changes were made to the main questionnaire from the original 
pilot study; these refinements were model specific.  
The model at the early stage was preliminary. However, further developments were made 
following the literature review and, as suggested earlier, the specific research issues were not 
refined, largely because the conceptual model was not finalised.  The changes to the research 
questions were issue specific. Finalisation, and refinement, would follow on from reviewing the 
literature. Table 4.4 below show the dates and locations of the interviews held at the banks. The 
times originally allocated for discussion were between 1-2 hours depending on the time it took 
for the participants to understand the nature of the question and the time taken to respond. In the 
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case of German banks, the response time was slightly longer because each question delivered 
was timely and the response was equally slow for clarity.   
Interviews 
The interview is a method by which to collect information and view it in the context of research, 
as a rich and valuable resource for collecting data. The interaction between the researcher and 
participants sheds much light on varying perspectives, and in most cases reflect the views of the 
participant relative to the phenomenon studied – from an interpretive stance, interview data 
provides a rich source of information (Patton 2001). In this case, the researcher aimed to draw 
out subconscious thoughts, which gains an insight into the manager’s perception to risk. For 
example, attitudes towards risk are essentially a social construction brought about by values held 
by both the institution and the manager’s own values – brought about by social influences such 
as the economic standing.       
Table 4 4 Interview dates and locations 
UK Bank HSBC Lloyds TSB Barclays   
National       
Westminster  
 
Location London Peterborough London London 
 
 
Date of Jun-07 Jun-07 Jun-07 Jun-07 
 
 
Interview Duration 1.5 hours 2 hours 1 hour 1. 5 hours 
 
 
 
          
 
German Bank Volksbank    Raifenhaisen Dresdner Deutsche Bank  
 
 
Commerzbank 
Location Leverkusen Leverkusen Köln Leverkusen 
 
 
 
Leverkusen 
Date of Feb-07 Feb-07 Feb-07 Feb-07 
 
 
 
Feb-07 
Interview Duration 2 hours 3 hours 2 hours 2 hours 
 
 
 
2 hours 
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 There are generally two strategies for conducting an interview process. In the first case, the 
researcher carefully guides the participant in obtaining respondent answers.  However, the 
structured interview can also evoke rational responses. The structured interview is inflexible 
because the design is usually in the form of fixed response questions.  In contrast, an 
unstructured process gives the researcher flexibility and a wide scope of data. However, there is 
a likelihood of the respondents being astute and more knowledgeable than the 
researcher/interviewer, which may cause interference and noise impairing the researcher’s ability 
to control the environment (Yin 1988). Therefore, bias should be minimised. In this study, 
minimisation of bias is achieved in part through the interpretation of the respondents’ answers by 
adopting the use of hermeneutics, discussed at length later in this chapter. One factor, considered 
a drawback to the collection of data through interview methods, is the limit to the numbers of 
participants involved in the study and the associated costs (White and Gunstone 1982). 
The instrument selected for interviews was a four-page questionnaire in printed format (see 
Appendix 1). All of the questions were consistent and all questions asked were in the same tone 
and manner to minimise bias. All questions asked were in the same order and in the same tone. 
The researcher did not record the transcripts at any time at the request of participants.  However, 
the nature of each question was designed to elicit a response to every question in an unstructured 
way. The nature of the research was outlined and explained to the participants. During the 
process of explaining the contextual nature of the research, the participants were at liberty at any 
time to ask questions, in order to limit the ‘vagueness’ of the questions.  
The interview structure was guided not only from the initial review of literature, but also from 
the initial conceptual model developed at the initial stages of the study. The model developed 
would provide the necessary insight into the process of loan allocation and determine through the 
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framework. Whilst the whole interview process linked to the model, the interviews designed 
were also to facilitate an open structure for variations in answers. Nevertheless, each question 
asked was maintained with consistency with all participants in terms of tone and purpose. The 
interview process lasted for a period of about 45 minutes; however, there was a degree of 
variability in time allocation in four cases.  
Language issues 
Prior to the study, the researcher spent some time in Germany and is fluent in German. However, 
in order to minimise bias and overcome any potential language issues, including the need to use 
or interpret technical jargon, all interviews were conducted in English. The transcripts written 
were in English and the German participants signed transcripts following each interview.  
Rigour 
Rigour was maintained throughout by continuous discussion with the researcher’s supervisor. 
Coding was also effectively managed and transcripts were scrutinised and signed by an 
experienced and independent researcher at the University (Professor Mohammad Roomie) for 
verifiability. The guiding framework and theoretical model acts as the platform for progression 
to enable the researcher to code from the transcripts and identify key elements of the interviews, 
which formed part of the triangulation method.  Triangulation would effectively comprise of: 1) 
theoretical model, 2) literature review, and 3) transcript material.  An overarching aim was to 
iterate the basic issues and conceptualise the parts to the whole. In this study, for example, the 
question arose as to whether these were issues underpinning the process of loans, and whether 
these values seated into the culture, or embedded into the organisation.  The interpretive analysis 
reveals that such a process can enable the researcher to gain insights into the effect of 
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institutionalisation, which manifests in values and beliefs through its practices and conditioning 
procedures.     
Units of analysis   
The unit of analysis was the interview and subsequent data from transcripts. All transcripts were 
carefully analysed and the researcher aimed to capture particular themes, deemed by the 
researcher as being relevant and purposeful to the study.  For example, key concepts identified 
could be following each comment at the end of each question  
Following the initial analysis, the transcripts were investigated a number of times to avoid loss of 
detail and with a particular aim of deciphering and gaining an understanding of what was 
meaningful information extracted from the participant transcripts.  The researcher coded each 
response based on perception and concept, and categorised these into the relevant areas for 
analysis.  
Data analysis techniques 
This part in the section discusses the techniques that were employed in this research study, Also 
discussed in this section is the inclusion of additional data which strengthen the research overall. 
As previously discussed earlier, the sample size was considered too small, and did not take into 
account the mutual banks in the data set, although two cooperative banks were interviewed.  The 
data collected was taken in the form of questionnaires and a series of questions were submitted to 
loan officers. The method of collection came from two sources: and were banking groups from a 
social network site LinkedIn the second source came from the banks directly. Therefore, the data 
analysis in this research combines the interviews and post questionnaire. For purposes of clarity, 
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the questionnaire is referred as the post questionnaire and the original questionnaire referred to as 
the pilot questionnaire. 
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Coding the interviews as part of the analytic process  
Most qualitative research employs certain instruments in order in enrich data. The employment 
of coding techniques enabled the researcher to identify specific themes and issues relating to 
repetitive phrases or sentences within the context of the transcripts, text data or other materials 
taken from interview or questionnaires (Polit Hungler 1993).  The process of 
In this study, the coding techniques were designed to translate the raw data into a standard 
format. Most coding techniques recognise words, phrases, themes and repeatability of sentences. 
Since the banking industry commonly uses techniques and jargon, there was a strong possibility 
that repeated sentences would occur, for example credit worthiness, collateralisation and risk 
variance. Because the nature of the questions were open-ended it was necessary to transform the 
responses from the interviews into an efficient mode of analysis. The first level of coding took 
words, sentences and phrases which were relevant to each other by context.  In order to gain 
insight and make sense of the data, the words, phrases and sentences were processed using N-
Vivo software (in vivo coding). Figure 4.1 illustrates the whole process. 
Figure 4 1 process of coding 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Transcribe the 
interviews Read the 
sets of data to form 
impressions  
 
Divide the themes 
into sentences or 
phrases 
Label the themes 
with more than one 
word. Write these 
labels in the margins 
Look for possible groupings of themes  
Make a list of the themes to see whether the codes make sense and whether 
there is some coherence.  Make certain that the codes can be related to the 
research question 
Adapted process of coding (Henning 2004)  
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For the first level of coding, words sentences or paragraphs that were linked through their 
content or context were added.  Table 4.5 illustrates the initial coded frame. The table represents 
the first question.  
Table 4 5 - response matrix to categories. 
 
Axial coding 
After the first level of coding, each cluster of words was considered for relevance and categories 
were identified.  Categories were developed at the second stage of coding, and the emergent 
themes linked to the questions constructed. Accordingly, each interview aligned to a category of 
emergent clusters, for repeatability. The clusters of words/phrases were subjected to a second 
level of coding and thereafter grouped into themes for further scrutiny and interpretation. The 
semi-structured interviews designed focussed on issues, shedding some light on the lending 
process, and ascertaining whether these issues would reveal themselves in a recurring pattern. 
Table 4.6 illustrates the coding process. The example illustrated in Table 4.6 illustrates from 
Responses to Statement: 
 
 
German Banks 
 
UK Banks 
Can I ask what the initial requirements are 
from the bank prior to the loan application? 
 
D2 
 
C3 
 
D4 
 
V6 
 
R9 
 
H1 
 
N5 
 
L7 
 
B8 
1.   Audited accounts  X X X X X   X 
2.   Qualifications X      X X  
3.   Management accounts X      X X  
4.   Credit history    X X    X 
5.   List of assets X      X X  
6.   Personal history  X   X X   X 
7.  Bank at the branch     X     
8.   Bank statements  X  X X    X 
9.   Business plan X      X X  
10. Business Type  X   X X   X 
 115 
 
right left to the cluster of words taken from the interview transcripts and developed into 
categories. The clusters of words/phrases explored were at the second level. 
Table 4 6 coding data into categories  
   Category                 Clusters         Themes   Repeated response 
 
 
 
Lending 
factors 
Uncertainty 
Customers 
Computerised technology 
Data bases 
Decision 
Rules 
Procedures 
Process  
 
 
 
Audited accounts                 
Qualifications 
Management accounts           
Credit history  
List of assets 
Personal history                    
Bank at the branch               
Bank statements 
Business plan 
Business Type 
 
In the table, the main category identified: 
Lending factors 
Validity of the study 
Validity and reliability are described as a processing methodology, where accuracy and results 
reproduced are dependent on the adoption of various other methodologies (Joppe 2000). 
Obviously, within the context of a qualitative study, results are not positivistic and not 
necessarily rooted with quantitative numbers, and therefore results might be emergent in varying 
ways.  
Qualitative research seeks to uncover the phenomena through a naturalistic enquiry, which is 
considered to contrast with the quantitative enquiry approach, which aims to make use of 
statistical inference. Strauss & Corbin (White)1996) suggest:  Reliability of qualitative 
approaches involves two aspects, first the researcher’s ability in the research design, second, the 
analysis of results and quality (Patton 2001).  The essence of reliability is its trustworthiness 
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(Seale 1997) Judgment and trustworthiness lies in the strength of the report itself. Credibility and 
validity are rooted in four main themes – credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
conformability (Guber and Lincoln 1982). The approach to these themes is indicative of a 
specific research strategy, which embodies aspects of audit trailing, sufficient coding and 
material referencing effectiveness.      
 The research attempted to validate and minimise bias through the adoption of several    
techniques:  
The adoption of (Patton’s 2001) purposive sampling ensured against any bias by selecting 
participants with a variety of backgrounds and experiences. Although this suggested a specific 
criterion sought, it enabled the researcher to conduct a comparative study.  
In addition, the methods of data collection were multiple: semi-structured, documentation in the 
form of questionnaires and interview transcripts, and each transcript examined was thorough and 
any distortions highlighted.  
In addition, bias was minimised through the coding process (Polit and Hungler 1993; Burns and 
Grove 1993). Furthermore, the researcher attempted to triangulate data to maximise the report’s 
trustworthiness and validity.  
Triangulation is an important testing tool for the qualitative researcher cross-examining relevant 
data to bolster the study overall (Patton 2001, Cohen and Manion, 1986). Triangulation was 
achieved by interaction with the theoretical model, interpretation of transcripts and a review of 
the literature. Another specific strategy commonly cited in the review literature is the 
employment of an auditor, who can substantiate the study’s credibility and validity. In this case, 
the researcher was guided by the supervisor, who engaged the researcher in lengthy discussions 
at scheduled meetings and through exposure to the research material. Addressed were the issues 
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of negative cases introduced into the research; however, no significant differences were 
identified amongst the participants. 
Ethical considerations   
Ethics is a code, a pattern of behaviour, deemed acceptable and correct. The pattern of behaviour 
or conduct in the case of this study is between the researcher, the individual or groups. The ethics 
relate to the research and the individuals subjected to the research, and relate to the basic rights 
of protection and privacy. Ethical issues considered were in accordance with the practices at the 
University.   
Consent 
The researcher informed all respondents about the nature of the research, and they were advised 
that the researcher was a PhD student at Loughborough University.  
During the interview procedures, the researchers wrote notes that were open to scrutiny by each 
respondent for verification. The researcher took these acceptances and agreement of notes as an 
informed consent. Respect for the respondents was paramount; respondents could opt out of the 
interviews at any time following explanations about the nature of the research.  
All individuals have a basic right to choose. Similarly, each individual has a right to anonymity 
and a preservation of confidentiality. During the course of the study, three respondents required 
confidentiality and a signed assurance that the researcher would grant this.  The researcher 
agreed to these requests based on ethical principles and signed an affidavit. Another ethical 
consideration taken into account was harm avoidance, i.e. not to embarrass or offend in either the 
workplace or offsite; the researcher was aware and observed the rules of harm avoidance at all 
times before, during and after the study.   
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Section - 4 conclusions 
The research design used an interpretive study utilising material taken from transcripts, however 
because the research sample did not cover a wider range of the banking sector, which represented 
mutual banks and that of individuals in the same bank, a second questionnaire was distributed 
see data analysis section. Approximately 67 questionnaires were distributed to both German and 
UK banks with a response rate of 34 per cent. The response rate was very reasonable mainly 
because of the banking groups contacted online via the LinkedIn site. The questionnaire design 
reflected a gap and bolstered the research findings to give the study credibility and robustness. In 
hindsight, the decision to revamp the methodological approach was the right one.       
The study aimed to find answers to the initial research questions: how do banks perceive risk, 
and did conflict arise in the process of loan allocation between the banking institution and their 
respective clients (in this case the small firm)? An inductive approach was the initial approach of 
study in order to conduct and interpret collected data. 
In addition, the researcher aimed to introduce deductive data to bolster the qualitative enquiry in 
an interpretive paradigm.  
The secondary aim was to collect quantitative data and prove the hypothesis that bank lending 
behaviour can influence the degree of premiums set in a purely subjective way.  
 In a positivistic paradigm, the data could be regressed to identify those organisations that 
experienced insolvency as the result of high loan rates. This approach was abandoned for a 
number of reasons. Primarily, the researcher was unable to access the appropriate data, but even 
were access available the evidence drawn would not necessarily be conclusive and aspects of the 
approach would have issues of validity and trustworthiness.  
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The researcher believed that research studies would always be more convincing if an approach 
adopted a positivistic stance.  
The study, however, did indicate that an interpretive enquiry would yield more meaningful and 
emergent evidence, and therefore provided an insight into the phenomenon.  One major obstacle 
in the research was the time taken to gain access to the banking community in the United 
Kingdom. In the early stages, the assumptions regarding time to complete the research were 
based on easy access and a readiness to engage.  
The reluctance of banks in the United Kingdom became evident following several attempts to 
gain access. In addition to access difficulty, the researcher assumed that information given would 
be freely flowing – this was never the case with the exception of all banks in Leverkusen, 
Germany.  
In this sense, the study required additional analysis and coding and a series of assumptions made 
were from the thematic analysis, which might with hindsight have led to certain disproportionate 
findings and resulted in slight bias towards the weighting between German and UK banks. 
However, careful steps were taken at every stage in the study to minimise the researcher’s bias.  
One limitation in the study was the omission of the role of government, considered initially in 
the research because there may be linkages in the deterioration of relations between the two 
actors – the UK lending institution and the small start-up firm. The researcher did consider that 
major difficulties would ensue if there were to be a third actor, i.e. the government. The 
researcher took advice from supervision and omitted the reviews of literature in chapter 2 and 
materials from the research based on time and the necessary resources required. With hindsight, 
this omission proved to be the correct decision.   
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The initial model that was originally developed aimed to determine significance, through 
statistical methods. The researcher did not consider the sequential steps of the interpretive 
paradigm, and consequently the questionnaire considered was in the data as an additional source 
of information. However, the fact that these questionnaires were to elicit particular responses 
means that the method of interpreting data is subjective, and therefore partially biased from an 
interpretive perspective. The research was discussed the introduction of the secondary 
questionnaire with the supervisor, which resulted in a design change. The questionnaires retained 
were for an expanded research study. With hindsight, the action taken by the researcher 
facilitated an in-depth study based on the initial questionnaire and semi-structured interviews 
which proved more fruitful.   
From a research study and design perspective, the researcher required considerable time to 
integrate the model for coding and hermeneutic analysis and to make sense of the data in a 
comparative way, which would then be both meaningful and contribute to other research in these 
fields of study.  
The chapter discussed at length the approaches adopted for this study, including the tabling of 
models and the applicable approaches in the design. The researcher took into account 
authenticity and took steps to ensure the study conducted was with credibility and 
trustworthiness. In addition, there were issues associated with ethical information. In the 
researcher’s opinion, all conduct was appropriate and within the ethical code guidelines set by 
the University of Loughborough.  
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Chapter 5 -Analysis 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the UK and German banking sectors to provide a picture of how banks 
operate in their respective environments. The analysis follows the key sections of the interview 
questionnaire and subsequent survey process, itself the product of the literature review in 
Chapter 2.  The chapter is broken into two main sections: 
 
Section One  (a) The initial lending process (information gathering) 
   (b) The internal (bank) environment 
   (c) The external environment 
 
Section Two  A synthesis of risk issues 
 
In the first part of the analysis the questions are answered in sections and are broken down into 
four parts. Part (a) analyses the attitudinal differences between German and UK banks from a 
perspective of initial lending and the approach that the banks take.  
Responding to the questions and issues in part (a) is achieved by interpreting the transcripts and 
the additional questionnaire mentioned in the conclusion (see chapter four). Typical quotes are 
drawn from interview transcripts to amplify and illustrate key points. 
Parts (b) and (c) review answers to the interview questions relating to lending influences through 
the lenses of the internal and external environments in the banks’ respective countries. Part (c) 
further analyses the external environment to provide examples where banks adjust and change 
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their patterns of behaviour in response to environmental pressures and drivers. Section Two is 
the second part of the analysis and discussion, re-visiting key risk issues from Section One and 
incorporating both the remaining questions in the interview questionnaire and the secondary 
survey that was conducted in 2011. 
Section One – Part (a) An analysis of the initial lending process.  
The first part in this analysis was to look at the approaches to lending by UK and German banks 
involved in the SME markets. The table 5.11 summarises the information with respect to the 
initial question asked i.e. the bank officers were asked about the types of information that banks 
generally required during the process of lending. It should be noted that respondent banks V6 
and R9 are the same bank but interviews were held in different branches. 
Table 5.1 1 Key responses to initial requirements 
 
The information taken from the transcripts indicate that the banks display a combination of 
both “going” and “gone” concern approaches. An emphasis on the ability to repay the loan is 
Responses to Statement: 
 
 
German Banks 
 
UK Banks 
Can I ask what the initial requirements are 
from the bank prior to the loan application? 
 
D2 
 
C3 
 
D4 
 
V6 
 
R9 
 
H1 
 
N5 
 
L7 
 
B8 
1.   Audited accounts  X X X X X   X 
2.   Qualifications X      X X  
3.   Management accounts X      X X  
4.   Credit history    X X    X 
5.   List of assets X      X X  
6.   Personal history  X   X X   X 
7.  Bank at the branch     X     
8.   Bank statements  X  X X    X 
9.   Business plan X      X X  
10. Business Type  X   X X   X 
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also clearly evident. There is also an emphasis on the accounts, which also indicates that security 
and asset values, on the basis of the balance sheet, were more important than the SMEs forecasts 
and business plans. Qualifications and CV’s were not seen as a requirement if the SME  already 
banked with them.  New SMEs tended to submit personal backgrounds and CV’s, but this was 
not a requirement. The management accounts were not normally required in the initial 
information pack. Credit history was an important factor in the initial process. Management 
accounts were seen as an important part of the due diligence process. Security was also 
considered to be an important part of the lending approach, but in the case of unsecured loans 
security did not matter because individuals that had good credit histories and good standing. In 
some cases, owners of firms use their personal credit to obtain an unsecured loan (Frazer, 2005). 
Banking statements were required for up to 3 months irrespective of whether the SME was 
known to the bank. 
Table 5.11 appears to show no significant difference between UK and German approaches 
although it is acknowledged that the interview process did not have the scope to interrogate how 
the initial information was processed by loan officers. 
Table 5.1 2 Response from H1 bank (Initial requirements for credit)  
Commentary 
“We take into account a number of factors when assessing loans and actually, the application process does not begin by filling in 
forms, also it depends on the size of the loan, this can change the whole procedure because we do give unsecured loans on the 
basis of personal history and in a lot of cases people who come in here ask for personal loans and in these cases a form and input 
into the system to give a score is just one that’s it up to £25k unsecured”. “But when we go beyond that level, we would require 
the firms to bring in accounts preferably audited. “New firms that come and see us, the better ones…. Bring in their plans and 
forecast projections some of them include their backgrounds. Even If the firm’s projections are solid, we need to look at the 
firm’s ability to repay the loan. “management accounts give us a good look at the overall operation and how the management 
handles the cash flow… it’s a good indicator and it’s all about the flow of cash in and out “   
There was evidence that use of formal accounts in the assessment process was a factor in the 
decision approach. This was viewed to look at the strength of assets particularly the strength of 
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the assets with regard to assets to debt as a ratio. There was also an emphasis on the strength of 
current assets in relation to accounts receivable (outstanding). The banks also implied that 
customers would normally be quite well known to the bank even at the level of director. Again 
here, there did not seem much of an emphasis on future cash generation, but more emphasis on 
security and the ability to make the loan payments.  As regard to security, the bank did take into 
account personal security. The assessment process seemed informal, but still rigidly following a 
process of “box ticking”. There was some evidence that customers, or SMEs were mainly large 
and accounted for a fairly population of the bank business although in some cases, the banks still 
retained a small portfolio of customers. 
 
Table 5.1 3 Response from D2 bank (Initial requirements for credit) 
Commentary 
“We like to see the operating accounts it can give a picture of the company” The order book is appealing “We credit score and 
feed this information about the type of loan and each piece of information is carefully examined by the manager making the 
decision to give the credit”. “I am sure we will bring the systems to a standard where anyone involved in the matter of lending 
can use” “We can also an analysis make on the customers who owe the company and this can decide” “I know our customers 
very well and if they are known to us the information is in our hands. I have known some customers in here for many years and 
we are always helping customers to do well for the business” We do look at the assets of each loan we give but in these 
circumstance if the customer wants to prove this it is reasonable”“ we can check the customer performance from our data base 
and the monthly audit 
 
When asked about the types of information that banks require of an SME prior to the loan, bank 
C3 stated that it would make use of all information, which ensured coverage at least in an 
adequate way. Management accounts, full disclosure and the financial accounts were needed 
during the due diligence process of loans above €50k  The gone approach was emphasized with 
personal assets taken into account including the equity difference in the personal house, which 
implied this would be part of the coverage were a loan to be granted. This bank has a process 
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where each part of the process is staged and signed off by a team member. For example, the 
management accounts, and financial statements are entered and signed to show that documents 
were checked on file. Although the bank had some specific rules to follow they did provide an 
analysis to firms regarding repayment ability. 
Table 5.1 4 Response from C3 German bank (Initial requirements for credit) 
Commentary 
“In our procedure we take all information to help us decide management accounting procedure, and the audit accounts in the 
last years we also use internal process to check on the clients attention to the loan before” “The information from our clients 
give us an idea if they can provide security.” “We will take assets listed in the clients operation and if this is not an amount 
enough we will ask for the home security.” “Bank statements can help us to see if they have a good housekeeping record to see if 
their record is good” “The business must show they can pay the loan at the agreement times. Sometimes we can give 
details to the customer to show how they can commit to repayments in the future”. 
The interpretation from bank C3 is that they make use of information during the due diligence 
process Accounts that were audited was a requirement and management accounts if they were 
available. The bank also made us of credit scoring technology to cut out time. The business 
assets were considered along with personal assets as part of their process. The bank in this case 
also took into account the debt to equity. The gone concern and going concern was evident here 
with the bank taking into account the future prospects and generation of cash in the business. 
 
Table 5.1 5 Response from D4 German bank (Initial requirements for credit) 
Commentary   
We use SCHUFA and this can help the banks to assess risk [...] it is convenient for us to use such a method because 
they have collected much data”. “We also use the financial statements of our customers “We examine all 
possibilities to give the customer a loan, and hope we can”  “We do make the credit score” “Personal security is 
also looked at as part of the loan to cover ratio we must pick out some aspects for the cover of loan if the customer 
cannot pay”. Always can get information. There is a record for the business registration and the files on the 
commerce data base. We can use also the financial information to find the details of the company business. 
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The emphasis was on the “gone concern” approach to lending with the bank looking for 
information which covered loan exposure. Loan applications were credit scored and assets were 
measured by analysing the financial statements not much attention was given to the firm’s future 
earnings or growth of the business. Monitoring the loan was also a consideration in the approach 
to lending. The information flow was that of quantitative and measurable information, 
management accounts and other information, like bank statements were also considered 
important. 
Table 5.1 6 Response from N5 UK bank (Initial requirements for credit) 
 
For German Bank V6, the bank approach to lending takes into account the management 
accounts, bank statements and financial statements from the last two years of trading. New SMEs 
are assessed on the basis of personal history and collateral availability with an emphasis on 
personal assets. Future forecasts based on cash flow and profitability was not considered in the 
lending process. The bank did, however, provide personal loans to businesses on the basis of 
their personal standing and security. Similarly to other UK banks, the threshold of £25K meant 
that loans were considered corporate loans rather than unsecured personal loans. The bank did 
Commentary   
We would require full banks statements, financial statement and management accounts for corporate loans. Most small firms 
don’t have management accounts, generally these firms have bookkeepers and management accounts are a bit of an on-cost”. 
“Financial statements gives a bit of an indication of cash management and the types of liabilities the firm’s got” we do look to 
cover the loan and ask for collateral by way of cash, savings and other assets including personal.  Credit history is important to 
us and can save a lot of time and gives an indication to the firm whether they’d be eligible or not Background and education can 
be useful on a personal level, but is not a measurable variable we’d put it on file if the owner, director brings it in. Business 
plans also help, but when the firm is new we really can’t take them into account. 
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take into account the assets of the business, but in the event of small firms, security was by way 
of floating charges, or debentures held over personal and business assets to provide loan cover. 
Table 5.1 7 Response from V6 German bank (Initial requirements for credit) 
 
UK bank L7 adopts a combination of the “gone concern” approach and “going concern” 
approaches to lending. Use of management accounts for cash flow forecast was taken into 
account for business loans above the £25K threshold. Managers also considered the future profits 
with cash flow generation as a factor in determine whether repayments could be met. The bank 
also makes use of the financial accounts to measure the value of assets held in the firm and the 
debt to equity ratio. Credit scoring and the company history were important factors in the due 
diligence process. Business plans were also reviewed, but were not part of the process, the 
qualitative information was not measurable but managers did in some cases make notes. Past 
history and personal background education and experience was not a factor. 
Table 5.1 8 L7 UK bank (Initial requirements for credit) 
Commentary 
“We do require audited accounts plus management accounts if the loan exceeds £25K The loan can be fixed or 
variable over a time frame, but this is dependent on the firm’s ability to repay” “Consideration is given at every 
level, but we would never use any resources until an initial agreement is met” only the use of some internal system 
to kick start the loan application” “Credit scoring is used on every account with overrides in the event that an issue 
can be explained like time and default on judgements made in the small claims courts. Personal credit history and 
details of assets are also considered, we may take a debenture, or floating charges on assets to provide adequate 
cover”.  “Personal details are part of the discussion, but not factored in the lending, or decision to lend; someone 
with an MBA doesn’t guarantee they can pay back loan commitments but can help in the overall management of the 
business”.    
 
 
Commentary “We take the accounting information from company account and also conduct a credit analysis. 
The account should be audited and the management should be registered” 
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Emphasis was on the security and the firm’s ability to make repayments over the agreed terms 
for UK bank B8 although some evidence did suggest that they combine the “going” and “gone 
concern” approaches. For example, they did include the management accounts as part of their 
information pack requirement – and the accounts were used to identify future cash flows. The 
bank also utilised the financial statements and scrutinized the leverage, gearing of debt to equity.  
No mention was made regarding the use of qualitative information such as background education 
or qualifications. Credit scoring technology was in use. Previous months of bank statements were 
required if the firm was unknown to the bank.   
Table 5.1 9  B8 UK (Initial requirements for credit) 
Commentary 
“All banks have a box ticking process to keep down the costs “Credit scoring is used to check the history and the 
background of the firm, we also do a credit check on the person to measure personal credit. Bank statement are 
useful if the firm is an unknown quantity we usually ask for around 6 months of company bank statements, not the 
personal account”  management accounts, and financial audited accounts are useful for loans above £25-30K but 
its normal for new companies there are no audited accounts apart from the change to limited firms from sole, or 
partnerships.   
The going concern and gone concern were used by bank R9. The bank asked for bank 
statements, normal management accounts and final audited accounts for the past two years. Not 
much was discussed about collateral, but employment of credit scoring was used. The bank made 
use of the management accounts for future cash flows based on two years projections, but this 
was underestimated to compensate for problems 
Table 5.1 10 R9 German Bank (Initial requirements for credit) 
Commentary 
The bank asks for several pieces of information, first the financial accounts from an external auditor and we can ask 
for the management operational accounts.  Credit scoring is part of our lending process especially if the bank will 
give an unsecured loan 
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Section two – Part (b) an analysis the internal environment 
This section examines the internal environments between the banks two countries. The first 
part of the section deals with the internal environment in answering the question about the 
banks efforts to influence the internal environment; a similar approach for the analysis is 
adopted. Table 5.10 starts the process by filtering out the repeated words taken from the 
transcripts 
 
Table 5.1 11 repeated words from transcripts  
 
The second stage of the analysis is broken down bank by bank and utilises a table which 
categorises the information into two sections: market-led and hierarchical. The commentaries 
are taken directly from the transcripts, however, an interpretation of the analysis is extended by 
making use of the additional questionnaire and the thematic analysis discussed in chapter three. 
Table 5.111 illustrates the process of linking words taken from the transcript and coding into 
themes and categories.  
 
 German banks UK banks 
Key responses to questions relating to 
internal operations: 
 
 
D2 
 
C3 
 
D4 
 
R9 
 
V6 
 
H1 
 
N5 
 
L7 
 
B8 
Policies X  X  X X X X X 
Rules X X X X X X  X X 
Bonus X X X   X X X X 
Rewards X X  X X X X X X 
Managers X X X X X X X X X 
Teams X  X  X  X X  
Systems  X X X  X  X X 
Training X X X X  X X X X 
Sales  X X X X X X X X 
Culture X X X X X X X X X 
Professionalism X X X X X X X X X 
Markets X  X X X X X X X 
Pressure X X X  X   X X 
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Table 5.1 12 cluster formation leading to categories   
   Category                 Clusters         Themes   Repeated response 
 
 
Market-led 
(Individualistic) 
 
 
 
 
 
Hierarchy 
(Collectivistic)  
normative 
in-house 
motivation 
decisions 
personal objectives 
 
 
rules 
procedures 
process  
promotion 
structure 
 
 
 
 
Policies  
Rules 
Bonus 
Rewards 
Managers 
Teams 
Systems  
Training 
Sales 
Culture 
Professionalism 
Markets 
Pressure 
 
The repetition of words filtered from the transcript led to two categories: 
 Market-led environment Individualist approach 
 Hierarchy – collectivist approach 
 
Bank H1 operates in a team environment with manager and teams in sections. Each team 
member has a set of personal objectives and a target set by head office. SMEs are managed by 
advisory services and usually referred as customer services Teams are used to deal with SMEs 
in an attempt to speed up decisions and any holdup problems through bureaucratic processes. 
The banks internal management of risk would suggest that a combination of hierarchy and 
market-led culture type exists. Managers are motivated by individual performance based on 
sales, customer satisfaction and grades. The bank operates an incentive scheme, which is based 
on individual performance and discretionary and employees are incentivised through increased 
holidays and promotion opportunities i.e. to a higher band on the banks scale 
 
Table 5.1 13 H1 Internal environment 
Commentary 
“The in-house systems we use are designed to follow a process, of course there are overrides, but this has to be 
sanctioned by the senior manager”. I remember one case where the customer came in and wanted to switch banks 
but his unsecured loans were too high the manager just by passed the system to accept the customer. “We are 
always facing pressure to deliver to a specific target” decisions to push are measurable our bonuses are based on 
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a number of factors grade, individual, sales and customer service. We do an induction and training is sponsored, 
but there is not much time to familiarise with the products because an aim is to get into corporate” 
 
For German bank D2 the environment at local branch level seemed very informal and offices 
were arranged by partitions with the assistant manager and manager located in offices. 
Although the offices are informal, the hierarchy institutional type was evident because of 
internalised procedure the rules. Training at bank is thorough and employees are expected to 
gain an understanding of the stakeholder rules regulations and the applications in business 
areas.  Rules and standardisation were evidenced as branch managers still had the final say in 
operations despite the introduction of teams. There was also clear evidence that the bank 
promote a structured and informational environment. Other evidence also shows that the bank 
influences their employees through a number of incentivised schemes salaries are however, 
below the market average. Whilst the informal style of management and culture forms an 
impression, this institutional type display a hierarchical approach to internal operations 
institutional type display a hierarchical approach to internal operations 
 
Table 5.1 14 D2 Internal environments 
Commentary 
“Our internal operations are very well managed and we do have dedicated teams to manage the data and 
system” Our control system is done by training each staff member to observe the rules and processes of the 
systems they are working with we do this in a module form the learners can try to simulate the transaction, 
balance verification and other activities using this technique. We are rewarded for the personal efforts we achieve 
and also the benefits we are receiving are appreciated.  The manager carry out audit through the guidelines and 
questions from the manager has the ability to ask the loan officer to produce rejected applicants if they cannot do 
this it is red flagged. Collateral verification on the register is another area. 
 
German bank C3 has strict internal controls and is guided by internal processes and systems. 
The bank has a due diligence process, which looks at microfinance and the loan collection, 
underwriting and write offs. The bank is rigid in the application of rules and training standards 
appear to be high. For example, the bank has a variety of schemes for graduate entry with each 
scheme offering a specialism – corporate finance, in this case dealing with SMEs clients. On 
first sight the bank gives an impression of informality and the environment is open and bright. 
However there is still symbols, which reflect rigidity in the institution with partitioning of 
offices and separation of staff and managers 
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Table 5.1 15 C3 Internal environment 
 
Commentary 
“Our quality management tool is very careful and manages the control of operations here in the bank “training is 
also very important to us and the people who are employed at the bank“Bank staff are rewarded for their 
personal performance and we also reward based on the banks performance entirely” “Yes, there is a system for 
rewarding the employees and the overall performance can achieve a quarter of yearly salary. This applies to the 
relationship managers, but other reward methods are there for non-managerial employees. I don’t think this can 
make the decisions secure, but it can make everyone look for the same achievements”. 
 
Bank D4 (German) is a modern institution and adopts a formal approach to operations and the 
quality management. Training was also evident with the managers advising that huge amounts 
of monies had been allocated in the leadership for excellence program. Training also includes 
risk simulation programs; for example, when capital buffers are breached the impact is 
evaluated and tested. Employees are rewarded based on individual performance and benefits 
are given by way of transfer to more lucrative sectors and promotion opportunities. The bank is 
formal in the assessment of internal operations and the systems scrutinized using in house 
training and robust in-house quality control in the main, the organisation is pointing towards a 
hierarchy and bits of individualism, however, each decision is passed through the management. 
The adapted its own mechanism of evaluating risk using a number of technologies and 
techniques. Further, they removed what they considered were risky borrowers from their 
internal classification on rating 
 
Table 5.1 16 D4 Internal environment 
Commentary 
We have our own in-house training and method of controlling and managing the internal operations of the bank 
we have a system where each business unit must show a data where the business processes. “We  also use 
workflows and supply a detail of operations for the audit “Bonuses are paid to individual employees based on 
their own talent and can also get promotion and increase in opportunities” there is also a stock option for staff 
here” 
 
Bank N5 (UK based) is informal in its approach and shows evidence that staff and institutional 
type is market-led and individualistic. Decisions and decision taking is flat and bank 
employees are encouraged to exercise discretion. For example, ceiling levels on loans.  Nat 
west does have a quality control in-house which monitors the operations internally. The 
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pressure on staff to sell more is evident with staffing level in decline. Managers are given 
discretion to make faster decision and can in some cases override the quality process and 
procedural rules. 
 
Table 5.1 17 N5 Internal environment 
Commentary 
Managers are under pressure to increase productivity as well as ensure the management of operations we do 
have effective systems which identifies particular questions associated with particular risk, are risks relevant to 
the strategy is the capital requirements sufficient – branch management is guided by central and we make sure 
quality procedures are adhered to. “Training is light and You probably know we got into trouble and were taken 
by RBS. Since then we get a lengthy document outlining the vision for next year. I can’t remember what it entails 
always discusses HRM and volatility management. “We do more now in terms of selling than before even though 
our staffing levels are in decline” 
 
Bank V6’s management of risk follows that of a market-led approach with a flat management 
structure and customer focus teams. Training is generally in-house on the job training with a 
goal of passing the FSA consumer and regulations exams. 
 
Table 5.1 18 V6 German Bank Internal environment 
Commentary 
“We have specialised staff in effective decision-making”. “Our levels of management are at different training 
areas and each grade is able to exercise discretionary decisions relevant to lending and operational risk“We 
removed the hierarchy a long time ago”. 
 
Bank B8 is flexible and identified and being individualistic for the following reasons: an 
Emphasis is placed on customer focus groups. 
Table 5.1 19 B8 Internal environments 
Commentary  
“We do have a performance pay, and each grade is appraised on their agreed targets and measured against the 
actual results”. I do see this as a motivational driver for work output, but in no way does this affect the process 
regarding day to day decisions 
 
Finally, Bank R9 is considered to be an institutional type of hierarchy top down management. 
Even though employees have thorough training, the key decisions are made by the branch 
manager and in order of sequence. 
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Table 5.1 20 R9 Internal environment 
Commentary 
Our internal control is made from the headquarters and we follow the procedure. I am the manager make the 
decisions for control of risk and the entries. We drive our systems through team approaches and fully exercise 
decision being made for monitoring and lending procedures. We continue to become effective on a daily basis The 
benefits we can get is the subsidized housing or allowance for our effort.   
 
The information reflects that team members are held to account and also evidence of top down 
management.   
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Section three – Part (c) an analysis of the external environment 
This section analyses the external environment and the question about whether the external 
environment change banks behaviour is answered by asking the participants a series of 
questions, which explores the environment. Common repeated phrases and words are extracted 
from the transcript and broken into clusters. The second stage of the analysis involves 
identifying clusters specifically as perception from the themes. The final stage in the analytic 
process is to theme the clusters into categories. In this case, the clusters link to the external 
environment. Table 5.21 illustrates the process and thereafter the second stage of the process 
are coded and categorised. 
 
Table 5.1 21 Key responses to external environment 
 
Table 5.1 22 illustration of coded words taken from transcript  
   Category  Clusters Themes   Repeated 
response 
 
External environment 
  
Regions 
New banks 
Declining 
Globalisation 
Technology 
 
 
 
 
Monopoly 
Market power 
Competition 
Basle 
Regulations 
Pricing 
Home markets 
Shareholders 
Stakeholders 
Pricing 
 
 German Banks UK Banks 
Key responses to questions  
relating to external environment 
 
D2 
 
C3 
 
D4 
 
V6 
 
R9 
 
H1 
 
N5 
 
L7 
 
B8 
Monopoly X  X X X X X X X 
Market power X X X X X X  X X 
Competition X X X X  X X X X 
Basle X X  X X X X X X 
Regulations X X X X X X X X X 
Pricing X  X X  X X X  
Home markets  X X X X X  X X 
Shareholders X X X  X X X X X 
Stakeholders  X X X X X X X X 
Pricing X X X X X X X X X 
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Part 1 – an external environmental analysis of banking in the UK and Germany 
De-regulation in the 1970s and the new entrant factor caused changes in the UK banking 
sector. Bank H1 gained economies of scale and scope to compensate for declines in revenue. 
The banks also provided a mix of products and services – expanding the role beyond the 
traditions of banking. On the regulatory side, banks were required to hold about 26 % liquid 
deposits; competition control was eased to allow efficiencies promoting competition. 
 
Table 5.1 23 H1 External environment 
 
Commentary 
“We have seen some big changes in the last 10 years regulations are changing constantly and the competitive 
situation has changed as well ”“Competition has increased and we have become a sales force rather than 
traditional bankers selling a number of products to our customers ”“Our small business sector is set up 
specifically to assist new business. We provide quick kits which can minimise the interview times to cut the admin 
costs and improve the decision speed and efficiencies”. “We would not make a preference ordinarily, but our 
existing customers do cut the overall cost of a lend”“Of course, we had to change after introduction of Basle and 
the self-regulatory process these on cost have made us look closely and develop effective systems” 
 
The process of deregulation significantly changed the external competitive environment in 
Germany. Bank D2 gained economies of scale and divided the group into corporate and 
investment banking to widen the scope of banking. Branching level had decreased with 
decreases in profitability Change in management focus: The focus of the bank shifted from 
asset growth as a management goal to other goals such as profitability and capitalization. Data 
technology and information gathering affected the bank.   Since 2002, the bank began a series 
of phases: phase 1 and 2 were aggressive growth and efficiency strategies. Their final phase is 
global and was launched in 2006. Their aim is to reduce their cost to income ratio; this is 
reflected by their pre-tax earnings of 31 per cent and increases in share earnings to 66 per cent. 
A dividend of 4 euros was paid out on each share.  This bank is one of the private banks in 
Germany and its primary aims are to satisfy shareholders and be a global player in the 
international markets. They recently pushed an expansion programme into the US with 
acquisitions of IT mortgage securities; it has also made pushes into the Middle East and 
notably China. Their organic growth reflects an increase from just over 1,500 to 1,700 
branches in the last year, but notably their drive to streamline the organisation and push for 
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efficiencies is also reflected in the overall increase in share prices, which rose from €81.90 to 
€101.34 and increases in dividends from €2.50 to € 4.00. 
Table 5.1 24 D2 external environment 
Commentary 
We face competition from all quarters” our effort to increase economies of size for the Dresdner bank was the 
start of our intention to be bigger bank ”“We concentrated on the financial services and designed a customer 
service model. We have to compete with the largest banking group and focus on the corporate business. We can 
do this by the quick decision and try to make it cost effective ”“technology and internationalisation all resulted 
from the decentralisation strategy and decommissioning of regulation and EU law” 
 
The 1970s impacted on the German competitive environment this bank The process of 
decentralisation of the big banks in West Germany resulted in a breakdown into three regional 
banks, which were united in 1958 as Aktiengesellschaft, which had its headquarters in 
Düsseldorf.  The bank stepped up its retail banking activities and built up a nationwide 
network. At around the same time, it started expanding around the globe. From 1970 onwards, 
the bank's administrative activities were shifted to Frankfurt am Main as a retail bank; provide 
a variety of products and services globally. Key to their income is deposit and current 
accounts. In addition, similarly to the retail banks in both the UK and Germany, they compete 
to sell insurance, manage assets and lend to small, medium and large corporations both 
domestically and at an international level. 
 
Table 5.1 25 C3 external environment 
 
Commentary 
“All of our strategies come from the central corporate office and the directors send the visions. One reason was 
the fact we had have a strategy to begin the efficient and some offices are closed about the 1990s.” “We lose 
many customers because of that principle. and now we return to our principles of long relationships in each 
community with our customer “Our shareholders play an important factor in our chance to become stronger and 
it is an intention to balance this with our customers too. We also moved into the capital markets offer credit, 
securities, asset management, and financial advice to governmental, institutional and corporate clients” 
 
The 1970s impacted on the German competitive environment this bank Change in regulation. 
The implementation of the capital adequacy rules from 1988 onwards provided a regulatory 
framework for new management drivers. For example, when banks were processing new loans, 
management reacted taking into account the impact to capital reserves. This aspect indicates 
the change in management and the rolling out of regulations did change behaviour. 
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Table 5.1 26 D4 external environment 
Commentary 
“All of our strategies come from the central corporate office and the directors send the visions. One reason was 
the fact we had have a strategy to begin the efficient and some offices are closed about the 1990s.” “We lose 
many customers because of that principle. and now we return to our principles of long relationships in each 
community with our customer “Regulation and the Basle do increase our cost, but we developed our own IRB 
systems to self-regulate. We reacted to the Basle committee and check our capital position through the internal 
efficiencies” 
 
Bank N5 became highly profitable in the wake of deregulation and the easing of competition 
laws. The activities of the bank steered toward the securities market and consequently resulted 
in the acquisition of a merchant bank. The bank experienced severe threat of competition, 
firstly by one of the main banks in Scotland, and second the bank was under attack through 
mismanagement and heavy fixed costs, the bank did not keep pace with technology and this 
resulted in pressure from outside shareholders despite being innovators in some technology, 
the bank was eventually acquired by a Scottish bank   
 
Table 5.1 27 N5 External environment 
 
Commentary 
“We faced severe competition and developed our own systems, but after the takeover in 2000 we had to make 
further changes to our own in-house systems. Basle regulation obviously means a huge cost to the bank and 
further impacts on the monitoring costs as well as the fact we didn’t have enough staff”. 
 
The abolition of competition in 1966 intensified the level of competition in Germany which 
essentially allowed financial institutions a free hand in choosing their own credit and 
investment conditions. During the expansion phase of the savings banks switched to market- 
led commercial banks, which placed this bank under intensive pressure and the battle for 
market share began in the 1970s 
 
Table 5.1 28 V6 external environment . 
 
Commentary 
“We faced severe competition and developed our own systems, but after the takeover in 2000 we had to make 
further changes to our own in-house systems. Basle regulation obviously means a huge cost to the bank and 
further impacts on the monitoring costs as well as the fact we didn’t have enough staff”. 
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Table 5.1 29 L7 external environment cont. 
Commentary 
“We faced severe competition and developed our own systems, but after the takeover in 2000 we had to make 
further changes to our own in-house systems. Basle regulation obviously means a huge cost to the bank and 
further impacts on the monitoring costs as well as the fact we didn’t have enough staff”. 
 
The new regulatory approaches required by Basle meant that banks have increased internal 
costs as a result of internal monitoring methods. Banks in the UK face considerable 
competition following the deregulation of the 1980s with new entrants coming into the banking 
sector. In addition to these competitive pressures, outside shareholders demand better returns, 
which in turn forces banks to compete in other markets. ATM technology, supermarkets bring 
and other financial institutions also bring further pressure on the competitive environment. 
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Section 4 – Part (d) Synthesis and remaining analysis  
This section consolidates the analysis in the previous three sections to give an overall picture 
of how banks assess risk when processing SME credit. The analysis includes the remainder of 
questions set out in the questionnaire along with the additional information obtained in a 
secondary survey mentioned in chapter three.  
 
Lending approaches to SMEs   
An approach to lending was the first category of the data formed during the process of coding 
and the data analysis. Risk management is defined as the process of analysing risk and the 
management in restricting the banks’ exposure by ensuring adequate cover is in place.   
The initial questions in the interview explored how banks in Britain and Germany perceive and 
handle risk during the lending process. Two clusters of themes were put together which formed 
the first category of meaning, approaches to lending. These clusters were Qualitative, and 
Quantitative; I also identified these to have the same meaning of relationship and transaction 
lending. The initial question asked of the participants was about the types of information that 
SMEs would be required to bring with them before the initial assessment.  
One of the respondents at a UK bank said that they took into account the characteristics of 
individuals, namely, their education and background during the first stages of the assessment 
process, but this was never recorded as information that could be used in the evaluation 
process. However, these were merely the impressions formed by the assessing officer and were 
not necessarily recorded for measuring purposes. Nonetheless, the qualities of individuals who 
came forward and presented a case for credit were processed using credit scoring techniques. 
All UK banks were found to make use of the credit scoring technology from the second 
questionnaire; the information seemed to support that with all German banks confirming they 
made use of credit evaluation technology. Similar assessments of risk by German banks during 
the initial stages of processing loans were by computer scoring. The majority of respondents 
said that their application process had changed because of EU regulation and changes in the 
law. One respondent said that they were under pressure to become more streamlined and 
computerised credit scoring meant that decisions based on the characteristics of the 
organisations were no longer highly ranked.  
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Table 5.29 Secondary Questionnaire survey 2011 
Section C Institutional Policy issues   German banks UK banks 
How important are the following issues on you as 
  
  
a decision maker when considering a loan 
application 
  
  
for a new or existing SME client? 
 
9 
 
7 
Likert scale 1-5 
  
5 
 
5 
              
 
The analysis showed that all banks in the first round said they had used information technology 
to initially rate prospective SMEs irrespective of whether they were known to the bank or not. 
The relationship lending approach, or gone concern was evident in some of the cases, for 
example, one of the questions in the initial interview asked about visits to prospective 
borrowers and did any visit constitute value in the evaluation process of lending.  
The German bank participants said that they continue to visit client organisations. However, 
they also said that visits are not as regular as they have been previously, but they are still 
required to write a report about their visit and the activities of the business for future records. 
One of the German participants had commented that lending decisions are becoming 
centralised but reports were still expected. On the other hand, UK participants said that branch 
manager would not normally visit SMEs in the community and were less inclined to visit new 
client organisations prior to, or after lending, except in exceptional cases such as visiting those 
firms from Europe who are entering the UK market. One of the participants said that they 
tended to use visits in order to validate the assets held by the firm. Such visits could then 
support analysis based on historic accounting information or support demands for collateral.  
Banks, at the first stage in the lending process, start a formalised procedure, a set of distinct 
rules and approach to the lending process, for example, the teams, or individuals that engage 
with the firm during the interview process (formulation of the loan product at the first stage). 
Usually, at this point, the firm brings information associated with their history and background 
information of management. Differences identified from the analysis found were in the types 
of information offered to potential borrowers during the interview.  
The bank Participants revealed that the current market environment demands fast lending 
decisions. Both German and UK banks suggested that to gain efficiencies, there was heavier 
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reliance on technological practices and applications and neglect the other types of data. The 
UK participants said they rarely investigate other details during the selection process despite 
there being valuable and consistent records held at, for example, Companies House under the 
Companies Act. Data held is on firms’ annual returns, changes in directors, auditors and 
charges granted over company assets.  
Case-based approaches 
In the case of German banks, sources of reliable information were easily accessed and 
retrieved. Most German firms register with their local chamber of commerce and their 
registration details are lodged at government departments for a variety of different reasons. 
German law requires each firm to register at the trade office (Gewerbeamt). Details of the firm 
are also held at the chamber of commerce for the municipality in which it operates. The 
German participants said that sources of information are standardised and factored into the 
model of lending. Typical sources of information obtained from the Chamber of Commerce 
include: 
 size 
 market sector 
 taxation details 
 number of employees. 
 
In addition, German banks said that they have access to data from the courts (Handelsregister). 
The legal system in Germany gives German banks more access to data, which include 
qualitative information via German legislation for small firms to register.  
To further explore questions on relationship lending approaches, the participants were asked if 
other information was used during the process other than formal or information, which can 
ordinarily be measured. In essence, the question explores if relations with SMEs could lower 
risk and knowledge lessens the exposure to the bank through closer ties between the bank and 
the firm seeking funding.  
The secondary questionnaire indicated that 6 German banks and 2 UK banks related to 
personal knowledge and information about the SME as being ranked important see table 5.30 
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Table 5.30 Use of technology 
Section C Institutional Policy issues   German banks UK banks 
How important are the following issues on you as 
  
  
a decision maker when considering a loan 
application 
  
  
for a new or existing SME client? 
 
6 
 
2 
Likert scale 1-5 
  
5 
 
5 
              
 
The cooperative banks did suggest that relations were ranked as being important, but the 
advent of new technology reduced hold-up problems, which gave the decision quickly. The 
importance of technology and its use within all of the banks indicated that relationship lending 
was gradually in decline. 
 
Summary of section one - parts (a) and (b) 
To summarise section one, this research found that German banks took into account the 
management background of firms. This research also found that German banks emphasis on 
the importance of qualitative information lessened. This is borne out by the secondary 
questionnaire in which all of the German banks gave a high weighting to the credit history 
during the loan application. These findings found similarities between German and UK banks 
with regard to the level of importance attached to qualitative data.    
German banks had become more reliant in the use of credit scoring and increasingly had 
become more important than background of SMEs, management, performance and historical 
information.  Banks from both countries made use of accounting information to some extent; 
and it was evident that they viewed statutory accounts as being less important than the firm’s 
credit history. The conclusions drawn are that the participants perceived credit scoring as a 
necessary instrument equipping loan officers to accumulate information about the firm in a 
short time frame. 
These findings found that German banks tend to allocate greater resource concentrations and 
training in an effort to become more effective in the management and interpretation of scoring 
and standardisation. German banks have shifted from a qualitative approach to a heavier 
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reliance on credit scoring measurement, which included the use of internal credit rating 
procedures.  
Management of internal operations internal environment 
In analysing the institutional type further, questions were asked about internal procedures and 
quality control. Participants from both UK and German banks perceived in-house training as an 
induction process to familiarise themselves with operational systems and the bank’s culture. 
One participant at a UK bank reported that in-house training is mainly sales oriented, focusing 
on approaches to selling. However, in the context of lending, participants at UK banks said 
they also trained to follow the bank’s processes.  
The secondary questionnaire asked participants about policy and institutional issues, the 
response showed that out of 23 banks 68% of German banks gave a high importance to the 
credit quality, UK banks also reflected a high level of importance 50 % of UK banks See table 
5.31 
 
Table 5.31 Institutional/ Policy issues 
Section C Institutional Policy issues   German banks UK banks 
How important are the following issues on you as 
  
  
a decision maker when considering a loan 
application 
  
  
for a new or existing SME client? 
 
11 
 
2 
Likert scale 1-5 
  
5 
 
5 
              
 
The German participants reported that there had been a push towards team approaches for risk 
evaluation in order to be the first to market and to improve customer satisfaction. UK banks 
said they perceived lending as procedural and standardised its approaches to assessment, 
thereby removing individual bias within the systems they use.  However, almost 70 per cent of 
German participants said that whilst they were moving towards a model of faster and more 
efficient assessment methods and team approaches to decision-making, they continued to 
uphold standard processing.  
The question about personal attitudes was also factored into the questionnaire to measure 
whether the values, personal goals and promotional vision of individuals affected the lending 
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approach. All participants said their personal aims and objectives coincided with their bank’s 
policy and goals. These findings contribute to the argument that the German banks’ attitudes of 
hierarchical management and rigid structures were changing, allowing greater flexibility and 
teamwork in order to change the bank goal of shareholder maximisation. These observations 
suggest that attitudes towards the German structure and institutional environment change, 
shaped by deregulation and environmental pressure i.e. from shareholders.     
However, three German bank participants said that an objective of managing risk by teamwork 
did not necessarily constitute operational effectiveness. Participants at UK banks said their 
own personal objectives coincided with their bank’s vision and goal, but from time to time 
bank strategy was in conflict.  
 
Team-working 
Team working was considered to be an important factor in answering the question about 
attitudinal differences in the institutional type as in whether the bank’s structure was 
hierarchical or market-led.  These factors were important to the analysis because market-led 
banks generally are flatter in form and lending approaches were less reliant on management. 
The participants at both UK and German banks said that teamwork helped to lessen the risk 
and largely guided the decision-making process. From the general responses of the 
participants, an interpretation might suggest that teamwork is encouraged by banks to engender 
shared decision-making. However, the overall impression suggests that the teamwork ethic is 
encouraged but performance-based rewards are individual. For example, teams have targets, 
but individuals have individual targets measured at performance reviews.   
 
Training and education 
The training and education of employees at banks are also considered a factor in determining 
the institutional type – one reason for the proposition is that training of employees is designed 
to ensure employees follow procedure with UK banks spending less resources on training than 
German banks;. 
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The participants at UK banks said they saw training as a means to achieve personal goals 
leading to upward mobility with their careers. UK banks train for sales and according to the 
further, the participants said that each customer focus group or manager is trained on selling 
techniques and products. Little training was devoted to the internal operational systems. 
Training in recent years at UK banks has been ‘on the job’, and newcomers typically undergo 
training for a period of about three years.  German participants said that training was rigid and 
required several years, with formalised assessments at each level measured by senior 
management before individuals could move progressively upwards within the bank. German 
participants said they perceived training as a means for the bank to standardise and familiarise 
managers with bank procedures. German banks train their employees over a period of three 
years and recruit from the graduate population.  The secondary questionnaire showed that 62 % 
of German banks gave a high weighting to the development and training of employees at the 
bank. UK banks AT 33 % see table 5.32 which supports the notion that banks in the UK spend 
less on training (see coded analysis table 5.2 H1)  
 
Table 5.32 analysis of training 
Section D Personal issues/Training   German banks UK banks 
How important are the following issues on you as 
  
  
a decision maker when considering a loan 
application 
  
  
for a new or existing SME client? 
 
11 
 
2 
Likert scale 1-5 
  
5 
 
5 
              
 
The personal objectives of bank employees affect internal operations 
The objective in this part of the questionnaire attempts to gain an insight into motivation at the 
individual level, and identify if bank culture influences individual behaviour. This section also 
attempts to identify whether institutional influence overrides personal beliefs and attitudes 
towards risk. Another objective aimed to establish whether influences of institutional structure 
and culture distorted personal values, beliefs and perceptions of risk.  
The interview questions attempted to gain some insight into the phenomena i.e. observed 
behaviour (consciousness) and unobserved behaviour (subconscious). Conscious behaviour 
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judges a person’s thoughts and actions. In the case of bankers, the institution shaped their 
perception of risk through cultural indoctrination, but subconsciously, the bankers’ underlying 
perceptions towards risk may override the moral behaviour or conscious thought. 
 
Promotion  
The researcher asked participants at all banks to discuss openly and freely their desires and 
personal aims in the context of their working environments. Most of the participants said that 
they aspire to become senior managers and to be in control of their departments and establish 
themselves in their own branches. These aspirations echoed drive and personal motivation 
within the job design. This aspect is an important feature since individual goals and desires are 
different, and therefore outcomes, performances and individuals steer towards them in different 
ways.   
German bank participants suggested that whilst their personal motives are profit-driven, they 
also took into account the acceptance of generating good work for the community. The 
participants said that there is a need to be individually competitive in order to achieve their 
personal goals. German participants said they are motivated by both reward and promotion, but 
perceive goal orientations and values at the bank as steering them toward the community. 
Conflict in the internal environment amongst employees 
The participants at UK banks said their roles have changed extensively from perceived 
professionals to sellers of products not directly connected to banking, for example, home 
insurance, car insurance and other product types. The participants said that target setting for 
product sales generated stress, causing direct conflict with the personal desires and aims of 
their manager. Whereas, the German banks participants said that they continued to believe that 
the relationship between banks and firms was strong and saw no reason to think that changes 
would reverse this. Participants from both UK and German banks said that team conflict did 
arise, which did result in poor lending decisions, but no examples were given to deny or 
support such a claim. The researcher concluded that these conflicts were of a personal nature 
amongst the respondents. This research would argue that conflict could arise when one 
decision of a team member can affect the pay-out bonus to another. 
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The External Environment 
Are government loan schemes encouraged? 
The researcher asked the participants if banks encouraged them to promote government 
schemes during the assessment process, for example, the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme 
(SFLGS) and Bürgschaftsbanken for German banks.  
Responses from UK participants said that the guarantee schemes supported by government 
have inherent problems in relation to servicing and monitoring: each firm must produce 
monthly management accounts, monitored by the bank. They also revealed that they advertise 
government loan schemes in literature and via their websites, but further suggested that they 
would react and give information to firms only if asked by the SMEs.  UK participants said 
that these schemes such as loan guarantee, which are government supported, are not legislated, 
and their promotion is largely therefore left to the bank’s discretion. On the other hand, the 
German participants said they would actively encourage the use of government schemes 
because they perceived the government to share the risk. UK participants said they perceived 
banks as operating as institutions, but not as part of the institutional framework.  
The banks competitive environment 
A recurring theme echoed by all participants was greater emphasis on increases in competitive 
practices by the commercial banks; both German and UK participant said that the intensity of 
competition to breeds an aggressive selling culture. They also said that European Law on 
competition and deregulation had led them to attempt to achieve competitive advantage 
through horizontal acquisitions and mergers.  
The four main UK banks said their strategies were about seeking to gain advantages by 
economies of scale in order to increase barriers to entry because building societies from Europe 
are positioning themselves to offer similar services with competitive rates. Similar comments 
were from the German participant and said they had also adopted strategies in order to curtail 
new rivals from entering their markets. Participants at UK banks said they push to increase 
market share by convincing potential customers to switch to their services. The pressures on 
staff members are such that the ‘friendly’ banking service is very sales focused. Participants at 
German banks reported that commercialisation and intensity of competition led to the adoption 
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of team approaches in order to be ‘first to market’ and the fastest to make lending decisions.  
ATM and internet banking was also mentioned as being a factor in competitive pressure. 
Supermarkets and other financial institutions did not have the same pressure, according to the 
UK participants. German participant also commented that ATMs and other means of banking 
by customers had changed. 
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Chapter 6 – Findings  
Introduction 
This research set out to answer a series of questions outlined in chapter one of this thesis. 
Whilst there is an abundance of extant research about lending theory, little research was 
devoted to the areas of how banks perceive SMEs during the lending process. Numerous 
academics have argued that a major factor influencing the banks’ lending approach is driven by 
the environment. Other academics argue that bank lending strategies depend on a number of 
factors ranging from policy, security, and environmental. This chapter discusses the findings of 
the analysis in chapter five and is divided into five sections. Section one analyses the 
approaches of lending that both German and UK bank banks take during the initial process. 
Section two discusses the findings, relevant to the institutional design and culture of each bank 
in Germany and the UK. Section three reviews the analysis regarding the banks competitive 
environment. Section four gives an account of the regulation environment and the findings 
drawn from the analysis. 
Section one – lending approaches   
How UK and German banks lend to SMEs   
The research literature in chapter two highlights that risk assessment is based on computerised 
scoring techniques mainly by UK banks and the relationship techniques with German banks; 
the analysis separates this into the gone concern and going concern for clarity in further 
discussions. The analysis from chapter five found that both UK and German banks used a 
combination of the gone concern and going concern approaches in their lending practices. The 
analysis also showed that banks used technology to lessen hold up problems and reduce the 
decision times and reduce costs overall. The going concern approach to lending was also 
discussed and in most cases, little attention was given to the future revenues, or the 
profitability that SMEs showed in their projects. Both German and UK banks gave a greater 
weighting to the SMEs credit history and creditworthiness. This was further evidenced from 
the secondary questionnaire where 56 per cent of German banks preferred the use of 
technology in their initial assessment for loans, whereas, all UK banks adopted the use of 
credit scoring technology.  
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To analyse the importance of assessing the characteristics of managers running the SMEs a 
series of questions explored this area asked participants at both German and UK banks about 
the level of importance they placed on the characteristics of managers running SMEs. The 
literature (Peterson and Rajan, 1994, Lane; and Quack, 2001, and Thackor; 1984) suggested 
that relationship lending in some cases, can lower interest rates because the problems 
associated with information asymmetry is negated, or lessened.  
This analysis found that German banks took into account the management background of 
firms. However, this research also found that German emphasis on the importance of 
qualitative information lessened. Reasons for this change, suggested by participants, are 
internal pressures and the need to become more competitive in their respective markets. These 
pressures link to the intensity of rivalry from building societies and European banks entering 
the financial markets. German banks continue to assess firms by individual case rather than by 
class.  UK banks were more likely to assess firms by class. This analysis found that German 
banks are steering towards portfolio-based assessment techniques, and at the same time 
adopting a wider use of credit scoring.  
Distinctions between German and UK banks suggest that class-based and case-based 
approaches between the two banking cultures are different. However, the responses from 
German participants suggest that their banks are moving towards a market-led an 
individualistic approach. The analysis also found that in some cases, German banks continue to 
retain a strategy of case-by-case assessment, but in the long term seek to standardise class-
based assessment of SMEs to reduce the cost of monitoring, the study revealed that banks 
operating in the German and UK sectors continue to have differences in their aims, goals, and 
values. One perspective is the role of German government and their proactive behaviour in the 
practice of boosting SMEs as part of economic stimulation. Moreover, as such they provide 
regulatory guidance for banks to follow an agenda, which works towards the common good of 
the community.  
   Also found was evidence suggesting strong relations existed between the German banks and 
SMEs whereas, UK banks did not exhibit the same unifying goals but instead aimed to enhance 
the interests of their shareholders.  However, the survey conducted indicates that banks had 
made great attempts to close the divide between themselves and small firms.  The literature 
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(Lane and Quack 2001 Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, Storey 2002) relating to lending 
differences between German and UK is wide ranging and argues that small firms who are 
exposed to lending practices in Britain are disadvantaged when compared with small firms in 
Germany.   
   The study found that the initial processing information is similar, for example, both UK and 
German banks require qualitative information from the borrower. In addition, both undertake a 
procedure of credit scoring, although noted from the literature and the respondent’s evidence 
that German banks do not place as much importance on credit scoring as UK banks. UK banks 
place a heavy reliance on measuring risk through quantitative methods.   
  In essence, UK and German banks are lured by technological advances and cost reduction 
strategies, believing that relationship lending is not necessary, and has no place in modern 
banking. Such a heavy reliance on these types of techniques is indicative that relationship-
lending practices as a priority is pushed further back.   
   The conclusion found from this section suggests that German banks do have similar lending 
practices from a perspective of risk technology. However, a difference of lending practice is 
evident following the initial process. (Keasey and Watson, 1995, and Cowley, and Westhead; 
1998) identify that UK banks were charging margins significantly above rates to larger firms, 
which may imply that banks mitigate risk through the increase of security and an increase in 
the premium above lending rates.   
  The survey concurs with the research presented by (Keasey and Watson, 1995, Cowley and 
Westhead 1998) and similar findings from (Llewellyn 2002) suggest that pursuits of 
profitability are more prevalent in UK banks. An important point to mention is that 
fundamental differences exist in the two sectors; differences within the context of market share 
and coverage. Binks and Enew (2002) equally argue that differences between the bank sectors 
exist. Additionally, they suggest that the top four banks dominate market share with 
approximately 37 per cent of the market, but importantly the mainstream commercial banks are 
centralised, which brings into question the strength of relations between the UK banks and the 
small firms. 
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Section two – the culture of banks 
The institutional culture or make-up of the banks institutional type was considered to be an 
important component since the internal operations and procedures directly related to the 
differences between hierarchy types (collectivist model) or a market-based institutional type. 
Academic literature (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Starbuck, 1973, and March; 1988); in 
chapter two highlighted that hierarchy types were more inclined to follow procedure and 
therefore lessen the chance of individual decision making. This aspect answered the question in 
chapter three, which asks if the institutional type or culture affects lending behaviour and the 
approaches taken by banks. The analysis showed German and UK banks continue to have 
differences in their aims, goals, and values. The literature identified that differences lay in the 
sectors from a perspective of relationship lending and the banks’ different approaches to small 
businesses. One perspective is the role of the German government and its proactive behaviour 
in the practice of boosting SMEs as part of economic stimulation. Moreover, German 
government provide regulatory guidance for banks to follow, an agenda, which works towards 
the common good of the community.  
   Also found, was evidence suggesting strong relations existed between the German banks and 
SMEs whereas; UK banks did not exhibit the same unifying goals but instead aimed to 
enhance the interests of their shareholders rather than the overall economic picture.  However, 
the survey conducted did reveal that UK banks had made great attempts to close the divide 
between themselves and small firms.  The literature (Lane and Quack 2001 Douglas and 
Wildavsky 1982, Storey 2002) relating to lending differences between German and UK is wide 
ranging and argues that small firms who are exposed to lending practices in Britain are 
disadvantaged when compared with small firms in Germany. This is contrary to the findings 
the study found that whilst the initial processing information is similar, for example, both UK 
and German banks require qualitative information from the borrower. In addition, both UK and 
German banks undertake a procedure of credit scoring, although noted from the literature and 
the respondent’s evidence that German banks do not place as much importance on credit 
scoring as UK banks. UK banks place a heavy reliance on measuring risk through quantitative 
methods.   
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  In essence, UK and German banks are lured by technological advances and cost reduction 
strategies, believing that relationship lending is not necessary, and has no place in modern 
banking. Such a heavy reliance on these types of techniques is indicative that relationship-
lending practices as a priority is pushed further back.   
   The conclusion found from this research argues that German banks do have similar lending 
practices from a perspective of risk technology. However, a difference of lending practice is 
evident following the initial process. Keasey and Watson (1995), and Cowley and Westhead 
(1998) identify that UK banks were charging margins significantly above rates to larger firms, 
which may imply that banks mitigate risk through the increase of security and an increase in 
the premium above lending rates.   
  The survey concurs with the research presented by Keasey, Watson (1995), Cowley and 
Westhead (1998) and similar findings from Llewellyn (2002) suggest that pursuits of 
profitability are more prevalent in UK banks. An important point to mention is that 
fundamental differences exist in the two sectors; differences within the context of market share 
and coverage. Binks and Enew (2002) equally argue that differences between the bank sectors 
exist. Additionally, they suggest that the top four banks dominate market share with 
approximately 37 per cent of the market, but importantly the mainstream commercial banks are 
centralised, which brings into question the strength of relations between the UK banks and the 
small firms.  
   Since the study by (Lane and Quack 2001), there is evidence to suggest that UK firms are 
moving towards stronger relations with small firms; but whether these aims are achievable 
remains to be seen because the UK banks are predominantly centralised and branch closure has 
been a recent strategy to reduce costs. Another identified difference between the two banking 
sectors was the issue of competition.  
The notion of competition brings into question the effective level of competition within the 
context of UK banks’ raised concerns, from both the Competition Commission (2002) and the 
evidence presented by Cruickshank (2000).   
   The UK banks allegedly operate a monopoly, and new entrants face fierce barriers. The 
banks deny any such claim and assert that levels of competition are such that firms are not 
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disadvantaged. The participants also reflected the view that competition and pricing was at 
different levels. 
    The spread and range of the banks offer greater levels of competition; similarly, the aspect 
of relationship lending is dominant in the German banking sector largely because of 
heterogeneity, which facilitates wide branch coverage both local level and Nationwide.     
Evidence suggests that the horizontal mergers undertaken by UK banks in recent years have 
generated sufficient scope to reduce transactional cost, branch closures, and fewer employees 
and thus returns to shareholders are significantly higher than banks in Germany, (Llewellyn 
2002). 
   The research concludes that the two models are fundamentally different and distinctions 
drawn are with shareholder involvement and stakeholder involvement. The literature review 
extended to the work by Deakins and Hussain (1993), which argues that the practices of loan 
officers were inconsistent with their decisions regarding risk and the perception of risk.  
    The findings were such that a great deal of variability was evident, in particular the 
variability in risk scoring and taking into account historical data, which reflected the firm’s 
performance.  
  The research also found that training played a big part in the loan officer’s ability to be 
objective. The study revealed that training regimes in German banks were thorough in the 
interpretation of loan applications, but not the case in UK banks who, instead focussed on sales 
training programmes.  
    These facts concur with (Deakins and Hussain’s 1993), but also taken into account in these 
conclusions was the research conducted by (Rhodes 1984), which argues that little training had 
been extended beyond the quantitative approach and that UK banks placed a deal of reliance 
on mathematical scoring, which bears out the findings earlier in this study.  
    In addition to the arguments presented, the survey conducted by the Bank of England (2002) 
suggests that there is an over-reliance on credit scoring techniques.  
    The research concerning the loan officer’s behaviour sheds light on the proposition that bank 
culture, the institutionalisation of its lending officers, and the interaction between the borrower 
and lender may be discriminative towards particular markets and small firms The proposition 
that fears and values are institutional, which in turn adjusts the aspect of lending, is clear from 
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the studies. The study draws attention to the fact that participants follow the guiding 
frameworks and central policy at UK banks.  
    Banks have unifying values oriented to growth and profitability, which emanates and filters 
down to how lending officers perceive risk. The guarding of the organisation’s values may 
influence and shape the perceptions of risk into threats rather than opportunities for the bank; 
hence the avoidance of risk through a huge presence of collateral, normally required from 
smaller firms.  What appears to be clear from the findings in this section and the evidence 
presented in the literature is that German banks are more proactive in the encouragement of 
risk sharing through partial state absorption and inter-bank risk sharing, evidenced in the 
cooperative banks.  This research argues that differences exist between the institutional make-
up between German and UK banks with varying degrees of influence.  UK banks, who on one 
hand embrace risk, guard their own organisational preserve and accordingly adjust to mitigate, 
whereas loan officers in German banks embrace risk with an approach to sharing the potential 
economic benefits derived from the lending.          
Bank training of staff serves as a mechanism by which banks as institutions can mould and 
shape particular normative patterns of behaviour learned by bank staff. UK banks spend less on 
training than German banks; moreover, the participants said they see training as part of a 
package, which promotes effective performance, maximising returns to shareholders. 
These factors bring about different patterns of lending behaviour between UK and German 
banks. The participants saw training as themes, unifying personal goals leading to upward 
mobility within their careers. However, the analysis showed that clear distinctions existed 
between German and UK bank cultures in respect to training. UK banks at local branch level 
train for sales each employee is trained on selling techniques and products. Little training was 
devoted to the operational systems and procedure. Training in recent years at UK banks has 
been ‘on the job’, and newcomers typically undergo training for a period of about three years. 
According to UK banks, an intensity of competition and pressure on profits has meant 
limitations on training budgets   
 On the other hand, German participants said that training was rigid and required several years, 
with formalised assessments at each level, measured by senior management before individuals 
could move progressively upwards within the bank. German participants said they saw training 
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as a means for the bank to standardise and familiarise managers with bank procedures. German 
banks also train their employees over a period of three years and recruit from the graduate 
population. The analysis showed that German banks gave greater emphasis on procedure 
through training and generally recruited graduates from universities; employees were also 
steered toward the achievement of professional banking qualifications. This is also highlighted 
in chapter two (Quack and Hildebrandt 1997). The analysis also showed that by comparison, 
UK banks were more likely to recruit from the main stream population and training was 
generally on the job. The analysis also showed that banks in both countries employed the use 
of incentives such as promotion and rewards to foster their culture. The German banking 
system is heterogeneous and less centralised mainly because of the statutory framework, i.e. 
savings and cooperative banks interact with small firms in the community in an attempt to 
facilitate growth and stimulate the economy Two German banks also revealed that their 
structures were closer to a form of centralisation driven by globalisation and a desire for 
diversification across the various international economies. Environmental pressure exerted 
from shareholders drives German commercial banks toward a centralised decision-making 
model similar to that of UK commercial banks.  
Whilst these facts suggest that German banks consciously aim toward a higher risk and lean 
approach to gaining higher returns, the very nature of German regulatory systems may prevent 
changes, despite their efforts to move toward the UK banking model. 
German banks employ individual incentives such as, performance related payments and 
included in the main commercial banks was the employment of team and central performance 
schemes. UK banks operated similar incentive schemes to their employees, but some 
differences were on the target setting. UK banks paid individual rewards to employees based 
on personal targets, whereas, German banks rewarded on effeciency and employees were 
required to reach. 
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Section three – The external environment  
An abundance of literature in chapter three (Llewellyn 2006, Berry; and Jarvis, 2003, Lane, 
and Quack; 2001) suggested that the external factors caused organisations to change and and 
adjust in order to conform to external pressures from regulators, shareholders, and other 
stakeholders. Both countries have arguably undergone many changes in their respective 
environments. EU law deregulation and Basle have inevitably changed the way banks operate. 
 
This section summarises the analysis in chapter five and discusses the findings. The section 
also answers the question in chapter three – does the environment change banks behaviour? 
The literature in chapter three highlights the differences between the two banking 
communities. German banks are divided into a three pillar system, The German banking 
system is often described as a three-pillar system, “Drei-Sälen Modell” and divides into three 
distinct categories: Public sector banks; these comprise of savings banks “(Sparkassen)” 
usually operating at regional level, but with head offices operating at provincial level, 
“Landesbanken”. The public sector banks account for half of the German banking sector with 
Sparkassen and Landesbanken controlling almost two thirds of the share. In the main public 
banks agendas are expected to stimulate local business and finance viable propositions for the 
public good. Generally, these regional banks are not in pursuit of profit maximisation and have 
a tendency to operate specifically at regional levels. Cooperative and Sparkassen banks operate 
at regional level, competing mainly with the public sector banks. Following the anti-
competitive laws, the cooperative banks are positioning in order to compete with other 
financial institutions. 
 
One of the key factors, according to some academics, is the Basle II accord, which is designed 
to exert pressure for banks to manage risk both in an operational and market sense. The 
analysis was not forthcoming in this area, mainly because the nature of the interviewees was 
not able to comment about such matter and it was deemed beyond their scope.  Despite 
institutional change and the dismantling of decentralisation in German banks, the 
environmental structure and culture continues to embrace a bureaucratic approach reflected by 
rigid monitoring and security of the regulatory systems.  
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The competitve environment is evidenced in the UK with an abundance of new entrants 
offering a vareity of financial  products  in addition, the UK banks suggested that the advent of 
internet banking, ATM technology and supermarkets are forms of competitive pressure 
pushing ino the banking sector. While this seems not to impact the SMEs, the analysis shows 
that UK Banks are attempting to revisit their strategies moving from distant transaction 
banking by  becoming customer focussed, employing customer focus groups to deal with the 
threat of competition. In addition, Capital adequacy deposit requirements has come at a high 
cost. The analysis shows that in the main, capital adequacy deposits were around 26 percent, 
suggesting that capital contraint is  exercised by decreasing  loan products to SMEs. There is 
no evidence to suggest this of course, but given the lead up to the banking crisis the aspect of 
capital contraints will no doubt be debated.    
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Chapter 7 – Conclusions 
This chapter brings together the key findings from the preceding chapters and relates to the 
literature discussed in chapter two. This includes the extent that different lending approaches 
exist in both German and UK banks under the context of this research study. The chapter is 
divided into two sections. Section one concludes on the key findings on the three key areas of 
investigation. Section two discusses the wider implications of the work and the platform for 
future research. 
Section 1 – Key findings and implications 
Did Cross National differences in the approaches to lending impact on SMEs  
This was a key question discussed in chapter three along with the rationale for undertaking the 
research in the first instance. The literature in chapter two highlighted that relationship banking 
was at the forefront of main stream commercial and cooperative banking in Germany which in 
turn brought about benefits to the community, not only on the basis that SMEs are not 
constrained by banks when accessing credit, but also benefits to the community in relation to 
the economy at large.  
Relationship banking is heavily featured in the literature and argues that relationship banking 
filters the opaqueness generally exhibited by SMEs. This effect lessens the need for monitoring 
and can in some cases benefit the SME with better contract terms.  Banks, at the first stage in 
the lending process, start a formalised procedure, a set of distinct rules and approach to the 
lending process, for example, the teams, or individuals that engage with the firm during the 
interview process (formulation of the loan product at the first stage). Usually, at this point, the 
firm brings information associated with their history and background information of 
management. Differences identified from the analysis found were in the types of information 
offered to potential borrowers during the interview.  
German banks internalise risk through rigorous in-house training to develop particular systems 
of standardisation to absorb the insecurities of bank officers. The regulatory practices of 
government and its legislation are such that it attempts to influence German banks to aim for 
the good of the community and to stimulate local business and the economy as a whole. 
However, profits are at the forefront of priorities at commercial banks in Germany, following 
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the reshaping of their business models. For example, reward systems have been widely 
introduced at both bank and individual level.   
German participants reported that their overall banking strategy is modelled on the UK system 
and aims to achieve higher returns to the bank than in the past.  
  These facts imply that the influence of shareholders following bank privatisation may 
override the influence of the German government at both state and local levels. This was an 
important feature, particularly in suggesting that there is evidence of an overlap between the 
rigid approach to lending and the personal influence, adjusted by German bank culture.  
  An embedded culture of government intervention still exists within German banks. The 
institutional types determine the pattern of employee behaviour. Powell and DiMaggio (1991) 
suggest that constant long-term exposure to the organisation adjusts the individual lender’s 
behaviour up to a point where risk attitudes adjust. The extant research suggests that 
procedural actions at banks shape attitudes and form a framework for decision-making. This 
contrasts with evidence from the participants who report that individual decision-making is 
encouraged and rewarded based on bank profitability.  
  Davies (2004) suggests that shareholders influence banks to achieve high returns and that the 
banks consequently come under increasing pressure to sell more services and more products. 
The opportunity for rewards and profitability means that risk is more likely to be externalised 
in order to reach personal goals more readily. For example, the higher the risk, the greater the 
return, provided the firm pays the additional monitoring and administration costs.    
  German banks were less flexible in their decision-making and instead cultural orientations 
lent towards regulatory practices and rules that German banks previously embraced. However, 
German banks now operate flatter and less rigid hierarchical structures to strike a balance 
between shareholders and the regulatory regimes. For example, the individual participant’s 
reward is on the number of loans made available to firms, rather than on their long-term 
profitability. Also reported was a lower emphasis on bureaucracy, standardisation and 
hierarchical supervision. Participants at UK banks also referred to training, which involved a 
combination of out-sourced and internal trainers. A conclusion drawn from this evidence 
suggests that UK banks focus strongly on competition and selling strategies. The findings 
strongly suggest a heightened desire to serve both themselves and the shareholder, rather than 
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focusing on business and customer needs. The German participants suggested that initiatives to 
standardise the processing of loans and the removal of bureaucratic practices are clear evidence 
that new environmental regulations and competitive pressure are driving the banking sector in 
Germany toward a short-termism approach of quick gains for shareholders. However, the old 
values and beliefs of stimulating their communities are hard to shake off.  
 The study found that German banks including the cooperatives are steering towards the UK 
model of value orientation. Another implication to the approach on relationship lending was 
the regulatory pressure of the Basle II Accord being phased in. Basle favours the employment 
of gathering hard quantitative data for the management of credit risk. 
 
Had the changes in bank strategies impacted upon their competitive position? 
The banks in both the market based and bank based setting have given up their competitive 
advantage this is clear from the change of strategy in both cases – the German banks have 
enjoyed a comparative advantage Boot (1999) suggested that the proliferation of de novo 
lenders had brought a serious challenge to banks – nonetheless what is clear from the findings 
is that banks believe the costs of maintaining a relationship cannot match the efficiency of 
transaction lending as suggested in the review Allen, DeLong, and Saunders; (1999).  
There is a strong consensus by those academics who argue that the challenges facing banks 
which enjoy an advantage through relationships are losing the one thing that gave edge over 
their rivals was the accumulation of soft information. Llewellyn identified the loss of these 
critical success factors in the 90s Llewellyn (1999) identified an upsurge in alternative 
suppliers delivering credit with remarkable efficiency with competitive pricing. The findings 
bear out the notion that banks are attempting to diversify – particularly that of the German 
banks. The co-operative banks face a number of challenges of their own. 
 UK banking in the main has undergone a series of changes in the last 20 years. UK banks are 
developing strategies that increase the shareholders’ return through mergers and acquisitions in 
an effort to gain economies of scale and dominate the market, which is in contrast to a German 
culture of adding value to the community. The institutional culture in the banking industry in 
Britain would suggest that profitability is maximised with little risk and cost to the 
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shareholders by transferring a greater proportion of the risk onto the SMEs through greater 
levels of collateralisation and increased premia.  
Did the institutional type have an effect on lending approaches and the management of internal 
operations? The literature highlights that an institutions make-up would cause employees to 
adjust their behaviour resulting in normative patterns of behaviour. The literature argued that 
German banks exhibit a hierarchy type (collectivist view), which meant that careful procedures 
are followed and competent management through high levels of training and other methods by 
which to incentivise employees behaviour. Clear evidence from the literature in chapter two 
highlighted that banks behaviour had changed with the advent of regulatory pressure exerted, 
but how much? No doubt academics will debate this during the course of time. Established 
however, was the differences highlighted regarding the way internal operations were managed 
between the two. German banks still approach internal management with a high degree of 
authority and a hierarchical culture, whereas, UK banks were found to be more individual in 
the management of internal operations. The literature argued that German society resembles 
that of a hierarchical structure and banks adopt a similar pattern of behaviour in the 
management of credit risk. 
Contribution to the wider literature  
This analysis raised a number of issues about the lending practices of banks in the UK and 
Germany. The review literature in chapter two highlighted the need to address the shortfall in 
SME debt funding by banks and bring to bear the importance of SMEs in promoting economic 
growth. The literature also addressed issues where banks were turning away from SMEs and 
concentrating their focus to more lucrative corporate lending. 
A further contribution to the literature was featured in the methodological approach in which 
the objective to undertake an exploratory research to gain insight into the actual perception of 
loan officers and the real banking environment.  Finally, the development of a conceptual 
model derived from the literature acted as an excellent tool to evaluate each theme presented.  
  
 164 
 
Limitations to the research findings 
The research design used an interpretive study utilising material taken from transcripts, 
however because the research sample did not cover a wider range of the banking sector, that 
which represented mutual banks and that of individuals in the same bank, a second 
questionnaire was distributed see data analysis section. Approximately 67 questionnaires were 
distributed to both German and UK banks with a response rate of 34 per cent. The response 
rate was very reasonable mainly because of the banking groups contacted online via the 
LinkedIn site. The questionnaire design reflected a gap and bolstered the research findings to 
give the study credibility and robustness. In hindsight, the decision to revamp the 
methodological approach was the right one. The study aimed to find answers to the initial 
research questions: how do banks perceive risk, and did conflict arise in the process of loan 
allocation between the banking institution and their respective clients (in this case, the small 
firm)? An inductive approach was the initial approach of study in order to conduct and 
interpret collected data. In addition, the researcher aimed to introduce deductive data to bolster 
the qualitative enquiry in an interpretive paradigm.  
The secondary aim was to collect quantitative data and prove the hypothesis that bank lending 
behaviour is subjective.  
 A quantitative approach was abandoned for a number of reasons, primarily, the researcher was 
unable to access the appropriate data, but even if access were available, the evidence drawn 
would not necessarily be conclusive and aspects of the approach would have issues of validity 
and trustworthiness. The best approach was that an interpretive enquiry would yield more 
meaningful and emergent evidence, and therefore provided an insight into the phenomenon.  
One major obstacle in the research was the time taken to gain access to the banking community 
in the United Kingdom. In the early stages, the assumptions regarding time to complete the 
research were based on easy access and a readiness to engage.  
The reluctance of banks in the United Kingdom became evident following several attempts to 
gain access. In addition to access difficulty, the researcher assumed that information given 
would be freely flowing – this was never the case with the exception of all banks in 
Leverkusen, Germany.  
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In this sense, the study required additional analysis and coding and a series of assumptions 
made were from the thematic analysis, which might with hindsight have led to certain 
disproportionate findings and resulted in slight bias towards the weighting between German 
and UK banks. However, careful steps were taken at every stage in the study to minimise the 
researcher’s bias.  
One limitation in the study was the omission of the role of government, considered initially in 
the research because there may be linkages in the deterioration of relations between the two 
actors – the UK lending institution and the small start-up firm. The researcher did consider that 
major difficulties would ensue if there were to be a third actor, i.e. the government. The 
researcher took advice from supervision and omitted the reviews of literature in chapter 2 and 
materials from the research based on time and the necessary resources required. With 
hindsight, this omission proved to be the correct decision.   
The initial model that was originally developed aimed to determine significance, through 
statistical methods. The researcher did not consider the sequential steps of the interpretive 
paradigm, and consequently the questionnaire considered was in the data as an additional 
source of information. However, the fact that these questionnaires were to elicit particular 
responses means that the method of interpreting data is subjective, and therefore partially 
biased from an interpretive perspective. The research was discussed the introduction of the 
secondary questionnaire with the supervisor, which resulted in a design change. The 
questionnaires retained were for an expanded research study. With hindsight, the action taken 
by the researcher facilitated an in-depth study based on the initial questionnaire and semi-
structured interviews which proved more fruitful.   
From a research study and design perspective, the researcher required considerable time to 
integrate the model for coding and hermeneutic analysis and to make sense of the data in a 
comparative way, which would then be both meaningful and contribute to other research in 
these fields of study 
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Section 2 - opportunities for further research 
The literature which examines the failure rate of SMEs is wide ranging, but little research is 
devoted to the idea that banks may link to SMEs failure. One approach might be linking the 
amount of credit denied by banks to SMEs already bankrupt. This would mean an exhaustive 
search of the receivership data bases. However, the results may fruitfully illustrate the 
importance of banks in any economy.   
  
 167 
 
References 
Ackerlof, G, (1970), The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3, 488-500 
Aggarwal, R. and K.T. Jacques, (2001), The Impact of FDICIA and Prompt Corrective 
Action on Bank Capital and Risk: Estimates using a Simultaneous Equations Model, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol 25, 1139 1160 
Alexander, K, (2004), Corporate Governance and Bank Regualtion, CERF Research 
Programme in International Financial Regulation, Working Paper 17,  
Allen, F. DeLong, A. Saunders, (1999), Issues in the Credit Risk Modeling of Retail Markets, 
Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol 23, Issue 2-4, 135-194 
Allen, F. Gale, D, (2001), Comparing Financial Systems, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,  
Allen, F, Cartelli , E, (2008), The Role of Banks in Financial Systems, in: Oxford handbook of 
banking, Oxford University Press,  
Altman, E Sabato,G, (2005), Effects of New Basel Capital Accord on Bank Capital 
Requirements for SMEs, Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 28(1-3), 15-42 
Aoki, M. Patrick, H. eds, (1994), The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for 
Developing and Transforming Economies, New York. Oxford University Press,  
Audretsch, D. & Elston, J, (2002), Does Firm Size Matter? Evidence on the Impact of 
Liquidity Constraints on Firm Investment Behaviour in Germany, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, Vol. 201, 1-17 
Baecker, D (ed), (1993), Die Form des Unternehemens, Suhrkamp Frankfurt,  
Bannier, C. E. and M. H. Grote, (2008), Equity gap? Which Equity Gap? On the Financing 
Structure of Germany's Mittelstand, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Working 
Paper No. 106,  
Bartol, K, Martin D. (ed), (2002), Management: a Pacific Rim Focus, McGraw-Hill, Sydney,  
Basel Committee, (2000), Governers, Report to G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank, 
Basel: Basel Committee,  
Becker, G, (1971), The Economics of Discrimination, 2nd edn, University of Chicago Press,  
 168 
 
Berger, A. Saunders, A. J . Scalise, J. and Udell, G, (1998), The Effects of Bank Mergers 
and Acquisitions on Small Business lending, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 50 (2), 187-
229 
Berger, A.N Scott, F, (2005), Small Business Credit Scoring and Availability, Working paper 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, No 2005-10,  
Berger, A.N, Udell, G.F, (1995), Relationship Lending and Line of Credit in Small Firm 
Finance, Journal of Business, Vol 68 Issue 3, 351-81. 
Berger, A.N. and G.F. Udell, (2002), Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship 
Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure, Economic Journal, Vol. 112(127), 
F32-F53 
Berger, A.N, Frame, W. Scott, (2007), Small Business Scoring and Credit Availability, 
Journal of Small Business Management, Vol 45, 5–22 
Berger, A.N, Udell G.F, (1993), Loan Officers and Relationship Lending, RIET discussion 
paper, Series 06-E - 031,  
Berry, A. Grant, P. Jarvis, R, (2004), European Bank Lending to the UK SME Sector: An 
Investigation of the Approaches Adopted, International Small Business Journal, Vol. 22, No 2, 
213-32 
Besanko, D, Thackor A, (1987), Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic 
and Competitive Credit Markets, International Economics Review, Vol 28, 671-689 
Besanko, D. Thackor A, (1988), Competitive Equilibrium in the Credit Market under 
Asymmetrtic Information Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 43 
Issue 1, 167-182 
Besanko, D, Kanatas, G, (1993), Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral 
Hazzard, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol 6 No 2, 213-32 
Bester, H, (1985), Screening vs Rationing in Credit Markets, The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 75 No. 4, 850-55 
Better Regualtion task force, (2005), Principles of good regulation, leaflet, 
Http://www.brtf.gov.uk/taskforce/reports/Principles,   
Bhattacharya, S, and Thakor A, (1993), Contemporary Banking Theory, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, Vol 3, 2-50 
 169 
 
Binks M.R. Ennew, C.T. Reed, G, (1992), Information Asymmetries and the Provision of 
Finance to Small Firms, International Small Business Journal, Vol 1, 35-46 
Binks, M, (1991), Small Business and their Banks in the Paths of Enterprise, Routledge, 149-
62 
Binks, M.R, Ennew, C.T, (1998), The relationship between Banks and their Small Customer, 
Small Busines Economics, Vol. 9 Issue 2, 167-78 
Binks, M.R, Ennew, C.T. & Reed G.V, (1988), The Survey of Private Businesses on Banks 
and Small Firms, London, Forum of Private Business,   
Binks, M.R, Ennew, C.T. & Reed G.V, (1996), Growing Firms and the Credit Constraint, 
Small Business Economics, Vol 8, 17-25 
Black J, de Meza D and Jeffreys D, (1996), House Prices, the Supply of Collateral and the 
Enterprise Economy, Economic Journal, Vol 106, 60-75 
Blanco, J, Lewko, J.H, Gillingham, D.W, (1986), Fallible Decisions in Management: 
Learning from Errors, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol 5 Issue 2, 5-11 
Boland, R.J. Jr, (1985), Beyond the Objectivist and the Subjectivist: Learning to Read 
Accounting as Text, Accounting Organisations and Society, Vol 14, 591 - 604 
Boot, A. W. A, S. I. Greenbaum, and A. V. Thakor, (1993), Reputation and Discretion in 
Financial Contracting, American Economic Review, vol 83.11, 65–83 
Boot, A, Thackor, A.V, (1999), Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition? Journal of 
Finance, Vol 55, 679-713 
Boot, A.W. Thackor A.V, (1997), Financial System Architecture, Rev. of Financial Studies, 
Vol 10, 693-733 
Boot, A.W, Thackor, A.V, (1994), Moral Hazzard and Secured lending in an Infinitely 
Repeated Credit Market Game, International Economic Review, Vol 35 Issue 4, 889-920 
Broecker, T, (1990), Credit-worthiness tests and interbank competition, Econometrica, 58, 
429–452 
Bryman, A, (1998), Quantity and Quality in Research, London, Unwin Hyman,  
Burgess, T. F, (2001), A General Introduction to the Design of Questionnaires for Survey 
Research, Retrieved from http://www.leeds.ac.uk/iss/documentation/top/top2.pdf, Aug-04,  
 170 
 
Burke, A. and A. Hanley, (2003), Bank Interest Margins and Business Start-up Collateral: 
Testing for Convexity, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 53 No. 3, 319-334 
Carter N and Allan KR, (1997), Size Determinants of Women Owned Businesses: Choice or 
Barriers to Resources, Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, Vol 9(3), 211-220 
Chaston, (1993), Delivering Customer Satisfaction within the SME Client-Banker 
Relationship, Services Industry Journal, Vol 13 No 1, 98-111 
Chittenden, F, Hall, H. & Hutchinson, P, (1996), Small Firm Growth, Access to Capital 
Markets and Financial Structure: Review of Issues and Empirical Investigation, Small 
Business Economics, Vol 8, 59–67 
Clay, N. Cowling, M, (1998), Small Firms and Bank relationships: A Study of Cultural 
Differences between English and Scottish Banks, Omega International Journal of Management 
Sciences, Vol 24 No 1, 115-20 
Cohen L and Manion L , (1989), Research Methods in Education, London, Routledge,  
Competition Commission, (2002), The Supply of Banking Services by Clearing Banks to 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, London: Competition Commission, cm 5319 Vol 1,  
Cowley, M. Westhead, P, (1996), Bank Lending Decisions and Small Firms: Does Size 
Matter? International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and research, Vol 2, 52-68 
Cressy R, Olofsson C, (1997), "European SME Financing: An Overview” Special Issue of 
Small Business Economics, Small Business Economics, Vol.9, 87-96 
Cressy, R, (1993), Introduction of Funding Gaps, Economic Journal Royal Economic Society, 
Vol 112 (477), 1-16 
Cressy, R, (2002), The Theory of the Opportunistic Entrepreneur, Small Business Economics 
Springer, Vol 4, 267-71 
Cressy, R. Storey, D.J, (1996), New Firms and their Bank, Warwick SME Centre Warwick: 
University of Warwick, Working paper series 39,  
Creswell, J. W, (1998), Design Choosing among Five Traditions, Thousand Oaks C.A. Sage, 
Qualitative Enquiry and Research,  
Cruickshank, D, (2000), Competition in UK Banking, London: HMSO,  
Daft. R.L, (2006), Management Fifth Edition, FT Press,  
 171 
 
Dane, F.C, (1990), Research Methods, Pacific Grove CA.Brooks/Cole Publishing Co,   
Davis, A, (2004), NASD Scrutinizes Conflicts in Bankers’ Fairness Opinions, Wall Street 
Journal (Eastern edition), A.1. 
Dawson, P, (1996), Organisational Change: A Processual Approach, London: Paul Chapman,  
de Mezza, D, (2002), Over Lending, The Economic Journal, special Issue, Vol 112 No 477, 
17-31 
de Mezza, D, Webb, D, (2000), Does Credit Rationing imply Insufficient Lending?, Journal of 
Public Economics, Vol 78 No 3, 215 
De young, R. Glennon, D. Nigro, P, (2008), Borrower-lender Distance Credit Scoring and 
Loan Performance:Evidence taken from Informational-opaque Small Busines Borrowers, 
Journal of Financial Intermediation Elsevier, Vol 17 Issue 1, 113-143 
Deakins, D. Hussain, J.G, (1994), Risk Assessment with Asymmetric Information: A Case 
Study of Lending Decisions by Bank Officers, UKMER Journal, Vol 3 No 2, Nov-23 
Deeg, Richard, (1996), Economic Globalization and the Shifting Boundaries of German 
Federalism. Publius, The Journal of Federalism Comparative Political Studies, Vol 33 No 3, 
374-405 
Di Maggio, P.J, Powell, W, (1983), The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isopmorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, American Sociological Review, Vol. 48 Issue 
2, 147-60 
Diamond D.W, (1984), Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, Rev. Econ. 
Studies, Vol 5, 393–414. 
Diamond, D, and R. Rajan, (2001), Banks and Liquidity, American Economic Review, Vol. 
91, 422-425 
Diamond. D.W, (1991), Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loan and 
Directly Placed Debt, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol 99 Issue 5, 689-721 
Douglas, M. Wildavsky, A, (1982), Risk and Culture, University of Californian Press, LA and 
London,  
DTI, (2003), SME Banking Services and Small Business Competition. London, HMSO,  
EIM/ENSR, (1995), The European Observatory: The Third Annual Report EIM Business and 
Policy Research, Zoetermeer,  
 172 
 
Elas, R. Kranhnen,P, (2003), Universal Banks and Relationships with Firms, CFS Working 
Paper, No. 2003/20,  
England, Bank of, (2001), Finance for Small Firms, London: Bank of England,  
England, Bank of, (2002), Quarterly Report on Small Business statistics, London: Bank of 
England,   
England, Bank of, (2003), 10th Finance for Small Firms, London: Bank of England,  
Fama, E. (1985), what’s different about banks. Journal of Monetary Economics Volume 15, 
Issue 29 39.  
Fazzari, S, (1988), Financing Contraints and Corporate Investment, Brookings paper on 
Economic activity, 141-195 
Feldman, R, (1997), Business Loans, Small Banksand a Big Change in Technology Called 
Credit Scoring, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis’, The Region. September, 1997, 19-25 
Fischer, K. and Pfeil, C, (2003), Regulation and Competition in German Banking, An 
Assessment Cente for Financial Studies, Working paper No 2003 19,  
Frame, W.S, Padhi, M, Woosley, L, (2004), Credit Scoring and the Availability of Small 
Business Credit in Low- and Moderate-income Areas, Financial Review, Vol 39, 35–54 
Frame, W.S, Srinivasan, A, Woosley, L, (2001), The Effect of Credit Scoring on Small-
Business Lending, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol 33, 813–825 
Frazer, S, (2005), Finance for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises: UK Survey of SME 
Finances, Warwick Business School,   
Freel, M. S, (2000), Barriers to Product Innovation in Small Manufacturing Firms, 
International Small Business Journal, Vol 18(2), 60–80 
Gerschenkron A, (1962), Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, A Book of 
Essays, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA,  
Glasser, B, Strauss, A, (1967), The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Strategies of Qualitative 
Research, London: Wiedenfield and Nicholson,  
Grunert, J, Norden, L, & Weber, M, (2005), The Role of Non-Fnancial Factors in Internal 
Credit Ratings, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol 29, 509–531 
 173 
 
Hall, P.A, (1996), Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, Political Studies, 
Vol (44) 5, 936-957 
Hamilton, R.T, Fox, M.A, (1998), The Financial Preferences of Small Business Owners, 
International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research, Vol 4 Issue 3, 239-48 
Hannan, T.H, (2003), Changes in Non-local Lending to Small Business, Journal of Financial 
Services Research, Vol 24, 31–46 
Hauswald, R. and R. Marquez, (2006), Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in 
Credit Markets, Review of Financial Studies, Vol 19, 967-100 
Hellwig, S, (1989), Competency-Based Training: Different Perceptions in Australia and 
Germany, Australian Journal of Adult Learning, Vol 46 No 1, 51-73 
Heppner, P, Kivlingham, D. M, & Wampold, B. E, (1992), Research Design in Counseling, 
Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole,  
Herring, R.J./Litan, R.E, (1995), Financial Regulation in the Global Economy, The 
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C,  
Hoffman, A.J, (2002), Linking Organizational and Field-level Analysis- the Diffusion of 
Corprorate Environmental Practice, Organization and Environment Journal, Vol 13, 133-156. 
Howarth, C. Peel, M.J, Wilson, N, (2003), An Examination of the Factors Associated with 
Bank Switching in the UK Small Firm Sector, Small Business Economics, Vol 20 No 4, 305-17 
Hughes, A. Leube, B, (1997), The Extent and Nature of Mutual Guarantee Schemes in 
Europe, Draft paper, Cambridge: Centre for Business Research,  
Hutchinson, R. McKillop, D, (1992), Banks and Small to Medium Size Business Financing: 
Some general issues, The National Westminster Banking Review, 84-95 
Jackson, P, (1999), Capital Requirements and Bank Regulation:the Impact of the Basel 
Accord, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Working Paper,  
Jacques, K. and Nigro P, (1997), Risk-based Capital, Portfolio Risk, and Bank Capital: A 
Simultaneous Equations Approach, Journal of Economics and Business, Vol 49, 533-547 
James, C, (1987), Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol 19, 217-235 
Joppe, M, (2003), The Research Process, http://www.ryerson.ca/~mjoppe/rp.htm, Retrieved 
February 25, 2003,  
 174 
 
Keasey, K, Watson, R, (1993), Banks and Small Firms: Is conflict inevitable?, National 
Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, 30-40 
King, R and Levine, R, (1993), Finance and Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 
108, 717-37 
Klein, H.K, Myers, M.D, (1999), A Set of Principles for Conducting and Evaluating 
Interpretive Field Studies in Information Systems, MIS Quarterly, Vol 23, 67 
Kunt A, Levine R, (1999), Bankbased and Market-based Financial Systems: Crosscountry 
Comparisons, World Bank Working Paper, No. 2143,  
Lane, C. Quack,S, (2001), How Banks Manage and Construct Risk, Working paper series, 
Vol 217,  
Lazonic, W, and O’Sullivan M, (1997), Finance and Industrial Development: Evolution to 
Market Control, Financial History Review, Vol 4 (2), 117-38 
Lean, J. Tucker, J, (2001), Information Asymmetry, Small Firm Finance and the role of 
Govenrment, Journal of Finance and Management in Public Services, Vol 1 Issue 1, 43-62 
Levine, R, (1997), Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, Journal 
of Economic Literature, Vol 35, 688-726 
Llewellyn D. T, (2006), European Financial Integration: Convergence or Diversity In 
Banking?, SUERF Paper,  
Llewellyn D.T, (1999), The New Economics of Banking, SUERF, Amsterdam forum No 5,  
Llewellyn, D.T, (2002), Strategic Implications of the New Economics of Retail Financial 
Services, London: Building Societies Association,  
Llewellyn, D.T, (1999), The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation, Occasional Paper, 
Series 1,  
Luhmann, N, (1993), Risk: A sociological Theory, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter,  
MacMillan, (1931), Report of Committe on Finance and Industry, Cmd 322,  
March, J.A, (1998), Marching towards a behavioural theory of the firm, Journal of 
Management, Vol 42 Issue 2, 1257-1268 
Martinelli, C, (1997), Small Firms, Borrowing Constraints, and Reputation, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol 33, 91-105 
 175 
 
Merton, R.C, (1974), On the Pricing of Debt: The Risk of Interest rates, Journal of Finance, 
Vol 29, 449-70 
Mester, L, (1997), What’s the Point of Credit Scoring?, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia’s Business Review, p 3-16 
Midland Bank, (1994), The Mittelstand. The German model and the UK, Midland Bank, 55 
Milde, H. and J.G. Riley, (1988), Signalling in credit markets, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 103(1), 101-129 
Nerin, C, Gonzalez, Huang, (2002), ECB Annual Report, European Central Bank,  
Orlickowski, W. Baroudi, J, (1991), Studying Information Technology in Organisation 
Research. Approaches and Assumptions, Information systems Research, Vol 2, p 1-28 
Parker, S.C, (2002), Do Banks Ration Credit to New Enterprises and should Governments 
intervene? Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol 49 Issue 2, 162-195 
Patton, M.Q, (2001), Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, Newbury Park CA:Sage,  
Petersen, M.A, Rajan, R.G, (2002), Does Distance still Matter? The Information Revolution 
in Small Business Lending, Journal of Finance, Vol 57, 2533–2570 
Peterson, M.A, Rajan, R.G, (1994), The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from 
the Small Business Data, Journal of Finance, Vol 49 Issue 1, p 3-37 
Pond, K, (2004), Banks and Insolvent Corporate Customers, Experience of the Rescue Culture, 
in Gerbal et al, Aktulle Entwicklungen im Finanzdiestleseislungsberich, 3 Liechtensteinisches 
Finanzdiestleistung - symposium, Liechtenstein,  
Quack, S Hildebrandt, S, (1997), Bank Finance for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in 
Germany and France, in: Morgan, G, Knights, D, Regulation and deregulation in European 
financial services, London: Macmillan Business, 105-132. 
Quack, S. O`Reilly, J Hildebrandt, S, (1995), New Patterns of Recruitment and Training in 
German, UK and French Banks, Discussion Paper, Wissenschaftszen-trum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung, Berlin, P 11-38 
Rabb R Welzel P, (2010), The Economics of regional Demarcation in Banking, EDIRC 
Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve banks St Louis, Discussion Paper 
Series 87,  
 176 
 
Rajan, R, (1992), Insiders and Outsiders; the Choice between Informed and Arm’s length 
Debt, Journal of Finance, Vol 47, 1367–1400 
Rajan, R. and Zingales L, (1997), The Cost of Diversity: Diversification Discount and 
Inefficient Investment, The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment, NBER 
Working Paper #6368,  
Robson, C, (2002), Real world research: A resource for Social Scientists and Practioner- 
Researchers, Oxford: Blackwell,   
Rossi C, (1998), Mortgage Banking Cost and Structure: Resolving an Enigma, Journal of 
Economics and Business, Vol 50, 219-23 
Saunders, A, (1996), Financial Institutions Management A Modern Perspective, Irwin 
Publishers, Illinois, 1996,  
Saurina, J Trucharte, C, (2004), The impact of Basel II on lending to small- and medium-
sized firms: a regulatory policy assessment based on Spanish credit register data, Journal of 
Financial Services Research, Vol 26(2), 121-144 
Scott WR, (1992), Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems 3rd Edn, Prentice Hall: 
Englewood, Cliffs N.J,   
Scott, W.R, (2001), Institutions and Organizations, Thousand Oaks CA, Sage,  
Seal, C, Croft, A, (1997), Professional Rivalry and Changing Management Control 
Approaches in UK clearing Banks, Journal of Accounting and Finance, Vol 10 Issue 1, 60-84 
Sharpe, S, A, (1990), Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A 
Stylized Model of Customer Relationships, Journal of Finance, Vol 45, 1069-1087 
Spitler, V.K, (2002), Adventures in the field: Conducting an Interpretive Case Study of 
Strategic Management Consultants, Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual International 
Conference of System Sciences, Waikolao Village, The Big Island Hawaii, 1-10 
Stanworth, J. and C. Gray, (1991), Bolton 20 Years On: The Small Firm in the 1990s, Paul 
Chapman, London,  
Starbuck, W, (1973), Designing Adaptive Organizations, Journal of Business Policy, Vol 3,  
Steckler, A, McLeroy, K. R, Goodman, R. M, Bird, S. T. & McCormick, L, (1992), 
Toward Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: An Introduction, Health Education 
Quarterly, Vol 19, 1–8 
 177 
 
Stiglitz, J, Weiss, A, (1981), Credit Rationing in Markets with Imprefect Information, 
American Economic Review, Vol 71, 393-409 
Story, D, (1994), Understanding the Small Business Sector, London: Routledge,  
Strauss, A. Corbin, J, (1994), Grounded Theory Methodology An overview in : Handbook of 
Qualitative Research. London: Denzin, NK, and Lincoln Sage Publications,  
Taylor, C, (1976), Hermeneutics and Politics in Connection P. ed, Critical Sociology Selected 
Readings, Penguin,  
Tere, M. and Kelly, K, (1999), Interpretive Methods Research in Practice: Applied Methods 
For the Social Sciences, Cape Town SA University of Cape Town press, 147-177 
Tucker, J. Lean, J, (2003), Small Firm Finance and Public Policy, Journal of Small Business 
and Enterprise Development, Vol 10 No 1, 50-61 
Udell G. Yamori, U. Uchida, H, (2008), Loan Officers and Realtionship Lending, Discussion 
Paper 06031,  
Van Hoose, D, (2006), Bank Capital Regualtion, Economic Stability and Monetary Policy: 
What does the Academic Literature Tell Us? Atlantic Economic Journal International Atlantic 
Society, Vol 36, p1-14 
Vitols, S, (2001), Financial Systems and Industrial Policy in Germany and Great Britain: The 
Limits of Convergence in Forsyth and Notermans, in Forsyth, D. J./Notermans, T. (eds): 
Regime changes, 221-255 
von Thadden, E.-L, (2004), Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: 
The Winner’s Curse, Finance Research Letters, Vol 1, p1-14 
Waring, J. D, Payne, J. D, Schacter, D. L, & Kensinger, E. A, (2010), Impact of Individual 
Differences upon Emotion-Induced Memory Tradeoffs, Cognition and Emotion, Vol 24, 
150167 
Weber, (1997), Risk Decision and Policy, Cambridge University Press 6, 3, 187-206 
White, R, Gunstone, R, (1982), Probing Understanding, London: Falmer Press,  
Wickham, P. A, (2001), Strategic Entrepreneurship: A decision-making approach to new 
venture creation and management (2 ed), London: Prentice Hall,  
Wilson, (1979), Report on the Financing of Firms, London: HMSO,  
 178 
 
Wilson, (2003), Bridging the Finance Gap: A Consultation on Improving Access to Growth 
Capital for Small Businesses, Consultation, London: HMSO,  
Wilson, G, (1979), The Financing of Small Firms: Report of the Committee to Review the 
Functioning of Financial Institutions, London: HMSO, CMND 7503,  
Yin, R.K, (2002), Case Study Research Design and Methods 2nd Edition, Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications,  
 
  
 179 
 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire  
 
For the researcher’s guidance  
 
1. Read out the nature of the research and the justifications for the study. Explain 
to the participant that the study comprises of a comparative analysis between 
banks in Britain and Germany. Advise that the researcher will take notes, which 
will be available. In the case of German banks, explain that the notes can be 
translated into German if required for scrutiny.  
 
2. Show the participant the models developed, and explain their content, which 
may be relevant to the study. Also, explain to the participant for a hermeneutic 
analysis which in part will be agreed upon by the researcher and participant. 
 
 
1) Can I ask what the initial requirements are from the bank prior to the loan 
application?  
 
2) How does the bank market credit for businesses? Is there any government 
legislation regulatory requirements, or requirements that require the bank to 
encourage business growth? Could you expand on these areas?    
 
3) Could I ask if there is a ceiling of credit? In addition, how does the bank deal 
with firms that require large amounts of credit, which reaches above the lending 
limit of the team or individual? 
 
4) Does the bank have a pre-screening criterion, which automatically rejects 
applications? If so, could you elaborate and give some examples? 
 
5) Assuming the bank has entered into a dialogue with the borrower, what is the 
next stage in the lending process? Is the process of lending protected by both 
the bank and the borrower, for example through data protection?  
 
 
1) Can you override the standard make-up of the loan, can you be flexible with the 
system, or is it strictly regulated – do you need to refer to other members in the 
team, or manager? Can you change the premium charged on the loan, for 
example, can you agree terms at particular levels? 
 
2) Are you able to increase or decrease the level of interest because you believe 
that the targets set by the bank may be too high? 
 
3) Does your personal decision count? 
 
4) Does the bank have a rewards system for staff? 
Loan 
allocation 
Loan 
specification 
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3. At this stage of the interview, explain to the participant the need in the 
procedure of identifying the process of the method of allocation, expand on the 
ideas that banks have internal policies on how they allocate credit. 
 
 
 
1) What information should the borrower bring with them at the initial stages of the 
interview? Is it documentary evidence, history, or bank statements – can you 
elaborate on the particular bank’s practices?    
 
2) How do you determine if the information obtained through evidence is factual? 
Can false documentation arise at the initial stages – do you have a filtering 
policy, or do you accept documents at face value? What instances have loans 
for development or investment been turned down because of limited 
information? If so, could you elaborate? 
 
3) Does the bank stick to locality, or can anyone from any locality walk into the 
bank and apply for credit? Do you have a referral policy to keep businesses in 
a regional or segmented location? 
 
4) Does the bank have to compete for business with sister branches, or is there a 
policy which keeps business banking local?   
 
5) Does the bank use internal guidelines, or are the guidelines driven externally or 
centrally – could you expand if this is the case? 
 
 
 
 
1) Does the bank have teams which are organised and which aim towards 
                the overall bank’s aim, for example, does the bank have objective  
                meetings? Do you personally agree or disagree with some policies? 
  
2) Can you make personal judgements, a feeling about something, say 
                you simply have a hunch about the lender, do you decide personally? 
                Alternatively, are there procedures, documentation to stop your views   
                influencing the process? 
          
3) Is there conflict amongst the employees? 
 
4) How would you describe the process of lending in terms of the bank’s 
                desires and aims?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
How we 
allocate 
Process 
symbols 
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4. Explain to the participant that we are going to examine the process of 
preference and identification of lenders.  
 
 
1) How do you identify risky borrowers? Does the bank have a pre-determination 
of sifting risky borrowers? If so, what does the bank do to minimise the risk? 
 
2) Do you have a predetermined amount allocated for lending? If this is the case, 
how do you discriminate between borrowers, are there any internal policies for 
identification? Could you elaborate? 
 
3) How do you determine preference, do you for example prefer limited      
                        organisations, proprietorships or other? 
 
4) Does the bank give preference to existing account holders who wish to start 
their own business? 
 
 
 
1) Ask the participant to freely discuss the roles, aims, rewards, 
      desires and objectives. 
 
 
Discuss their views on profits, how small business should be helped, actions of 
banks which encourage small business development, how they might view best 
practices for both the banks and the small business. 
 
General discussion 
 
 
As the final stage in the process, show the participant transcript notes and 
whether they wish to change anything – this process enables an agreement 
between the researcher and participant. Explain these rules carefully. 
 
 
5. Explain to the participant that we’re going to examine why they allocate credit 
and the reasons for credit allocation. 
  
1)   Does the bank allocate loans for the good of the community, 
      or is there a policy of maximising profitability for the banks?  
 
2)   What is the bank’s policy for loan allocation – is it their guidelines,  
      or is it regulatory?  
 
Who 
receives?  
Why 
allocate?  
Personal 
and team 
symbols 
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3)    Does the bank discriminate in certain market segments,  
      for example industry, services or other? 
 
4)    Does the bank have policies of identifying markets which  
      can maximise returns to the bank?   
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6. Explain to the participant that we are going to examine underlying values and 
culture. 
 
 
1) Does the bank have policies in place which exclude certain businesses on 
moral/ ethical grounds? 
 
2) Can you exercise influence over credit allocation based on your personal 
values, or do you follow the bank’s culture?  
 
3) Does the bank have an in-house induction, which includes organisational 
culture? If so, describe the bank culture? 
Underlying 
values 
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Participant Information Sheet 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The study investigates the influences on loan officers in UK and German banks when 
assessing proposals from SMEs. The research forms part of my PhD and your assistance 
would be very much appreciated in order to make this a credible and worthwhile piece of 
work. 
 
Who is doing this research and why? 
The research forms part of my PhD and your assistance would be very much appreciated in 
order to make this a credible and worthwhile piece of work. 
 
What am I being asked to do? 
You are being asked to complete a questionnaire which should take around 10 minutes. The 
questionnaire seeks to obtain your views about your general approach adopted to the due 
diligence process regarding lending to SMEs  
 
Do I have to take part? 
Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. You are not obliged to answer every 
question on the questionnaire so if you would prefer not to answer specific questions please 
leave them blank; the remainder of your responses will still be extremely useful. 
 
What personal information will be required from me? 
Only background information about experience, qualifications and training are sought. 
 
Will I be identified in any reports or summaries of this research? 
The questionnaire is anonymous. If you choose to provide an email address to which a 
summary of findings can be sent, this will be stored separately from your responses. Any 
potentially identifying information you provide in your responses will not be included in the 
reports produced as a result of this research. 
 
How will I benefit from participating in this research? 
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In return for your participation in this project, you may indicate on the questionnaire whether 
you would like to receive a summary of the findings from this survey 
 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
 
The information you provide will be treated in confidence and will be handled in accordance 
with the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 and under the control of Loughborough 
University. 
 
Who is funding this research? 
 
I am entirely self-funded. 
 
Who do I contact if I have any queries? 
 
I can be contacted by email:  A.R. Stevenson@lboro.ac.uk should you wish, you can contact 
my PhD supervisor Dr Keith Pond:   K.Pond@lboro.ac.uk 
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 Appendix 2 Questionnaire English Version 
Section A Categorisation issues 
Please answer the following questions by placing an X in the appropriate box  
 
Item Question Check  
 
A 
Location of Bank 
a) Germany 
b) United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
B 
Type of bank  
a) Retail 
b) Co-operative 
c) Foreign owned 
d) Other 
e) Small 
f) Large   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
Years in role of Lending Officer 
a) Less than 2 years 
b) 2 -5 years 
c) 5-10 years 
d) 10-15 years 
e) 15 -20 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
Area of expertise and currently operating in  
a) SME 
b) Corporate Banking 
c) Industry Specialist 
d) Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E 
How would you describe your job: 
a) Sales 
b) Credit Assessment 
c) Administration 
d) Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
Do you hold relevant professional qualifications 
relating to your job? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
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Section B Informational issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
 
How important are the following sources of data when considering a loan application / 
renewal for an existing SME client? 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts       
Up to date Management Accounts       
Externally provided credit score       
Internally generated credit score       
Personal knowledge of client       
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German equivalent?) 
      
Business Plan with forecast cash flow 
and accounts 
      
 
How important are the following sources of data when considering a loan application 
/ renewal for a new SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts       
Up to date Management Accounts       
Externally provided credit score       
Internally generated credit score       
Personal knowledge of client       
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German equivalent?) 
      
Business Plan with forecast cash flow 
and accounts 
      
 
If you are able to compare current practice with the pre 2007 period please answer the 
following, if not continue to section C 
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How important were the following sources of data when considering a loan application / 
renewal for an existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts       
Up to date Management Accounts       
Externally provided credit score       
Internally generated credit score       
Personal knowledge of client       
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German equivalent?) 
      
Business Plan with forecast cash flow 
and accounts 
      
 
How important were the following sources of data when considering a loan application for a 
new SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts       
Up to date Management Accounts       
Externally provided credit score       
Internally generated credit score       
Personal knowledge of client       
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German equivalent?) 
      
Business Plan with forecast cash flow 
and accounts 
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Section C Institutional / Policy issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
 
How important are the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Credit quality policy of the bank       
Benefit for the community / local economy       
The impact on personal reward / bonus       
Personal judgement about the business       
Knowledge of previous decisions by line 
manager / credit officer (as applicable, 
where loan exceed personal lending limit) 
      
Potential profitability of the loan       
The availability of security for the advance       
 
If you are able to compare current practice with the pre 2007 period please answer the 
following, if not continue to section D 
 
How important were the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Credit quality policy of the bank       
Benefit for the community / local economy       
The impact on personal reward / bonus       
Personal judgement about the business       
Knowledge of previous decisions by line 
manager / credit officer (as applicable, 
where loan exceed personal lending limit) 
      
Potential profitability of the loan       
The availability of security for the advance       
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Section D Personal issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
 
How important are the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Training by the bank       
Personal objectives in the bank (such as 
promotion / reward) 
      
Personal knowledge of the directors / 
managers of the business 
      
Professional qualifications       
       
       
       
       
 
Thank you for taking the time to respond to this survey. 
 
Please send the completed survey to: 
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APPENDIX 3 German information sheet 
Informationen für Teilnehmer 
 
Welchen Zweck verfolgt diese Umfrage? 
Die Umfrage untersucht,durch welche Faktoren Kreditsachbearbeiter in Deutschen und Britischen Banken 
beim Bearbeiten von Kreditanträgen kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen (KMUs) in ihren Entscheidungen 
beeinflusst werden. 
 
Wer führt die Umfrage durch und warum? 
Die Umfrage ist Teil meiner Abschlußarbeit. Ihre Mithilfe wäre ein willkommener Beitragzu Relevanz und 
Wert der Arbeit. 
 
Was muss ich dabei tun? 
Sie werden lediglich gebeten, einen Fragebogen auszufüllen, was nicht mehr als 10 Minuten Ihrer Zeit in 
Anspruch nehmen dürfte. In dem Fragebogen geht es darum, Ihre Ansichten betreffend Ihres generellen 
Ansatzes bei der Kreditvergabe an KMUszu erfahren. 
 
Bin ich zur Teilnahme verpflichtet? 
Ihre Teilnahme an dieser Studie ist vollkommen freiwillig.Sie müssen auch nicht jeden Punkt auf dem 
Fragebogen beantworten. Wenn Sie bevorzugen, bestimmte Fragen nicht zu beantworten, lassen Sie diese 
einfach aus. Ihre übrigen Antworten werden nach wie vor von großem Nutzen sein.  
 
Welche persönlichen Daten benötigen Sie von mir? 
Lediglich allgemeine Informationen über Erfahrung, Qualifikationen und Ausbildung. 
 
Werde ich in Berichten und Zusammenfassungen der Studie namentlich erwähnt werden? 
Die Umfrage ist anonym. Sollten Sie eine E-Mail hinterlassen, um eine Zusammenfassung der 
Umfrageergebnisse zu erhalten, wird diese getrennt von Ihre Antworten aufbewahrt. Jegliche Informationen 
in Ihren Antworten, die Rückschlüsse auf Ihre Person zulassen könnten, werden in der Auswertung der 
Studienicht aufgeführt.  
 
Was bringt mir die Teilnahme an dieser Studie? 
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Wenn Sie Ihre eMail Adresse hinterlassen, bekommen Sieals Dankeschön fur Ihre Teilnahme eine 
Zusammenfassung der Umfrageergebnisse zugeschickt.  
 
Was geschieht mit den Informationen? 
Ihre Angaben werden vertraulich behandelt, gemäß den gesetzlichen Datenschutzbestimmungen und unter 
Aufsicht der Loughborough University.  
 
Wer finanziert diese Studie? 
Meine Arbeit wird komplett aus eigenen privaten Mitteln finanziert. 
 
An wen kann ich mich wenden, sollte ich Fragen haben? 
Sie erreichen mich per eMail:  A.R. Stevenson@lboro.ac.uk  
order meine : Akademischer  K.Pond@lboro.ac.uk 
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2. APPENDIX 4 German Questionnaire 
Teil A Fragen zur Einstufung 
Bitte markieren Sie die zutreffenden Antworten in der rechten Spalte 
 
 
Pun
kt 
Frage  
 
A 
 
Standort der Bank 
a) Deutschland 
b) Großbritannien 
 
 
 
 
 
B 
 
Art der Bank  
a) Privatbank 
b) Volksbank, Sparkasse 
c) Ausländische Bank 
d) Andere 
e) Klein 
f) Groß 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
 
Berufserfahrung als Kreditsachbearbeiter 
a) Unter 2 Jahren 
b) 2-5  Jahre 
c) 5-10 Jahre 
d) 10-15 Jahre 
e) 15-20 Jahre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
 
Fachbereich in dem Sie gegenwärig tätig 
sind: 
a) KMU 
b) Firmenkundengeschäft 
c) Branchenexperte 
d) Andere 
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E 
 
Wie würden Sie Ihre Tätigkeit beschreiben: 
a) Verkauf 
b) Kreditprüfung 
c) Verwaltung 
d) Andere 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
Besitzen Sie relevante fachliche 
Qualifikationen für Ihre Tatigkeit? 
a) Ja 
b) Nein 
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Teil B  Allgemeine Fragen 
 
Beurteilen Sie auf einer Skala von 1 -5 die Aussagekraft und Bedeutungbestimmter 
Kernpunkte bei der Kreditvergabe aus Ihrer Sicht. 
 
1 = kaum aussagekräftig, unbedeutend; 5 = sehr aussagekräftig,sehr bedeutend 
 
Wie wichtig sindIhnen die folgenden Informationsquellen bei der Beurteilung eines 
Krediantrages oder einer Kreditverlängerung für einen bestehenden Kunden aus dem Bereich 
KMU? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Kontoverhalten       
Aktueller geprüfter Jahresabschluss        
Aktuelle interne Berichte/Abschlüsse       
Extern erstellter Kreditscore       
Intern erstellter Kreditscore       
Kunde ist Ihnen persönlich bekannt       
SCHUFA        
Business-Plan mit Umsatz- und 
Liquiditätsprognose 
      
 
Wie wichtig sindIhnen die folgenden Informationsquellen bei der Beurteilung eines 
Krediantrages oder einer Kreditverlängerung für einen Neukunden aus dem Bereich KMU? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Kontoverhalten       
Aktueller geprüfter Jahresabschluss        
Aktuelle interne Berichte/Abschlüsse       
Extern erstellter Kreditscore       
Intern erstellter Kreditscore       
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Kunde ist Ihnen persönlich bekannt       
SCHUFA        
Business-Plan mit Umsatz- und 
Liquiditätsprognose 
      
 
Falls Sie in der Lage sind, Ihre gegenwärtige Vorgehensweise mit dem Zeitraum vor 2007 zu 
vergleichen, beantworten Sie bitte folgende Fragen. Falls nicht, gehen Sie bitte direkt zu Teil 
C. 
 
Wie wichtig waren Ihnen die folgenden Informationsquellen bei der Beurteilung eines 
Krediantrages oder einer Kreditverlängerung für einen bestehenden Kunden aus dem Bereich 
KMU? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Kontoverhalten       
Aktueller geprüfter Jahresabschluss        
Aktuelle interne Berichte/Abschlüsse       
Extern erstellter Kreditscore       
Intern erstellter Kreditscore       
Kunde ist Ihnen persönlich bekannt       
SCHUFA        
Business-Plan mit Umsatz- und 
Liquiditätsprognose 
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Wie wichtig waren Ihnen die folgenden Informationsquellen bei der Beurteilung eines 
Krediantrages oder einer Kreditverlängerung für einen Neukunden aus dem Bereich KMU? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Kontoverhalten       
Aktueller geprüfter Jahresabschluss        
Aktuelle interne Berichte/Abschlüsse       
Extern erstellter Kreditscore       
Intern erstellter Kreditscore       
Kunde ist Ihnen persönlich bekannt       
SCHUFA        
Business-Plan mit Umsatz- und 
Liquiditätsprognose 
      
 
 
Teil C Unternehmensphilosophie/interne Richtlinien der Bank 
 
Beurteilen Sie auf einer Skala von 1 - 5 die Aussagekraft und Bedeutung bestimmter 
Kernpunkte bei der Kreditvergabe aus Ihrer Sicht. 
 
1 = kaum aussagekräftig, unbedeutend; 5 = sehr aussagekräftig, sehr bedeutend 
 
Wie wichtig sind Ihnen die folgenden Informationsquellen bei der Beurteilung eines 
Krediantrages oder einer Kreditverlängerung für einen bestehenden Kunden oder 
Neukunden aus dem Bereich KMU? 
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 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Kreditrichtlinien der Bank       
Nutzen für die Gemeinschaft bzw. die 
heimische Wirtschaft 
      
Einfluß auf persönliche 
Vergütung/Bonuszahlungen 
      
Persönliche Einschätzung des 
beantragenden Unternehmens 
      
Frühere Entscheidungen Ihrer 
Vorgesetzten (in Fällen in den die 
Kreditsumme Ihren Entscheidungsrahmen 
überschreitet) 
      
Voraussichtliche Profitabilität des 
Kredits 
      
Verfügbarkeit von Kreditsicherheiten       
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Falls Sie in der Lage sind, Ihre gegenwärtige Vorgehensweise mit dem Zeitraum vor 2007 zu 
vergleichen, beantworten Sie bitte folgende Fragen. Falls nicht, gehen Sie bitte direkt zu Teil 
C. 
 
Wie wichtig waren Ihnen die folgenden Informationsquellen bei der Beurteilung eines 
Krediantrages oder einer Kreditverlängerung für einen bestehenden Kunden oder 
Neukunden aus dem Bereich KMU? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Kreditrichtlinien der Bank       
Nutzen für die Gemeinschaft bzw. die 
heimische Wirtschaft 
      
Einfluß auf persönliche 
Vergütung/Bonuszahlungen 
      
Persönliche Einschätzung des 
beantragenden Unternehmens 
      
Frühere Entscheidungen Ihrer 
Vorgesetzten (in Fällen in den die 
Kreditsumme Ihren Entscheidungsrahmen 
überschreitet) 
      
Voraussichtliche Profitabilität des 
Kredits 
      
Verfügbarkeit von Kreditsicherheiten       
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Teil D Persönliches 
 
Beurteilen Sie auf einer Skala von 1 - 5 die Aussagekraft/Bedeutung bestimmter Kernpunkte 
bei der Kreditvergabe aus Ihrer Sicht. 
 
1 = kaum aussagekräftig, unbedeutend; 5 = sehr aussagekräftig, sehr bedeutend 
 
Wie wichtig sind Ihnen die folgenden Informationsquellen bei der Beurteilung eines 
Kreditantrages oder einer Kreditverlängerung für einen bestehenden Kunden oder 
Neukunden aus dem Bereich KMU? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Weiterbildung durch die Bank       
Persönliche Ziele innerhalb der Bank 
(beispielsweiseBeförderung, Bonus) 
      
Persönliche Bekanntschaft mit 
Firmeninhabern oder Managern der 
beantragenden Unternehmen 
      
Ihre Berufserfahrung und Qualifikation       
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Vielen Dank, dass sie sich die Zeit genommen haben, diesen Fragebogen zu beantworten! 
 
Falls Sie eine Zusammenfassug der Ergebnisse zugesandt bekommen möchten, geben Sie 
bitte hier Ihre eMail Adresse an:  
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Appendix 4 Questionnaire   German Banks 
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Appendix 5 Questionnaire UK Banks 
Section A Categorisation issues 
Please answer the following questions by placing an X in the appropriate box  
 
Ite
m 
Question Check  
 
A 
Location of Bank 
a) Germany 
b) United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
B 
Type of bank  
a) Retail 
b) Co-operative 
c) Foreign owned 
d) Other 
e) Small 
f) Large   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
Years in role of Lending Officer 
a) Less than 2 years 
b) 2 -5 years 
c) 5-10 years 
d) 10-15 years 
e) 15 -20 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
Area of expertise and currently operating in  
a) SME 
b) Corporate Banking 
c) Industry Specialist 
d) Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E 
How would you describe your job: 
a) Sales 
b) Credit Assessment 
c) Administration 
d) Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
Do you hold relevant professional qualifications 
relating to your job? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
 
 
 
 
Section B Informational issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
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How important are the following sources of data when considering a loan application / 
renewal for an existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts     x  
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score     x  
Personal knowledge of client   x    
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash flow 
and accounts 
    x  
 
How important are the following sources of data when considering a loan application 
/ renewal for a new SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts     x  
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score     x  
Personal knowledge of client    x   
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash 
flow and accounts 
  x    
 
If you are able to compare current practice with the pre 2007 period please answer the 
following, if not continue to section C 
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How important were the following sources of data when considering a loan application / 
renewal for an existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts     x  
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score     x  
Personal knowledge of client    x   
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash 
flow and accounts 
  x    
 
How important were the following sources of data when considering a loan application for a 
new SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts     x  
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score     x  
Personal knowledge of client   x    
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash 
flow and accounts 
  x    
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Section C Institutional / Policy issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
 
How important are the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Credit quality policy of the bank     x  
Benefit for the community / local 
economy 
  x    
The impact on personal reward / 
bonus 
   x   
Personal judgement about the 
business 
   x   
Knowledge of previous decisions by 
line manager / credit officer (as 
applicable, where loan exceed 
personal lending limit) 
   x   
Potential profitability of the loan     x  
The availability of security for the 
advance 
    x  
 
If you are able to compare current practice with the pre 2007 period please answer the 
following, if not continue to section D 
 
How important were the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Credit quality policy of the bank     x  
Benefit for the community / local 
economy 
  x    
The impact on personal reward / 
bonus 
   x   
Personal judgement about the 
business 
  x    
Knowledge of previous decisions by 
line manager / credit officer (as 
applicable, where loan exceed 
   x   
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personal lending limit) 
Potential profitability of the loan    x   
The availability of security for the 
advance 
    x  
Section D Personal issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
 
How important are the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Training by the bank   x    
Personal objectives in the bank (such 
as promotion / reward) 
   x   
Personal knowledge of the directors / 
managers of the business 
  x    
Professional qualifications   x    
       
       
       
       
 
Section A Categorisation issues 
Please answer the following questions by placing an X in the appropriate box  
 
Item Question Check  
 
A 
Location of Bank 
a) Germany 
b) United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
B 
Type of bank  
a) Retail 
b) Co-operative 
c) Foreign owned 
d) Other 
e) Small 
f) Large   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
Years in role of Lending Officer 
a) Less than 2 years 
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b) 2 -5 years 
a) 5-10 years 
b) 10-15 years 
c) 15 -20 years 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
Area of expertise and currently operating in  
a) SME 
b) Corporate Banking 
c) Industry Specialist 
d) Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E 
How would you describe your job: 
a) Sales 
b) Credit Assessment 
c) Administration 
d) Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
Do you hold relevant professional qualifications 
relating to your job? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
 
 
 
 
Section B Informational issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
 
How important are the following sources of data when considering a loan application / 
renewal for an existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts     x  
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score    x   
Personal knowledge of client    x   
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash 
flow and accounts 
    x  
 
How important are the following sources of data when considering a loan application 
/ renewal for a new SME client? 
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 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts     x  
Externally provided credit score    x   
Internally generated credit score     x  
Personal knowledge of client  x     
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash flow 
and accounts 
   x   
 
If you are able to compare current practice with the pre 2007 period please answer the 
following, if not continue to section C 
 
How important were the following sources of data when considering a loan application / 
renewal for an existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts   x    
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score    x   
Personal knowledge of client   x    
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash flow 
and accounts 
  x    
 
 
 
 
 
How important were the following sources of data when considering a loan application for a 
new SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
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Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts    x   
Up to date Management Accounts    x   
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score     x  
Personal knowledge of client   x    
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash flow 
and accounts 
  x    
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Section C Institutional / Policy issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
 
How important are the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Credit quality policy of the bank    x   
Benefit for the community / local 
economy 
  x    
The impact on personal reward / 
bonus 
    x  
Personal judgement about the 
business 
 x     
Knowledge of previous decisions by 
line manager / credit officer (as 
applicable, where loan exceed 
personal lending limit) 
   x   
Potential profitability of the loan     x  
The availability of security for the 
advance 
    x  
 
If you are able to compare current practice with the pre 2007 period please answer the 
following, if not continue to section D 
 
How important were the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Credit quality policy of the bank     x  
Benefit for the community / local 
economy 
  x    
The impact on personal reward / 
bonus 
    x  
Personal judgement about the 
business 
  x    
Knowledge of previous decisions by 
line manager / credit officer (as 
applicable, where loan exceed 
    x  
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personal lending limit) 
Potential profitability of the loan    x   
The availability of security for the 
advance 
     x 
Section D Personal issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
 
How important are the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Training by the bank   x    
Personal objectives in the bank (such 
as promotion / reward) 
    x  
Personal knowledge of the directors / 
managers of the business 
  x    
Professional qualifications    x   
       
       
       
       
 
Thank you for taking the time to respond to this survey. 
 
Please send the completed survey to: 
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Section A Categorisation issues 
Please answer the following questions by placing an X in the appropriate box  
 
Item Question Check  
 
A 
Location of Bank 
a) Germany 
b) United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
B 
Type of bank  
a) Retail 
b) Co-operative 
a) Foreign owned 
b) Other 
c) Small 
d) Large   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
Years in role of Lending Officer 
a) Less than 2 years 
b) 2 -5 years 
c) 5-10 years 
d) 10-15 years 
e) 15 -20 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
Area of expertise and currently operating in  
a) SME 
b) Corporate Banking 
c) Industry Specialist 
d) Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E 
How would you describe your job: 
a) Sales 
b) Credit Assessment 
c) Administration 
d) Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
Do you hold relevant professional qualifications 
relating to your job? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
 
 
 
 
Section B Informational issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
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How important are the following sources of data when considering a loan application / 
renewal for an existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts     x  
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score    x   
Personal knowledge of client    x   
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash 
flow and accounts 
    x  
 
How important are the following sources of data when considering a loan application / 
renewal for a new SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts     x  
Externally provided credit score    x   
Internally generated credit score     x  
Personal knowledge of client  x     
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash 
flow and accounts 
   x   
 
If you are able to compare current practice with the pre 2007 period please answer the 
following, if not continue to section C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 225 
 
 
How important were the following sources of data when considering a loan application / 
renewal for an existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts   x    
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score    x   
Personal knowledge of client   x    
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash flow 
and accounts 
  x    
 
How important were the following sources of data when considering a loan application for a 
new SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts    x   
Up to date Management Accounts    x   
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score     x  
Personal knowledge of client   x    
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash flow 
and accounts 
  x    
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Section C Institutional / Policy issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
 
How important are the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Credit quality policy of the bank    x   
Benefit for the community / local 
economy 
  x    
The impact on personal reward / 
bonus 
    x  
Personal judgement about the 
business 
 x     
Knowledge of previous decisions by 
line manager / credit officer (as 
applicable, where loan exceed 
personal lending limit) 
   x   
Potential profitability of the loan     x  
The availability of security for the 
advance 
    x  
 
If you are able to compare current practice with the pre 2007 period please answer the 
following, if not continue to section D 
 
How important were the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Credit quality policy of the bank     x  
Benefit for the community / local 
economy 
  x    
The impact on personal reward / 
bonus 
    x  
Personal judgement about the 
business 
  x    
Knowledge of previous decisions by 
line manager / credit officer (as 
applicable, where loan exceed 
    x  
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personal lending limit) 
Potential profitability of the loan    x   
The availability of security for the 
advance 
     x 
Section D Personal issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
 
How important are the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Training by the bank   x    
Personal objectives in the bank (such 
as promotion / reward) 
    x  
Personal knowledge of the directors / 
managers of the business 
  x    
Professional qualifications    x   
       
       
       
       
 
Thank you for taking the time to respond to this survey. 
 
Please send the completed survey to: 
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Section A Categorisation issues 
Please answer the following questions by placing an X in the appropriate box  
 
Ite
m 
Question Check  
 
A 
Location of Bank 
a) Germany 
b) United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
B 
Type of bank  
a) Retail 
b) Co-operative 
a) Foreign owned 
b) Other 
c) Small 
d) Large   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
Years in role of Lending Officer 
a) Less than 2 years 
b) 2 -5 years 
c) 5-10 years 
d) 10-15 years 
e) 15 -20 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
Area of expertise and currently operating in  
a) SME 
b) Corporate Banking 
c) Industry Specialist 
d) Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E 
How would you describe your job: 
a) Sales 
b) Credit Assessment 
c) Administration 
d) Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
Do you hold relevant professional qualifications 
relating to your job? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
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Section B Informational issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
 
How important are the following sources of data when considering a loan application / 
renewal for an existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts    x   
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score    x   
Personal knowledge of client   x    
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash 
flow and accounts 
   x   
 
How important are the following sources of data when considering a loan application 
/ renewal for a new SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts     x  
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score     x  
Personal knowledge of client   x    
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash 
flow and accounts 
   x   
 
If you are able to compare current practice with the pre 2007 period please answer the 
following, if not continue to section C 
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How important were the following sources of data when considering a loan application / 
renewal for an existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts    x   
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score     x  
Personal knowledge of client   x    
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash 
flow and accounts 
  x    
 
How important were the following sources of data when considering a loan application for a 
new SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Bank account behaviour       
Up to date audited accounts     x  
Up to date Management Accounts    x   
Externally provided credit score     x  
Internally generated credit score     x  
Personal knowledge of client  x     
Directors’ database on Companies 
Register (is there a German 
equivalent?) 
  x    
Business Plan with forecast cash 
flow and accounts 
  x    
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Section C Institutional / Policy issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
 
How important are the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Credit quality policy of the bank     x  
Benefit for the community / local 
economy 
  x    
The impact on personal reward / 
bonus 
    x  
Personal judgement about the 
business 
  x    
Knowledge of previous decisions by 
line manager / credit officer (as 
applicable, where loan exceed 
personal lending limit) 
   x   
Potential profitability of the loan     x  
The availability of security for the 
advance 
    x  
 
If you are able to compare current practice with the pre 2007 period please answer the 
following, if not continue to section D 
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How important were the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Credit quality policy of the bank     x  
Benefit for the community / local 
economy 
  x    
The impact on personal reward / 
bonus 
    x  
Personal judgement about the 
business 
  x    
Knowledge of previous decisions by 
line manager / credit officer (as 
applicable, where loan exceed 
personal lending limit) 
    x  
Potential profitability of the loan     x  
The availability of security for the 
advance 
     x 
Section D Personal issues 
Indicate, by choosing a number in the scale 1 – 5, your view of the strength / importance of 
key issues on the processing of loan applications. 
1 = very weak / unimportant; 5 = very strong / important 
 
How important are the following influences on you as a decision maker when considering a 
loan application for a new or existing SME client? 
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Training by the bank   x    
Personal objectives in the bank (such 
as promotion / reward) 
   x   
Personal knowledge of the directors / 
managers of the business 
  x    
Professional qualifications    x   
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Appendix 3: Transcript Data Using N-Vivo 
 
 Normative   
  
  
 Normative\Risk Management   
 B 8    (Male, Unknown) 
  
 
 We have to be very careful about how we manage risk, and the techniques we 
use are adapted to our own systems. We almost certainly would take personal 
assets to minimise the default risk. 
  
 C3    (Male, Unknown)   
  Of course we credit score and use the outside agencies, but we do not rely 
heavily on just this way. Our risk management structures really do succeed and 
the default rates are used for future risk modelling. 
  
 D2    (Male, Unknown)   
 The bank uses outside agencies for risk assessment, but our own in-house 
system is also effective and is backed. 
  
 H10    (Male, Unknown)   
 We use all three agencies in cases when the bank is lending to firms that have 
limited assets, but we also introduce monitoring, which is factored in. Our 
interest charge is weighted and measured. 
  
 L7    (Male, Unknown)   
 Risk management is built as part of our internal systems for credit scoring. We 
do take assets of a personal nature, not to offset just against risk but to ensure 
that risk participation exists. 
  
 N9    (Male, Unknown)   
 Credit scoring and relationship if known. Get other data from sources outside.   
 V1    (Male, Unknown)   
 Yes we use the assets of the company to manage risk and if the risk is high we 
would have some coverage of other assets. 
  
 Normative\Risk Management\Risk Sharing   
 B 8    (Male, Unknown) 
  
 
 We are expected by the state to promote loan guarantee schemes, but one issue 
is that is measured and monitored by the DTI we have to push the company that 
takes the loan to get in monthly accounts- and it’s not cost effective. 
  
 
 C3    
  (Male, Unknown) 
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 About 15 per cent of our units are supported by the state. We heavily promote 
state funded credit and submit data to the federal state with business activity. 
The problem for small companies is that they are not cost effective to run a 
guarantee scheme. 
  
 
 D2    (Male, Unknown)  
 This is quite common for large companies to work and arrange for the state 
funding and the business knows the process. The Chambers and craft industries 
are supporting the loan scheme. 
 
 H10    (Male, Unknown) 
 
 The take-up is about 1 or 2 per cent of the portfolio and probably as the 
result of an awareness of bureaucracy and time consuming paperwork. Also in a 
lot of cases the business wants the loan in place quickly. 
 
 L7    (Male, Unknown) 
 
 We have promoted it on the website, but the staff tends not to promote 
heavily. We would also charge a fee for the administration of loan schemes. 
 
 N9    (Male, Unknown)  
 Actually the loan scheme does not necessarily cancel out the risk of default, 
but externalises it to the state. We are also keen to support new ventures using 
the scheme. 
 
 V6    (Male, Unknown)  
 The use of federal loans takes about 15 per cent of the medium business. 
We also can have access to federal funds for liquidity shielding. We can apply for 
state assistance for loans which are above capacity. 
 
 Normative\Risk Management\Risk Sharing\Information Asymmetry  
 B 8    (Male, Unknown)  
 New loans would require last two years of accounts or if the firm is unknown 
previous personal job, loans of a personal nature and the forecast information. 
CV required and information to assets. 
 
 C5    (Male, Unknown)  
 We observe the qualities of the managers and also the future data they 
have. Historical information is good and we can see if they do not default 
previously. We like to see management accounts and look at how they control 
the money in the company. We know most of clients and new clients need to 
provide the same information as our other clients. 
 
 D2    (Male, Unknown) 
 
 Standardisation.  
 D4 1    (Female, Unknown)  
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 We take information both historical and future and place weightings on the 
known and unknown. Loans that exceed a certain amount above 200,000 Euros, 
the business is required by state law to give all information. 
 
 H10    (Male, Unknown)  
 Historical information is necessary before we begin the process. New 
applications are referred to our business unit and at this stage basic information 
is drawn past history and accounts and performance of previous loans both 
personal and business. 
 
 L7    (Male, Unknown)  
 We use our own in-house application, but if the business is known we would 
utilise the accounts to measure the financial performance previous to the loan 
application. Unknown applicants are credit scored and we would require to look 
at Cs and other sources of information such as previous bank accounts and 
management of accounts. 
 
 V6    (Male, Unknown)  
 In most case the applicant are known to us even from the idea of starting 
the business. Even if we know the person or the business for each application we 
set up a new file and monitor the progress. Our manager will visit the business 
on a more frequent scale than before and produce a report, which is entered into 
the file. 
 
 Normative\Risk Management\Risk Sharing\Information Asymmetry\Decision 
making 
 
 B 8    (Male, Unknown)  
 Credit scores and management decisions using our own in-house system. It 
depends on the information that’s fed back, but we do not wholly rely on just our 
standard systems. 
 
 C3    (Male, Unknown)  
 We credit score and feed this information about the type of loan and each 
piece of information is carefully examined by the manager making the decision to 
give the credit. I am sure we will bring the systems to a standard where anyone 
involved in the matter of lending can use. 
 
 D2    (Male, Unknown)  
 Our systems are computerised and further investments are being made to 
reduce the cost for loan assessments. The systems are used to help us make a 
decision at lower level but we continue to hold the card of lending in the hands of 
managers. 
 
 H10    (Male, Unknown)  
 We developed our own standards.  
 L7    (Male, Unknown)  
 We have a standardised system for assessment. Credit scoring and the 
managers at levels can quickly decide on loan we do this to reduce waiting times 
and efficiencies. Central policy has the various levels for each grade. 
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 N9    (Male, Unknown)  
 We use credit scoring techniques to assess loan applications. These are 
based on class and the probability analysis. Training both external and internal is 
given on standardisation of the in-house developed systems. 
 
 V6    (Male, Unknown)  
 We have invested a great sum of money to reach a good process of 
decision-making; and the training process is clear and graduate trainees spent 
time on the principles. 
 
 Normative\Risk Management\Risk Sharing\Information Asymmetry\Decision 
making\Team approaches 
 
 B 8    (Male, Unknown)  
 Teamwork is the culture at our bank and we continue to foster the team for 
any operation on lending. Teams are appointed to provide system data and 
decision is team based. The systems are standardised in a way to gain the 
maximum and effective decision output. 
 
 C5    (Male, Unknown)  
 The final decision is made by the relationship manager but we encourage 
this teamwork for our credit officers. The evaluation of the customer is always 
made by the teamwork procedure. 
 
 D4 1    (Female, Unknown)  
 We do make decisions on team approaches. The team approach has policy 
and procedures which are followed and this can help the manager to make a 
decision. Everything depends on the size of the loan and the decision is 
connected. 
 
 H10    (Male, Unknown)  
 Grades, training and team operations are fully integrated with the 
standardisation systems which we develop and train. Business or corporate 
teams produce information and the team leader is able to exercise a decision 
based on the information. 
 
 L7    (Male, Unknown)  
 We have specialised staff in effective decision-making. Our levels of 
management are at different training areas and each grade is able to exercise 
discretionary decisions relevant to lending. We removed the hierarchy a long 
time ago. 
 
 N9    (Male, Unknown)  
 Team approaches to a problem or decision are actively encouraged. Our 
policy is to provide a decision quickly not just for loans but also any operation. 
 
 V6    (Male, Unknown)  
 We drive our systems through team approaches and fully exercise decision 
being made for monitoring and lending procedures. We continue to become 
effective on a daily basis. 
 
 Normative\Risk Management\Risk Sharing\Information Asymmetry\Decision 
making\Team approaches\Regulatory effect 
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 B 8    (Male, Unknown)  
 Our attitude toward this scheme is that it’s not managed well and is poor in 
its operation. Business has to be less than £5 million and have good credit rating. 
Also the fact is that many small firms see the barriers of cost and administration 
too high. 
 
 C3    (Male, Unknown)  
 Our marketing and promotions are in the interest of the communities and 
we can provide the systems of relations and solutions to business issues. We 
have arrived first in the best provider of solutions for our business. 
 
 D2    (Male, Unknown)  
 Many businesses have the support of the bank and our goal is to provide an 
effective overall business support. We market the bank like a consulting solution 
for the business problem, loans insurance and other products are all included in 
our portfolio. The community spirit is still local and apart from the bigger 
companies remain with us from the beginning. 
 
 H10    (Male, Unknown)  
 We do support the loan guarantee scheme and is widely publicised on your 
website, which is directly linked to the business government link. Our view is that 
new ideas that can be supported can only be good for the economic conditions; 
as you probably know the bulk of economic activity is small firms. Our other 
initiatives are to provide free banking. 
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 L7    (Male, Unknown)  
 The policies and state support is largely taxation and our involvement is 
limited. The SFLGS is very much a government initiative, but the take-up is 
small. We do promote, but this only really applies to established ventures with 
limited asset bases. 
 
 V6    (Male, Unknown)  
 We provide many services to the community and to businesses. Our values 
are pushed to economic stimulation and the state guidance has ensured the 
stability of economic growth. 
 
 Normative\Risk Management\Risk Sharing\Information Asymmetry\Decision 
making\Team approaches\Regulatory effect\Interest rates 
 
 B 8    (Male, Unknown)  
 We do adjust the interest levels according to the risk if the loan is well 
collateralised then adjustment are made, one reason is our lending structure 
does tend to be variable and supports short-term working capital needs in the 
forms of overdraft operating facilities as well as investment. Our policies of long 
term lending have been overtaken by short-term type loans est. 
 
 C3    (Male, Unknown)  
 We would not succeed to increase the interest level above the normal 
calculation. Our other banks operate fiercely and this chance would be gone if 
our strategy is to push for high premiums. 
 
 D2    (Male, Unknown)  
 We will make adjustments but the commercial market is very intense and it 
would be better for us to secure the risk against some assets. This is an 
additional cost and we try to mechanise it. Our policy  is to catch the risk with the 
interest. 
 
 D4 1    (Female, Unknown)  
 Our terms are variable and fixed depending on the type of loan product and 
the business. Business requires that we help them with investment and capital 
solutions. Some companies require liquidity support and we can provide loans in 
the variable way. Some require for investment and we provide the long-term loan 
fixed or variable. 
 
 H10    (Male, Unknown)  
 We offer long-term loans for investment and senior debt, but generally we 
shield the bank against market fluctuation through the mechanism of variable 
rate. The economy is variable therefore the rates should fluctuate. 
 
 L7    (Male, Unknown)  
 We would adjust the interest rate in order to safeguard against the risk, but 
also take collateral and monitor if the conditions allowed. 
 
 N9    (Male, Unknown)  
 Collateral and interest are interlinked and we would adjust up or down 
dependent on the strength and measurability of the assets. 
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 V6    (Male, Unknown)  
 About half of our business loan are fixed-term interest and in most case the 
terms are collateralised. Interest levels are adjusted according to the risk analysis 
of the loan application. 
 
 Normative\Risk Management\Risk Sharing\Information Asymmetry\Decision 
making\Team approaches\Regulatory effect\Interest rates\Screening 
 
 B 8    (Male, Unknown)  
 Financial accounts, plus management accounts if they have them. That the 
initial source of information audited accounts are more widely used than softer 
type information. 
 
 C5    (Male, Unknown)  
 We can obtain quite a lot of information when the application is being made. 
The accounts of the company will pass through and we can see some 
information at the local industry. We can also use the government information on 
the company as well. 
 
 D2    (Male, Unknown)  
 Always can get information. There is a record for the business registration 
and the files on the commerce data base. We can use also the financial 
information to find the details of the company business. 
 
 D4 1    (Female, Unknown)  
 Our sources of information have been built over a great period and we are 
always in a good strength to collect information from new businesses. We have a 
network and can find out if the business is doing well with growth and the 
management too can be collected. 
 
 H10    (Male, Unknown)  
 Statutory accounts , management accounts, we would investigate should 
the need arise the internal banking data base, but then the cost begins to 
increase and overall efficiency begins to spiral. 
 
 L7    (Male, Unknown)  
 We favour the statutory accounts along with other information like the 
management accounts, to look at the way the business is controlled financially, 
our business manager may have already had dealing and the reports generated 
would be reviewed. 
 
 N9    (Male, Unknown)  
 Our data sources are fairly comprehensive, we make heavy use of internal bank 
data bases. It would probably depend on the nature of the business too, but our 
main source would be the provision of company accounts. 
 
 V6    (Male, Unknown)  
 The sources of information we obtain is very varied; newspapers are widely 
used as well as the information from the chamber of commerce. We can use the 
word of our other customers to identify certain aspects of information. The 
sources are wide ranging in point. 
 
 Rewards and motivation  
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 B 8    (Male, Unknown)  
 We do have a performance pay, and each grade is appraised on their 
agreed targets and measured against the actual results. I do see this as a 
motivational driver for work output, but in no way does this affect the process 
regarding day to day decisions. 
 
 C3    (Male, Unknown)  
 Yes there is a system for rewarding the employees and the overall 
performance can achieve a quarter of yearly salary. This applies to the 
relationship managers, but other rewards methods are there for non-managerial 
employees. I don’t think this can make secure the decisions, but it can make 
everyone look for the same achievements. 
 
 D2    (Male, Unknown)  
 Bank staff can earn additional money as a good performer and this amount 
can vary from 7 per cent to 30 per cent, the overall performance of the banks is 
also shared if we can achieve the scales marked. 
 
 D4 1    (Female, Unknown)  
 Our performance systems are under review and each objective is being 
aligned to the target reached by the principles and officers. We can expect to see 
some changes in the next months. 
 
 H10    (Male, Unknown)  
 Yes we do have a performance related pay system in place. Each 
employee is appraised by their line manager and at the start of the year, the 
personal targets objective and goals are aimed for and appraised on a 
continuous basis. Earnings are directly related to the individual performance as 
well as the overall performance of the bank. Account managers are appraised 
quite differently to customer liaison. 
 
 L7    (Male, Unknown)  
 We have been operating a rewards system, which has different rewards 
systems for different grades. Our account managers have differences to the 
customer assistants. 
 
 N9    (Male, Unknown)  
 Performance pay systems are designed to bring together the individual 
characteristics as well as the team performance which is reflected in year-end 
bonuses. 
 
 V1    (Male, Unknown)  
 At the moment we have no such system, but there are some benefits we 
can have based on the seniority and the time of the employees at the bank the 
personal mortgage is subsidised and we can also have some help to the travel 
cost. Other advantages are made for the staff. 
 
 V6    (Male, Unknown)  
 We take the accounting information from company account and also 
conduct a credit analysis. The account should be audited and the management 
should be registered. 
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 Rationality  
 B 8    (Male, Unknown) 
 
 Business procedures are such that we would automatically require 
accounts, business plans and other information, in fact as much information they 
can to support their loan application. We have no policy to discriminate existing 
or new customers. 
 
 C3    (Male, Unknown)  
 I heard this question before do you mean we require existing clients to bring 
the information with the interview or we already choose? We would request the 
documentary evidence of performance and the accounts it is the same for 
everyone because the system is standard. 
 
 D2    (Male, Unknown)  
 Each application is treated with an equal weighting we just go through the 
process to catch information and hear the project or the investment requirement. 
 
 H10    (Male, Unknown)  
 Our small business sector is set up specifically to assist new business. We 
provide quick kits which can minimise the interview times to cut the admin costs 
and improve, the decision speed and efficiencies. We would not make a 
preference ordinarily, but our existing customers do cut the overall cost of a lend. 
 
 L7    (Male, Unknown)  
 We evaluate each opportunity as it’s presented and welcome any new 
customers. The strength of information is judged and staff can determine if the 
cost of credit scoring and the administration charges of setting loans for new 
customers is not vastly different. 
 
 N9    (Male, Unknown)  
 We compete for new and valued business, but the existing customers do 
keep efficiencies particularly our screening costs. 
 
 V6    (Male, Unknown)  
 You already asked me this question before, but we make a preference of 
course if the client is known to us - it’s like a valued customer in a shop if we give 
them a service they can come back and when they are successful we can enjoy 
the fruits. 
 
 Bank strategy and customer relations  
 B 8    (Male, Unknown)  
 We consider ourselves to be global players and have obviously been active 
in our takeovers. This isn't new to us, we've been acquiring companies for a long 
time. Our strategy is mainly three approaches, we focus heavily on the retailing 
and customer side these include our private clients and customers in Europe and 
our international growth strategy. We have several joint venture one springs to 
mind is the Swedish venture FSB the. Of course, we attempt to build strong 
relations with each of our clients otherwise we won’t succeed. 
 
 C3    (Male, Unknown)  
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 All of our strategies come from the central corporate office and the directors 
send the visions. One reason was the fact we had have a strategy to begin the 
efficient and some offices are closed about the 1990s. We lose many customers 
because of that principle. and now we return to our principles of long 
relationships in each community with our customer. 
 
 D2    (Male, Unknown)  
 D4 1    (Female, Unknown)  
 We concentrated on the financial services and designed a customer service 
model. We have to compete with the largest banking group Deutsche Bank and 
focus on the corporate business. We can do this by the quick decision and try to 
make it cost effective. 
 H10    
       We are under an immense pressure to sell products to custom and at times 
the 
        targets are not realistic. Each team member is given a personal target for 
sales.   
 
 H10    (Male, Unknown)  
 Focus on community and understanding in a way it is like relation 
management but really it done quite remotely. We do have systems and 
department that spend the time to use the extensive networking that the banks 
got. 
 
 L7    (Male, Unknown)  
 We concentrated mainly on the UK and European markets and now try to 
use the product life cycle to keep the loyalty of our customers by selling them all 
their financial products. We also support a business framework with the 2,000 or 
so branches we have. 
 
 N9    (Male, Unknown)  
 You probably know we got into trouble and were taken by RBS. Since then 
we get a lengthy document outlining the vision for next year. I can’t remember 
what it entails always discusses HRM and volatility management. 
 
 V6    (Male, Unknown)  
 We concentrate on medium-sized companies and we have a strong 
knowledge of the local market. Our ideas have always been to focus on the 
partner ideas and in the future, we can get the reward and the economics boots 
in the region. 
 
Legend  
Tags      
 Great quote  
 Positives  
 Negatives  
 Contradictions  
 Important  
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Appendix : Background Research on Bank Strategies 
 
Case Analysis  
   This section discusses the results of the analysis and findings. First, each case is discussed 
at an individual level, and then each case is cross-compared for a comparative type analysis 
(see Chapter 3 methodology). This Appendix also gives brief outlines of the bank’s exposure, 
strategy, and historical origins. Additionally, there is a short overview of the bank’s financial 
position and performance.   
 
Case 1: Deutsche Bank AG 
   Since 2002, Deutsche Bank AG has begun a series of phases: phase 1 and 2 were 
aggressive growth and efficiency strategies. Their final phase is global and was launched in 
2006. Their aim is to reduce their cost to income ratio, this is reflected by their pre-tax earnings 
of 31 per cent and increases in share earnings to 66 per cent. A dividend of 4 euros was paid 
out on each share. Deutsche Bank AG is one of the private banks in Germany and its primary 
aims are to satisfy shareholders and be a global player in the international markets. Deutsche 
Bank recently pushed an expansion programme into the US with acquisitions of IT mortgage 
securities; it has also made pushes into the Middle East and notably China. Their organic 
growth reflects an increase from just over 1,500 to 1,700 branches in the last year, but notably 
their drive to streamline the organisation and push for efficiencies is also reflected in the 
overall increase in share prices, which rose from €81.90 to €101.34 and increases in dividends 
from €2.50 to € 4.00. 
Products 
   Deutsche Bank manages its small business section from PCAM, or Private Clients and 
Asset Management. The product portfolio comprises of private and institutional clients, but at 
the same time incorporates small to medium businesses. Their private asset management 
business is extensive and covers four lines, which extend into the real estate and asset 
management businesses.  
Risk management 
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   The bank takes into account the amount of loan exposure and the credit risk through its 
LEMG (Loan Exposure Management Group), which is split into two divisions: the credit risk 
of loans and lending commitments. However, it should be noted that the guidance framework 
for loan policy is centralised, but LEMG provides the respective capital rate. All banks face 
four categories of risk, which could, if incorrectly managed, cause institutional failure and this 
would have an effect on the economy to some degree or another.    
    Deutsche Bank manages all aspects of risk through their board of risk management, which 
exclusively monitors risk and capital management. The process of risk is principally managed 
by their chief risk officer who is responsible to the board. The risk is broken into the following 
categories: market risk, country risk, credit risk, liquidity risk and operational risk.       
 
   Credit risk is discussed extensively in the finding since credit risk is the phenomenon under 
investigation. The bank uses its own in-house method of evaluating risk; their loan officers 
adopt the scorecard method and similarly make use of statistical analysis based on a probability 
of default. All risk is evaluated on an individual basis. The bank manages its credit exposure 
through an intensive relationship lending process, which they refer to as an advanced system of 
detecting the obliger’s ability to pay future earnings on the loan allocated. The advance 
warning system comprises of pre-relationship lending and post-lending monitoring of the 
business through regional visits, which makes up the portfolio file. This is evidenced from the 
transcripts taken during the interview process. 
 
Case 2: Barclays Bank plc 
   Barclays Banks dates back to 1970 and in 1985 the group became Barclays plc. The bank’s 
purpose is to serve the needs of their shareholders and continue to drive efficiencies in their 
aim to be one of the global bankers. Barclays Bank has a supervisory board of 11 directors. 
The organisation is centralised with head offices in Canary Wharf, London. Barclays is 
aggressively acquisitive and their recent mergers and acquisitions programme reflects a high 
drive to become an international banker serving the global market. Similar to the aim of 
Deutsche Bank, Barclays is driving towards the Chinese markets recognising opportunities in 
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this high-growth market. The bank has issued shares to the China Development Bank and 
Temasek, which bears out their investment strategy. 
Products 
   Barclays’ main business and biggest revenue earner is retail banking, which has shown 
unprecedented profitability in this area. Barclay’s capital provides mortgages, equities and 
commodities which similarly delivered strong growth and profitability. Credit cards and wealth 
management contributed to Barclays’ profits base. In June 2001, Barclays’ market 
capitalisation was £36 billion with an earnings ratio of 14.3 (Competition report 2000). The 
bank reported profits of £1,385 million and earnings per share rose from £0.36 to £0.71 in 
2007. 
Risk management   
   Barclays manage their loan exposure centrally and factor the common exposure to risk, 
namely, credit, market internal operational risk, liquidity and country risk. Like the other 
banks, Barclays follows the regulatory accord as set by Basel and the bank provides a 
framework for capital adequacy and exposure to risk.      
Barclays outsource their credit risk management to three main agencies in the UK, but adapt 
the scorecard software and technology to provide a series of benchmarks driven by centralised 
policies; these techniques are extensively discussed in the cross-case findings.     
   Barclays pointed out to the Competition Commission that they had reorganised their SMEs 
into two broad categories: large or corporate business and small firms was named business 
banking such that relationship lending would be effectively improved and differentiate itself 
from other retail banks in the UK. Following the reorganisation of the business units, Barclays 
were said to deliver relationship banking through either branch or Internet telephone banking 
services. The management of loan exposure is suggested to be through effective pre-screening 
and post-monitoring, which minimise the bank’s exposure. 
 
Case 3: Volksbank Rhein Wupper eG 
   Volksbank Rhein Wupper eG dates back to 1922 as a main umbrella for several cooperative 
lending institutions (Volksbank Report 2007). Profits for the period ending 2001 were 
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approximately £30 million, which is substantially lower than that of either of the four largest 
retail banks in Germany or Britain. Volksbank’s strategy is primarily one of customer focus 
and relationship lending.  
Products  
  Volksbank has a huge presence in the real estate lending markets providing mortgages and 
loans to consumers. They also have a high presence in the market of lending to small firms. 
Risk management  
   Volksbank Rhein Wupper eG follows the regulatory framework of the Basel accord, which 
is internally regulated by their risk supervisory board which oversees credit, liquidity, country 
and operational risk. A daily report is issued to the supervisory board Ma-Risk, which is 
reviewed. Volkbank make use of their own internal system of scoring, relationship behavioural 
scoring and post-monitoring represents in part the process of managing credit risk. 
Relationship lending plays a large role in the overall strategy of winning customers and 
competing. The bank indicates in their annual report that they continue to develop their own 
internal systems, which follow the Basel accord. Similarly, they use an agency credit centre 
Kreditwerk who provide initial data on applications, that process and, in conjunction with their 
relationship strategy, is suggested to be the bank’s control mechanism for credit exposure. 
 
Case 4: Lloyds TSB plc  
   Lloyds Bank and its origins can be traced back to the 1700s – started by John Taylor and 
Samson Lloyd; the bank was originally a private bank and was formed in Birmingham. At the 
outset, Lloyds was acquisitive and acquired a foothold in Paris, France. In addition, the bank 
made inroads into South America and by the 1930s Lloyds had 30 branches in the USA, New 
Zealand and Argentina. Profitability for the bank in 2006 was in excess of £4 billion before 
taxation and there was a 28 per cent return to shareholders.    
Products 
   Lloyds TSB is a retail bank offering services that range from standard deposit and current 
accounts. As a bank their product range is considered diverse with insurance offerings, 
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management of investment portfolios and corporate lending. Another fruitful market is the 
provision of finance for leasing to the corporate markets.   
Risk management  
   Lloyds TSB, like other banks, adopts the principles of the Basel accord and adapts their 
own systems, which measure the bank’s exposure to risk. As with other banks in the UK, 
Lloyds TSB are said to outsource the area of credit risk to the three main credit agencies in the 
UK. The systems adopted are discussed extensively in the case findings.  
 
 
Case 5: Dresdner Bank AG 
   Dresdner Bank is considered one of the leading retail banks in Germany and competes 
effectively with their rivals, i.e. Deutsche, Commerz and others. Since its inception in 1872, 
Dresdner Bank has lived through changing times, developing from a regional bank in Saxony 
to one of the leading banks in Germany. It has not only witnessed, but also actively 
experienced the German empire, the Weimar Republic, the National Socialist era, post-war 
reconstruction in Germany and finally the reunification of both German states 
(Bankhistoryzahlen fakten/02_historie/index.html 2006). Earnings per share had decreased 
from €2.96 in 2005 to €1.51 2006 largely because of reorganisation and a thrust into the global 
markets. They have some 950 branches worldwide following the merger with Allianz SE 
Munich in 2002; Dresdner has been a wholly-owned subsidiary and enjoyed growth of 2.7 per 
cent in 2006. 
Products 
   Dresdner is a private bank and provides a variety of products ranging from ordinary current 
and deposit accounts. They also manage asset portfolios and are in the business of lending to 
large and medium-sized enterprises. Included in their portfolio of products are equities and 
foreign exchange. 
Risk management  
   The chief officer is responsible for managing the risk at the bank. All aspects of credit 
market, operational and liquidity risk are managed from centralised offices in Munich. 
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Responsibilities concerning the credit risk of lending similarly are policed at central offices. 
The chief officer is responsible and accountable to their supervisory board. In keeping with the 
Basel accord, Dresdner adapted its own mechanism of evaluating risk using a number of 
technologies and techniques. Further, they removed what they considered were risky borrowers 
from their internal classification on rating.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 6: HSBC plc    
   The bank is listed on the stock exchanges of Paris, London, Hong Kong and New York. Its 
history dates back to the 1800s, starting in Shanghai, but it also at that time had offices in 
London. Following the purchase of the Midland Bank in 1987, HSBC has become one of the 
largest retail and commercial banks in the UK: it has a vast global network and operations. The 
bank is capitalised with £79 billion with a total capital ratio of 13.3 per cent (Competition 
Commission 2000). The bank’s operating income rose from £3 billion to £5.4 billion.  
Products  
   The bank offers deposit and current accounts to individual consumers and businesses. Like 
other banks in the UK, HSBC competes for business in the asset management market and 
lending to large SMEs. They provide loans to smaller type enterprises and suggested with 
support and advice in business development. 
Risk management 
Apart from the usual adoptation of the Basel accord, HSBC have also adopted the use of 
credit assessment through outsourcing and a combination of in-house predictive assessment. In 
addition, they manage credit risk through the adoption of a central policy, which is discussed in 
the cross-case findings. 
 
Case 7: Commerz Bank AG      
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   In 1870, a number of merchants, merchant bankers and private bankers founded the 
Commerz- und Disconto-Bank in Hamburg. Around 1900, its business became focused 
increasingly on Berlin. It became one of the country's leading big banks with an extensive 
branch network. Milestones along the way include the merger in 1920 with the Mitteldeutsche 
Privat-Bank, a regional bank based in Magdeburg, and in 1929 with the Mitteldeutsche 
Creditbank based in Frankfurt am Main. In the wake of a crisis in the banking sector, the 
government ordered a merger in early 1932 of Commerzbank with the Barmer Bank-Verein 
Hinsberg, Fischer & Co. in Düsseldorf. In 1940, the name Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft, 
by which the bank was generally known, was officially adopted. 
   With the division of Europe after the war, Commerzbank lost some 45 per cent of its 
premises. The process of decentralisation of the big banks in West Germany resulted in a 
breakdown into three regional banks, which were united in 1958 as Commerzbank 
Aktiengesellschaft, which had its headquarters in Düsseldorf. Commerzbank stepped up its 
retail banking activities and built up a nationwide network. At around the same time, it started 
expanding around the globe. From 1970 onwards, the bank's administrative activities were 
shifted to Frankfurt am Main, which has been its legal domicile since 1990. (History extracted 
and adapted from Site 2006). 
Products 
   Commerzbank, as a retail bank, provides a variety of products and services globally. Key to 
their income are deposit and current accounts. In addition, similarly to the retail banks in both 
the UK and Germany, they compete to sell insurance, manage assets and lend to small, 
medium and large corporations both domestically and at an international level. 
Risk management 
The bank’s literature is comprehensive and extensive detail is provided. Commerzbank have 
adopted the Basel accord in the monitoring and measuring of the variants of risk. They suggest 
that an adaptation of Basel integrated internally ensures that banking codes and policy are 
adhered to. They similarly make use of the Kreditwerk agencies and combine these reports 
with their own scorecard controlling and assessment techniques. 
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